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Empirical Essays on Dynamic Decision Making 
Abstract 
This thesis is a collection of empirical and experimental studies on dynamic decision 
making.  
Chapter 1 studies the non-linear incentive of academics in economics departments of 
the U.K. high education institutions based on the data throughout the last four 
RAEs/REFs (i.e., RAE1996, RAE2001, RAE2008, REF2014). The time-discontinuity 
features of the RAEs/REFs and the constraints on job moving result in academics facing 
non-linear incentives. The data shows that in a harsh working environment with a 
periodical decline of the UK economics study, academic economists respond to such 
incentives by postponing the publication of their high-quality outputs to the beginning 
of the next assessment period, as expected. 
Chapter 2 presents an experiment designed to study how people play a two-person two-
stage dynamic game with incomplete information and uncertainty and to study the 
effect of different elicitation methods on equilibrium and level-k play. The experimental 
data shows that around half of the subjects are strategic thinkers and level-k thinking 
dominates in strategic thinking. Furthermore, the comparison between the direct-
response and the strategy method reveals that the latter method has a negative effect 
on players’ strategic thinking.  
Chapter 3 is an experimental study of the intertemporal consumption and saving 
behaviour of agents who have a finite lifecycle in an endowment economy in the 
presence of two different time profiles of taxes. A series of farsighted models (i.e., 
rational expectation and adaptive learning) and myopic models are introduced to 
explain players’ saving behaviour in the presence of a tax decrease in the middle of their 
lifecycle. In this setting, the data analysis shows that most of the subjects’ behaviours 
are consistent with the suggestions of myopic models.  
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Chapter 1. Non-linear Incentives: An Empirical Study of the 
Academic Performance of UK Economics Academics in 
RAE/REF in 22 Years (1992-2014)1 
1.1 Introduction    
Some of the studies on non-linear incentive have pointed out that agents take advantage 
of the non-linear feature to benefit themselves by manipulating outcomes. The empirical 
study (Oyer, 1998) finds that the salespeople and executives control the pricing or hide 
essential information to “pull in” or “pull out” the next fiscal year’s customers due to the 
periods of the fiscal years. The same result is emphasised by Larkin (2014) using the data of 
the Vendor’s salespeople, which shows that the salespeople manipulate the timing of deal 
closure by lowing prices in the non-linear incentive scheme. Similarly, Oettinger (2002) 
empirically and theoretically demonstrate that nonlinear grading standard incentive 
diminishes students’ study efficiency. A corruption study (DUGGAN and LEVITT, 2002) 
presents that the corruption of Japan sumo wrestling is caused by a sharp non-linear 
increasing of the paying function in the 8th win, which motivates wrestlers to rig their 
matches when they reach seven times wins.  
In general, the unwantedly distorted incentive caused by the non-linear feature usually 
brings adverse effects2 against the original aims of the incentive. Our study in this chapter 
investigates the nonlinear incentive caused by the combination of the institutional features 
of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) /the Research Excellence Framework (REF), 
which is a periodic assessment exercise carried out by the four UK funding bodies3, and the 
                                                          
1 This chapter is joint work with Prof. Miguel Costa-Gomes.  
2 Lacetera and Macis (2010) show some kinds of rewards works better in prosocial behaviors under the 
nonlinear incentive background. 
3 The funding bodies are the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), the Scottish Funding 
Council (SFC), the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW) and the Department for Employment 
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restricted rules, which are introduced by institutions to restrict free job moving of their 
staffs. Meanwhile, the stressful working background in the UK economics stimulates 
academics to seek strategies to benefit themselves. Then, a nonlinear incentive model is 
exhibited in our study to predict the strategy of academics submitted to the economics and 
econometric panel of the RAEs/REF. Similar to the salespeople, academics are noticed that 
they also “game” to the nonlinear incentive by “pull out” their better publications to the 
following RAEs/REF. 
The RAE/REF assesses the research quality of the higher education institutions (HEIs) 
in the UK every 5-7 year, and the assessment is only related to the performance within a 
census period. The RAEs and REF have already been conducted seven exercises from 1986 
to 2014. Based on the assessments provided by the RAEs/REF, the four funding bodies 
allocate their funds for the HEIs in the UK, and meanwhile, the assessments are published 
online (since 2001). The published information is also consulted by other funding 
organisations or individual investment. There were around five billion pounds allocated 
according to the assessment of RAE 2001.4  As more funds support the HEIs to maintain and 
improve their research capabilities, which determine their ratings and performance in the 
RAEs/REF, these institutional features motivate HEIs in the UK to chase higher ratings and 
better-quality performance. 
The main evaluating target of the RAEs/REF is the research quality of HEIs, which mainly 
consists of the outputs of the staffs submitted by HEIs5. In REF 2014, the weight of outputs 
in the evaluation has occupied a weighting of 65%6. In short, high-quality outputs bring HEIs 
high ratings. Lee, el (2013) pointed out that hiring decisions made by the economics schools 
                                                          
and Learning, Northern Ireland (DEL).  
4 http://www.rae.ac.uk/2001/submissions/Introduction.htm 
   http://www.ref.ac.uk/about/ 
   http://www.rae.ac.uk/aboutus/ 
5 The RAE/REF categories outputs into several levels (see Appendix 1.A) and introduces the FTE (Full-time 
equivalent) score in each UoA (subject-based Units of Exercise) to rate the HEIs 
6  http://www.ref.ac.uk/pubs/2012-01/, “Part 1: Generic statement of assessment criteria and working 
methods”, (37.a.) 
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in HEIs were affected by the top economic journals. That is, the economics schools have a 
strong motivation to hire staff who have high-quality outputs published on the top 
economic journals and avoid their job hopping by signing contracts with constraint. Then 
the restricted rule prompts economic academics to strategically allocate their efforts and 
manipulate the publishing time of their outputs.  
The following Section 1.2 describes the data collecting and data processing. In Section 
1.3, we present a detailed description of the background of UK economics in the RAEs/REF 
from 1996 to 2014. In Section 1.3, we build a non-linear incentive model to prediction the 
academic’s strategy and verify the prediction. The conclusion in Section 1.4 includes some 
limits of the study and proposes the following studies in the next stage.  
 1.2 Data Description 
The data of 4 RAE/REF exercises are collected in the UoA economics and econometrics 
panel from 1996 to 2014 7 . The data of RAE1996 are provided by the HEFCE (Higher 
Education Funding Council for England) and the data of RAE2001, RAE2008 and REF2014, 
are collected from the RAEs/REF website.  
The information collected from RAE2001 and REA2008 includes names of academics, 
titles of outputs submitted, published locations of outputs (journal titles, book names or 
publishers), dates of publication or output finishing, types of outputs (books, journal articles, 
working papers and so on), and names of co-authors (only record their internal but not 
external co-authors) in ‘’RA1 and RA2’’ of UoA 38 of RAE2001 and ‘’RA1 and RA2 and RA5c’’ 
of UoA 34 of RAE2008. The information from RAE1996 and REF2014 on the submitted 
outputs and the submitted staffs who had submissions in RAE1996/REF2014 are stored 
separately, so each output is matched to a specific academic in the same university (see 
Appendix 1.B.1). Then we build up the database for each exercise which identifies each staff 
who has submission(s) in the RAE(s)/REF with the information on HEIs that staff belong to 
                                                          
7 A small proportion of data are also collected from other panels as needed.  
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and outputs submitted by the staff. To complete the database, we trace each academic’s 
career map from 1992 to 2014 so that the four exercises data are merged (see Appendix 
1.B.2). The integrated database identifies each academic by his outputs and his career map. 
In order to uniform the measure of the quality of outputs, four reference systems are 
introduced to rank outputs. Keele (2003), ABS (2008) and ABS (2015) rank journals from 4 
to 1, and Klaus Ritzberger (2008) ranks journals from A+ to C. We transform the letter in 
Klaus Ritzberger (2008) to the digits from 6 to 1. Based on a specific reference system, if the 
published locations of outputs are found in this specific reference system, we assign them 
based on the digit in the reference system. If the published locations of outputs are not 
found in this specific reference system and the outputs are published in the journals, we 
assign them as unranked outputs with 0 in this specific reference. If the types of outputs 
are book/ conference/ working paper/ report, we assign them as 0. However, the orders of 
the quality of outputs are sorted by ranked journal > unranked journal > book > Conference 
Proceedings > Working Paper > Report > others (software, database). 
1.3 General Background  
Before starting the inference of the model, the overview of the economics research of 
the UK is presented in this section, which helps understand the background of the model.   
1.3.1 Overview of the performance in the UK economics 
As the narrowing of the UK economics and the increasing concentration of the QR 
(quality research) funding pointed by Lee et al. (2013), economics schools face more and 
more rigorous surviving competition. Table 1.1 shows that the numbers of economics 
schools submitting in the economics panel have fallen off from 50 institutions in RAE1996 
to 28 institutions in REF2014. Meanwhile, the quantity of academics submitted to the 
economics panel by their institutions also has shown a declining trend. Along with the shrink 
in the economics panel, the scale of outputs submitted to the economics panel also appears 
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wane.  Moreover, the entries in the business and management panel are 94 in RAE2001, 90 
in RAE2008 and 101 in REF2014.  
Table 1.1. Entries in the economics panel from 1996 to 2014 
 1996 2001 2008 2014 
# of academics (submitted to the economics panel)8 948 843 876 797 
# of institutions (submit to the economics panel) 50 41 35 28 
# of disappeared institutions from the economics panel in 
the following exercise 13 7 7 - 
# of newly added institutions to the economics panel in 
the current exercise  - 4
9 110 0 
# of outputs submitted to the economics panel11 3646 3227 3021 2600 
UOA code of the economics panel 38 38 34 18 
On the one hand, the shrinking quantity may harm the competitiveness of UK 
economics in the international competition of economics research. On the other hand, the 
surviving economics schools and academics maintain the high quality of UK economics 
research, which boosts the competitiveness of UK economics. This benefit is demonstrated 
in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3. The rules of the RAEs/REF from 1992 to 2014 required each 
academic to submit no more than four outputs. Table 1.2 displays the boom of the elite 
academics whose four outputs are all published in the top 5 journals 12  /diamond list 
journals (including 27 journals) /4 or 4* rank list journals in ABS 2008 (including 17 journals) 
/4 or 4*rank list journals in ABS 2014 (including 23 journals). The shrink does not impede 
the boom of high-quality outputs. Conversely, the rising of elite academics is driven by 
economics schools which pursue high-quality publications. 
 
 
                                                          
8 Since some academics were submitted by the two HEIs in one exercise, we have merged them as single 
academics but not two. The actual number of academics in our database is less than the total number of 
academics submitted by the institutions to the economics panel. 
9 Brunel University, Royal Holloway, University of London, University of Durham and University of Sheffield 
submitted to panel 43 “Business and Management Studies” in RAE 1996. 
10 Kingston University submitted in panel 43 “Business and Management Studies” in RAE 2001. 
11 Since some academics were submitted by the two HEIs in one exercise and their outputs were submitted 
twice by the two HEIs, in these cases we merge all the same outputs as single ones.  
12 American Economic Reviews, Econometrica, Review of Economic Studies, Journal of Political Economics and 
Quarterly Journal Economics   
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Table 1.2. Number of Elite academics with four high-quality outputs 
 1996 2001 2008 2014 
# of academics on Top 5 journals 4 3 9 12 
% of academics from Five-Top 
economics schools 13  out 
of the academics on Top 
5 journals 
100% 66.7% 100% 91.7% 
# of academics on Diamond list 
journals 42 59 76
14 74 
% of academics from Five-Top 
economics schools out of 
the academics on 
Diamond list journals 
38.1% 32.2% 56.6% 59.5% 
# of academics on 4 & 4* rank in 
ABS 2008 journals 9 9 25 32 
% of academics from Five-Top 
economics schools out of 
the academics on 4 & 4* 
rank in ABS 2008 journals 
66.7% 66.7% 92% 84.4% 
# of academics on 4 & 4* rank on 
ABS 2015 journals 14 26 59
15 66 
% of academics from Five-Top 
economics schools out of 
the academics on 4 & 4* 
rank in ABS 2015 journals 
50% 46.2% 72.9% 65.2% 
# Academics submitted in RAE2001, RAE2008 or REF2014 come from the HEIs which submitted to the 
economics panel at least once in those census period, and academics submitted in 1996 only come from the 
HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE1996 and RAE2001. 
% Exclude academics who retired or died or was missing (x) or was “uncertainty academics”. 
Furthermore, Table 1.3 presents the expansion of high-qualification academics. A high-
qualification academic is defined as the academic who submits at least one output 
published in the top 5 journals out of his four submitted outputs. Additionally, Table 1.2 and 
Table 1.3 implies the concentration that more and more high-quality academics come from 
Five-Top economics schools.  
 
                                                          
13 London School of Economics and Political Science, University College London, University of Cambridge, 
University of Oxford, and University of Warwick 
14 2 academics retired in REF 2014 exercise. 
15 2 academics retired in REF 2014 exercise. 
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Table 1.3. Summary of outputs published in the Top 5 publications 
 1996 2001 2008 2014 
# the academics who had 4 outputs 
published in the Top-5 journals 4 3 9/9 12 
% of the academics from Five-Top 
economics schools out of the 
academics who had 4 outputs 
published in the Top-5 journals 
100%(4) 66.%(2) 100%(9) 91.7%(11) 
# the academics who had 3 outputs 
published in the Top-5 journals 4 7 14 19 
% of the academics from Five-Top 
economics schools out of the 
academics who had 3 outputs 
published in the Top-5 journals 
75%(3) 85.7%(6) 64.3%(9) 84.2%(16) 
# the academics who had 2 outputs 
published in the Top-5 journals 11 27 31
16 41 
% of the academics from Five-Top 
economics schools out of the 
academics who had 2 outputs 
published in the Top-5 journals 
63.6%(7) 51.9%(14) 74.2%(2317) 73.2%(30) 
# the academics who had 1 output 
published in the Top-5 journals  46
18 7919 10720 102 
% of the academics from Five-Top 
economics schools out of the 
academics who had 1 output 
published in the Top-5 journals 
41.3%(1921) 53.2%(4222) 47.7%(5123) 56.9%(58) 
      
Total  65 116 161 174 
% of the academics from Five-Top 
economics schools out of the academics 
who had at least one output published 
in the Top-t journals  
50.8%(33) 55.2%(64) 57.1%(92) 66.1%(115) 
     
% of the academics submitted at least 
one outputs published in the Top-
5 journals out of the academics 
8.4% 13.8% 18.4% 22.3% 
                                                          
16 1 academic retired in REF 2014 exercise. 
17 1 academic retired in REF 2014 exercise. 
18 3 academics missed in RAE 2001 exercise. 
19 6 academics missed or retired in RAE 2008 exercise. 
20 3 academics missed in REF 2014 exercise. 
21 2 academics missed in RAE 2001 exercise. 
22 4 academics missed in RAE 2008 exercise 
23 1 academics retired in REF 2014 exercise. 
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who were submitted to the 
economics panel 
% of the academics from Five-Top 
economics schools submitted at 
least one outputs published in the 
Top-5 journals out of the 
academics who were from Five-
Top economics schools were 
submitted to the economics panel 
14.1% 28.6% 38.0% 46.6% 
# Academics submitted in RAE2001, RAE2008 or REF2014 come from the HEIs which submitted to the 
economics panel at least once in those census period, and academics submitted in 1996 only come from the 
HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE1996 and RAE2001 
% Exclude academics who retired or died or was missing (x) or was “uncertainty academics”. 
To summarise the information from Table 1.1 to Table 1.3, we generalise Finding 1.1 
on the background of UK economics: 
Finding 1.1a. The quantity of UK economics is shrinking, but the quality of UK economics is 
progressing. 
A visual impression on Finding 1.1 is exhibited in Figure 1.1, which draws the trend of 
the average ratings of outputs by years submitted to the economics panel. The four lines 
represent the average ratings of the outputs by years based on four rank references, and 
the clustered columns represent the number of outputs by years (on the right axis). In 
general, the trend of the average rating lines shows moving up over exercises and the 
clustered columns of each exercise by years shows the shrinking trend over exercises. 
However, the lines of the average ratings show periodical downturns within exercises24. A 
series of T-tests are conducted to compare the distributions of the ratings of outputs 
submitted in the first three years with the rest of each exercise. Within each exercise, the 
T-test proves the significantly higher quality of the earlier outputs than the later outputs (P-
values is 0).   
                                                          
24 To avoid the undervaluation on some high-quality working papers, we rate the working papers, which are 
published in the later exercises, based on their later locations instead of rating them as 0. Appendix 1.D displays 
the same figure with rating all working papers as 0.  
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Figure 1.1 The average rating of outputs by years submitted by staff who submitted in the economics 
panel  
# Staff submitted to RAE2001, RAE2008 or REF2014 come from the HEIs which submitted in the economics 
panel at least once in those exercises, and staff submitted to 1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted 
in the economics panel in both RAE1996 and RAE200125  
Finding 1.1b. The quality of UK economics follows a periodical turndown across exercises. 
Along with the increasing quantity of outputs within exercises, the decreasing average 
ratings within exercises implies that more outputs do not mean better overall quality and 
the high-quality outputs concentrate at the beginning of each exercise. One explanation is 
that in the later stage of an exercise, staff need to reach four outputs and it is a trade-off 
between quantity and quality. Therefore, it is reasonable that low-quality outputs appear 
more in the later stage of an exercise. Moreover, the model in Section 1.4 provides an 
alternative explanation for Finding 1.1b.  
                                                          
25 Unlike other RAEs/REF, there are still some outputs published or finished in 1996 in RAE1996. Then we label 
1996 in RAE1996 as “1996-96”. And based on the timeline of RAE2001, the start date of RAE2001 was from 1 
January 1996, and then we label this 1996 in RAE2001 as “1996-01” in Figure 2. 
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1.3.2 Overview of the career of academics in the UK economics 
Finding 1.1 implies a harsh environment in which there are fewer positions but higher 
standard. These pressures compel more academics to leave economics schools and join 
other related economics schools or research groups. Some academics leave the HEIs to 
work for companies, the government, research organisations, NGO and even to be writers, 
soldiers26 or run themselves companies. Also, some academics move to the abroad HEIs. 
Table 1.4 shows a summary on “Surviving ratio”, which represents the ratios that how many 
academics stay in the economics panel between two adjacent exercises out of academics 
who submit to the economic panel in the former exercise27. 
Table 1.4. Surviving ratio28  
 96-01 01-08 08-14 
% of academics who submitted in the economics panel in the 
following exercises 69.8% 59.3% 50.0% 
% of academics who submitted in other panels but not the 
economics panel in the following exercises (P) 6.1% 13.7% 8.9% 
% of academics who stayed in the (same/another) UK HEIs but 
do not have submissions in the following exercise (Y) 11.0% 12.9% 25.0% 
% of academics who left the UK HEIs but joined other abroad 
HEIs (A) 8.3% 12.1% 14.0% 
% of academics who left the HEIs and worked in companies or 
governments in the UK or abroad (C) 4.8% 2.0% 2.1% 
*One side Fisher exact test for the increasing trend among 69.8%, 59.3% and 50.0% is P=0. 
# All academics had submissions in the economics panel in the former exercise and only come from the 
institutions which still had submissions in the economics panel in the following exercise. 
#P: academics who submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercises and submitted 
at least one output in RAE/REF panels except for the economics panels in the following exercises. 
#Y: academics who submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercises and were still 
employed by the HEIs as researchers in the latter exercise but did not have submissions in any RAE/REF panels;  
#C: academics who submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercises and left the 
HEIs to have new jobs in other places or stayed in the HEIs but were not employed by research economics 
schools. 
#A: academics who submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercises and left the 
UK HEIs to move abroad but still worked in abroad HEIs. 
                                                          
26 The worst one went to jail. 
27 Academics here exclude staff who retired, died or “x” (no available information) during the later RAEs/REF 
exercise.  
28 The departments which have no entry to the economic panel in the later exercise are excluded. 
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There are only half academics who stay in the economic panel in REF2014 from 
RAE2008 to REF2014. More and more academics leave UK HEIs, move to other panels or 
have no submission. This implies that academics submitted to the economic panel in 
RAE2008 would only have half chance to keep their occupations in the economic panel in 
REF2014. A comparison between the senior academics, who have survived in the three 
adjacent RAEs/REF, and the junior academic, who have survived in the two adjacent 
RAEs/REF, is added. The surviving ratio of the junior academic in REF2014 (RAE2008) is 8% 
(12%) lower than the seniors, which points a harsher situation for the junior academics. 
Furthermore, once academics who submitted in the former exercise have an absence 
in the following exercise, the chance of returning to the economic panel in the third exercise 
is cut down to around 27%-25% from 77%-60%. Then Finding 1.2 generalises the 
background of the working environment in the UK economics: 
Finding 1.2 The career life of academics in the UK economics becomes severer. 
 1.4 Academics’ gaming cross exercises  
The background shown by the findings above describes a stressful career environment 
for academics in UK economics schools. Then it is reasonable for academics to maximise 
their benefits and minimise their costs. In this section, a non-linear incentive model against 
the stressful environment is introduced to illustrate one possible strategy of academics.  
1.4.1 Non-linear incentive model 
Under the pressure of surviving, academics strategically allocate their efforts to 
manipulate outcomes so that they could benefit themselves against the constraining rules 
they face. Usually, an RAE/REF exercise is executed every five to seven years, and only 
outputs published within the assessment period29 are eligible to be submitted. Meanwhile, 
                                                          
29 RAE2001: 1 January 1996 to 31 December 2000; RAE2008: 1 January 2001 to 31 December 2007; REF2014: 
1 January 2008 to 31 December 2013. 
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the FTE (Full-time equivalent) only rate staff who are submitted by the HEIs as Category A30 
research staff (RAE2001 also includes Category A* staff31). This rule means even if someone 
moves from HEI A to another HEI B just one day before the census date of an exercise, this 
staff is counted into HEI B. The FTE is the key rating to evaluate HEIs, so HEIs try to prevent 
their staff from leaving their positions. Some economic schools add the constraint into the 
employment contracts, which forbids staffs to leave their positions within a period of 
blocking time just before the incoming census date.  
The length of the blocking time is varied across economics schools, which could be from 
3 months to 12 months. It is reasonable that economics schools do not offer promotions or 
salary incentive to their staff during the blocking time. The blocking time and the assessing 
exercise’s periodicity constitute the non-linear incentive. Figure 1.2 presents a model to 
explain the non-linear incentive.  
 
Figure 1.2. Non-linear incentive  
The RAE/REF divides the continuous time into several exercise slots (Ti), such as T1 
(RAE2001) and T2 (RAE2008). An exercise Ti is subdivided into Ti-N and Ti-B by the 
                                                          
30 Category A staff includes the staff who are employed in the HEIs on the census date. The census date of 
RAE2001 is 31 Mar 2001. The census date of RAE2008 is 31 Oct 2007. The census date of REF2014 is 31 Oct 
2013. 
31 Category A* staff transfer to new HEIs in the period between 1 April 2000 and 1 March 2001. 
Incentive 
T1-N T1-B T2-N T2-B 
Time Ti 
Exercise T1 Exercise T2 
Yes 
No 
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constraining rule. Ti-N represents the period in which staff can leave their positions freely, 
and Ti-B represents the blocking time in which staff cannot leave their current positions. 
The end date of Ti-B in the exercise Ti is the census data of the exercise Ti, and the length 
of Ti-B depends on the economics schools. In the period of Ti-N, it is beneficial for the 
economics schools to reward their staffs for their high-quality outcomes. As the rewards 
incentive their staff to put effort into their work and willing to stay in their positions. The 
economics schools strengthen their research competitiveness, keep their high-quality 
academics and attract new superior academics in the period Ti-N so that the schools could 
achieve high ratings in the current RAE/REF exercise. As the ratings of the schools tie to the 
funds provided by four High Education Funding bodies, we assume the existence of 
incentive for staffs in the Ti-N is “Yes”. However, the constraint prevents current staffs from 
leaving in the period Ti-B, and thus there is a low incentive for economics schools to 
continue rewarding to their staff. Also, there is a low chance for economics schools to 
attract the new staff, as those staff may also be in their blocking time. So, we assume the 
existence of incentive to the staff in Ti-B is “No”.   
Now the incentive within an exercise Ti has the non-linear feature, like square waves, 
which drives staff to explore their optimal strategies. As staff cannot benefit from their high-
quality outcomes in the period Ti-B, it is reasonable for them to manipulate their higher 
quality outcomes not to be published in the period Ti-B. If staff expect that their imminent 
outcomes will be high quality32, either staff should put more effort on the work so that to 
“pull in” the publication time to the period Ti-N, or they should “pull out” the publication 
time to the next T(i+1)-N period, such as fully utilizing the R&R periods. Therefore, it is more 
likely that high-quality outputs appear in the early stage of an exercise. Postponing is an 
alternative explanation on the periodical turndown over exercises in Finding 1.2. As “pulling 
in” is a “positive” strategy and is aligned with the interest of the economics schools, the 
                                                          
32 For example, some outputs have already received R&R responses.  
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investigation in our study focuses on the “negative” strategy, “pulling out”, which is against 
the interest of the economics schools.  
Hypothesis 1.1: Academics tend to “pull out” their high-quality outcomes by postponing 
them to the next exercise. 
1.4.2 Empirical evidence on a non-linear incentive model  
In this section, a series of analyses are conducted to verify Hypothesis 1.1 in Section 
1.4.1. The rule of judging “pulling out” is the comparison between the earliest output33 of 
an academic34  in an exercise and the worst output35  of the academics in its previous 
exercise.  
Since the schools only can submit no more than four outputs for each academic, it is 
judicious for the schools to submit their staff’ best four outputs if the staff have more than 
four outputs (or all outputs if the staffs have less than four outputs). This means that a new 
outcome of an academic is worth to be considered by the school for the academic only 
when it is at least better than the current fourth-best output (or the current worst output) 
of the academic. Otherwise, a new outcome which is worse than the fourth-best (or the 
worst) output does not change the current submission plan of the academic (or the current 
overall quality of the submissions). That is, the schools should submit any new outcome for 
an academic which is expected to be better than the fourth-best output of the academic 
instead of the current fourth best. Then, the new submission plan can bring the school a 
higher rating than the previous one. If an academic determines to postpone a better 
                                                          
33 In some case, more than one outputs are recorded in the earliest year. We pick up the one with the highest 
rating as the earliest output in that exercise. We check if staff postpone their high-quality outputs to the next 
exercise, so we always pick up the highest rating one in the same year.  
34 The time record of the earliest output of each staff selected in RAE/REF system is in the first two years of 
this exercise. For example, when we compare the worst output of one staff in RAE 1996 with his earliest output 
in RAE 2001, the time record of earliest output in RAE2001 system should be before 31 Dec 2002.   
35 The quality of outputs is sorted by ranked journal > unranked journal > book > Conference Proceedings > 
Working Paper (not published later) > Report > others (software, database). If an output is submitted as a 
working paper in one exercise but it is published in the later exercises, the working paper is still rated as a 
journal article in this exercise.  
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forthcoming outcome when the time is close to the end of an exercise, it should be valuable 
for the academic to do this. The model mentions that staffs usually do not get rewards when 
they are in the period Ti-B. If it has a high chance that the outcome is published in the period 
Ti-B, postponing is a dominant strategy. Otherwise, if the outcome has been completed 
before the census date, it is beneficial for the school to submit the outcome.  
When an outcome is postponed, it will become the earliest output in the following 
exercise. In other words, the earliest output of an academic (within the first two years) in 
an exercise could have been completed in the previous exercise if the staff put more effort 
into it. Then, the comparison between the earliest output in an exercise and the worst 
output in its previous exercise is the evidence to detect the strategy of staff. If the earliest 
output is not worse than the worst one, the earliest one is potentially worth to be submitted 
by the school if it is completed in the previous exercise. So, we examine the pairs of the 
earliest and worst outputs of staff and get the actual proportion of possibly postponing for 
every two adjacent exercises. As there is an increasing trend of the quality of the outputs 
over exercises mentioned in Finding 1.1a, the outputs in the latter exercise are expected to 
perform better than the ones in the previous exercise. Meanwhile, as the worst output, it 
is highly possible to keep no better than any other outputs. Thus, a benchmark proportion 
is imported to exclude the alternative factors above. The benchmark proportion represents 
the expected probability 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥 ≥ 𝑦) that the expected earliest output (𝑥) is not worse 
than the expected worst output (𝑦). The expected earliest output is an output randomly 
selected from the distribution 𝐹(𝑥) of all outputs submitted in the latter exercise, and the 
expected worst output is an output randomly selected from the distribution 𝐹(𝑦) of the 
worst outputs of all staff submitted in the former exercise. The procedure is describe as 
following: 
𝐹(𝑥) = 𝑥௜ , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 = 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 (𝑖: 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑠) 
𝑥௜ =
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑗
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑠 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒 
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𝐹(𝑦) = 𝑦௝ , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦 = 𝑗, 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑛 (𝑗: 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑠) 
𝑦௜ =
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑠 𝑖
𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑢𝑚 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑠 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑒 
 
Given a specific x, 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥 ≥ 𝑦) = ൞
෍ 𝐹(𝑥௜)
௫
௫೔ୀ௬
, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 ≥ 𝑦
0,                        𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑥 < 𝑦
 
Then, the expected probability is described as following:  
𝐸𝑥𝑝[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥 ≥ 𝑦)] = ෍ 𝐹(𝑦௜) ∗ [ ෍ 𝐹(𝑥௜)]
௫
௫೔ୀ௬೔
௡
௬೔ୀଵ
 
Table 1.5a summarise the comparisons between the earliest ones and the worst ones. 
The first column shows the two adjacent exercises. The former exercises provide the worst 
outputs, and the following exercises provide the earliest outputs. The other four columns 
show the two percentages. The former one in each cell represents the “expected 
probabilities”, and the latter one in each cell represents the “actual proportions. The 
result36 shows that the quality of the earliest ones is significantly not worse than the quality 
of the worst ones in each comparison. This evidence justifies the existence of the “pulling 
out” strategy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
36 The data comes from the part of staffs who have submissions in any two adjacent exercises in the 
Economics or Business panel and who have at least one submission in the economics panel in the former 
exercise.  
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Table 1.5a Comparison between the earliest output and the worst output (Not worse)37 
 Expected probability / Actual proportion 
 K G ABS-EF ABS-A 
RAE96-RAE01 83%/96%*** 82%/95%*** 83%/96%*** 84%/96%*** 
RAE01-RAE08 85%/94%*** 81%/92%*** 84%/94%*** 86%/94%*** 
RAE08-RAE14 82%/88%** 76%/87%*** 85%/91%** 86%/92%*** 
***P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.01 
** P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.05 and larger than 0.01 
# Staff submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercise and submitted at least one 
output in economics or management panel in the following exercise 
# Staff in RAE1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE1996 and 
RAE2001.  
To support the evidence above, Table 1.5b and Table 1.6 adds more evidence from 
other comparisons. Table 1.5b still reports the comparisons between the earliest ones and 
the worst ones. However, the former percentages in the cells represent 𝐸𝑥𝑝[𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑥 > 𝑦)] 
and the latter percentages represent the proportion of the better pairs. The better pairs 
consist of two kind of pairs. If the output(s) of an academic in the former exercise are (is) 
not all rated as 4*/A+ and the earliest one in the latter exercise is better than the worst one 
in the former exercise, the pair is signed as a better pair. If the output(s) of an academic in 
the former exercise are (is) all rated as 4*/A+ and the earliest one is equal to the worst one, 
the pair is also signed as a better pair. The evidences provided by Table 1.5b is consistent 
with Table 1.5a for the first two adjacent exercises, but in the latest two exercises, the 
strategic behaviour is not statistically significant.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
37 Appendix 1.E represents “Comparison between earliest output and the worst output” of academics who 
submitted 4 journal-article outputs and shows the same result.  
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Table 1.5b Comparison between the earliest output and the worst output (Better/Equal) 
 Expected probability / Actual proportion 
 K G ABS-EF ABS-A 
RAE96-RAE01 69%/75%* 70%/76%* 69%/74% 70%/74% 
RAE01-RAE08 66%/75%** 69%/80%*** 66%/74%** 69%/76%** 
RAE08-RAE14 55%/61% 62%/66% 65%/66% 63%/70%** 
***P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.01 
** P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.05 and larger than 0.01 
* P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.1 and larger than 0.05 
#Staff submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercise and submitted at least one 
output in economics or management panel in the later exercise 
#Staff in RAE1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE 1996 and RAE 
2001.  
Table 1.6 introduces a stricter comparison. The output of an academic, which is also 
better than the average performance of all outputs submitted by the school, is more worthy 
for the school. Then, postponing this output can bring higher benefit for the staff. 
Meanwhile, it is also harder for the earliest output to be better than the average 
performance of the school. The left percentage in each cell represents the proportion of the 
better pairs, in which the average of the outputs of an academic submitted in the latter 
exercise is better than the average of the outputs of the school where the academic works 
in the former exercise. The right percentage in each cell represents the proportion of the 
better pairs, in which the earliest output of a staff submitted in the latter exercise is better 
than the average of the outputs of the school where the academic works in the former 
exercise. The evidence in Table 1.6 is consistent with Table 1.5a, which approves the 
existence of the strategic behaviour.  
Table 1.6 Comparison of the averages (Better) 
 Average/ Earliest 
 K G ABS-EF ABS-A 
RAE96-RAE01 71%/78%** 59%/58% 67%/69% 71%/77%** 
RAE01-RAE08 57%/85%*** 50%/69%*** 54%/78%*** 62%/86%*** 
RAE08-RAE14 43%/67%*** 43%/60%*** 46%/77%*** 46%/77%*** 
***P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.01 
** P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.05 and larger than 0.01 
#Staff submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercise and submitted at least one 
output in economics or management panel in the later exercise 
#Staff in RAE1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE 1996 and RAE 
2001.  
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Furthermore, an extended investigation is imported to compare the magnitude of 
“gaming” behaviour between the junior staffs and the senior staffs.  The junior staff are 
defined as the staff whose first submitting are in RAE2001 (or RAE2008), and the senior staff 
are defined as the staff whose first submitting are in RAE1996 (or RAE2001). Then Table 
1.7a and Table 1.7b display the contrast on the strategic behaviour of the senior staff in 
their second two adjacent exercises census with the junior staff in their first two adjacent 
exercises in RAE2008 (or REF2014). The percentages in Table 1.7 are drawn in the same way 
as ones in Table 1.5a.  
Table 1.7a Comparison between junior staffs and senior staffs (between RAE2001 and RAE2008) 
 Expected probability / Actual proportion 
 K G ABS-EF ABS-A 
Junior staff (x-01-08) 87%/94% 86%/95%** 87%/95%* 89%/95% 
Gap between Expected 
probability and Actual 
proportion 
7% 9% 8% 6% 
Senior staff (96-01-08) 84%/94%*** 79%/91%*** 82%/94%*** 85%/93%*** 
Gap between Expected 
probability and Actual 
proportion 
10% 12% 12% 8% 
***P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.01 
** P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.05 and larger than 0.01 
* P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.1 and larger than 0.05 
#Staffs submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercise and submitted at least one 
output in economics or management panel in the later exercise 
#Staffs in RAE1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE 1996 and 
RAE 2001.  
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Table 1.7b Comparison between junior staffs and senior staffs (between RAE2008 and REF2014) 
 Expected probability / Actual proportion 
 K G ABS-EF ABS-A 
Junior staff (x-08-14) 80%/86% 76%/86%** 85%/93%* 85%/93%** 
Gap between Expected 
probability and Actual 
proportion 
6% 10% 8% 8% 
Senior staff (01-08-14) 83%/90%* 75%/87%*** 85%/90% 87%/92% 
Gap between Expected 
probability and Actual 
proportion 
7% 12% 5% 5% 
***P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.01 
** P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.05 and larger than 0.01 
* P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.1 and larger than 0.05 
#Staffs submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercise and submitted at least one 
output in economics or management panel in the later exercise 
#Staffs in RAE1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE 1996 and 
RAE 2001.  
Compliance with the result in Table 1.5a, both junior staff and senior staff in Table 1.7a 
and Table 1.7b significantly and consistently postpone their high-quality outputs to the 
latter exercise. Meanwhile, the gap of senior staff is consistently higher than the gap of 
junior staff in Table 1.7a. Moreover, the expected probabilities of the junior staff are 
consistently higher than the ones of the senior staff in Table 1.7a. This implies that the 
improvement of the performance of junior staff is larger than the senior staff in the earlier 
RAEs. One explanation is that senior staff enter a stable stage of their career life, so it is not 
necessary for them to achieve higher performance. Another explanation is that junior staff 
do not have enough experience to balance the quality and the quantity so to complete four 
outputs is paid more attention. However, Table 1.7b does not provide clear evidence like 
Table 1.7a. One explanation is that the criteria of assessment on senior staff are more 
rigorous than before. As the surviving pressure mentioned in Table 1.4 is aggravating, senior 
staff need to demonstrate their sustainable improvement. Moreover, along with the 
improvement of international economics research, it is harder to produce high-quality 
outcomes for junior staff than before. Then the apparent gap between senior and junior 
staff fades away.  
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Therefore, Result 1.1 is generalised from the analysis of the comparisons above, which 
verifies Hypothesis 1.1: 
Result 1.1: Academics generally game with the non-linear incentive system by postponing 
their higher-quality outputs to latter exercises.  
1.4.3. Academics in Five-Top economics schools 
The overview in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3 of Section 1.3.1 demonstrates that high-quality 
academics concentrate on Five-Top economics schools (50%-66%). The proportions of 
academics from Five-Top economics schools are around 30%. Therefore, the strategic 
behaviour of academics from Five-Top economics schools is discussed in this section38.  
Table 1.8a provides consistent evidence with Table 1.5. In general, academics in Five-
Top economic schools also follow the strategy of “pulling out” and additionally they show 
relatively stable proportions on carrying out the strategy. The overall result in Table 1.2 
implies a fall of the proportions on carrying out the strategy from RAE2008 to REF2014, but 
this fall does not appear for academics from Five-Top economics schools. To explore the 
divergence deeply, Table 1.8b provides the results of the stricter comparisons. Unlike Table 
1.5b, Table 1.8b states the more significant strategy behaviours of the academics in Five-
Top. Academics in Five-Top usually face stricter criteria, so the growing pressure from 
international economics does not have a significant effect on their strategic behaviour. 
Table 1.8b also implies that academics in Five-Top possess the better ability to balance the 
quality and the quantity of their outcomes according to their needs.  
 
 
 
                                                          
38 Academics are defined as being employed by Five-Top economics schools according to the latter exercises 
in which they are submitted by Five-Top economics schools in two adjacent exercises. The paralleled results 
on academics submitted by Five-Top economic schools in the former exercises are provided in Appendix 1.E.  
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Table 1.8a Comparison between the earliest output and the worst output (Not worse) 
 Expected probability / Actual proportion 
 K G ABS-EF ABS-A 
RAE96-RAE01 84%/95%*** 83%/93%** 85%/98%*** 85%/95%** 
RAE01-RAE08 86%/92% 84%/92% 87%/97%** 90%/96% 
RAE08-RAE14 81%/92%** 77%/94%*** 86%/95%* 87%/92% 
***P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.01 
** P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.05 and larger than 0.01 
# Staff submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercise and submitted at least one 
output in economics or management panel in the following exercise 
# Staff in RAE1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE1996 and 
RAE2001.  
Table 1.8b Comparison between the earliest output and the worst output (Better/Equal) 
 Expected probability / Actual proportion 
 K G ABS-EF ABS-A 
RAE96-RAE01 70%/77% 71%/77% 70%/78% 71%/78% 
RAE01-RAE08 67%/78% 73%/85% 73%/81% 75%/87%* 
RAE08-RAE14 54%/70%** 62%/80%** 65%/77% 62%/78%** 
** P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.05 and larger than 0.01 
* P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.1 and larger than 0.05 
#Staff submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercise and submitted at least one 
output in economics or management panel in the later exercise 
#Staff in RAE1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE 1996 and RAE 
2001.  
 1.5 Conclusion  
In this chapter, we demonstrate a high-pressure working environment of UK economics 
academics and represent a non-linear incentive model to predict economics academics 
strategy in this high-pressure scenario. The data of the RAEs/REF from 1996 to 2014 verify 
our prediction: the staff “game” to the non-linear incentive causing by the institutional 
feature from the REAs/REF and the constraint on leaving positions from the HEIs by 
postponing their high-quality outcomes to the following exercises.  
The “gaming” strategy indeed benefits to individual academics, but overall the results 
of this “gaming” may harm the UK economics. As the rating system of the RAE/REF ties the 
outputs with academics, this means that owning outputs is binding with owning academics. 
This tieing pushes the HEIs to “steal” academics but not cultivate academics.  
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This system ignores the contributions of the satisfactory research environment on high-
quality outcomes. High-quality outcomes consist of the effort of academics and the support 
of HEIs. When an academic moves to a new HEI, his outputs will be counted as the outcomes 
of the new HEIs in the RAEs/REF system. In this case, evaluating the academic based on his 
outcomes is reasonable, but it is not convincing to evaluate the latter HEI based on the 
outcomes which are accomplished in the former HEI. In this scenario, there is no incentive 
for HEIs to assist academics in completing outcomes, but it encourages HEIs to set up the 
rules to prevent the leaving of academics. The improvement of research relies on both the 
effort of academics and the support of the environment. In the long run, the lack of support 
would bring a ceiling effect on the improvement of the UK economics, which is shown in 
this chapter that the ascent of the quality of outputs across exercises slows down.  
Furthermore, if we conjecture that this “gaming” extends to other science subjects, the 
situation will become even worse. Academic research devotes itself to benefit the whole 
human being and improves social progress. Postponed outcomes could have helped some 
people in urgent needs or solved some fatal issues.  
It may remit the issue above by weakening the ties between the census and academics 
and strengthen the ties between the census and HEIs, which could transform the non-linear 
incentives to the linear incentives.  Linear incentives enhance the possibility of the 
consistency of the interests between academics and the HEIs.   
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Appendix 1.A: Qualify level of RAEs/REF 
RAE 2001: 
 5* (five star): Quality that equates to attainable levels of international excellence in 
more than half of the research activity submitted and attainable levels of national 
excellence in the remainder. 
 5: Quality that equates to attainable levels of international excellence in up to half 
of the research activity submitted and to attainable levels of national excellence in 
virtually all of the remainder. 
 4: Quality that equates to attainable levels of national excellence in virtually all of 
the research activity submitted, showing some evidence of international excellence. 
 3a: Quality that equates to attainable levels of national excellence in over two-thirds 
of the research activity submitted, possibly showing evidence of international 
excellence. 
 3b: Quality that equates to attainable levels of national excellence in more than half 
of the research activity submitted. 
 2: Quality that equates to attainable levels of national excellence in up to half of the 
research activity submitted. 
 1: Quality that equates to attainable levels of national excellence in none, or virtually 
none, of the research activity submitted. 
RAE 2008: 
 4*: Quality that is world-leading in terms of originality, significance and rigour 
 3*: Quality that is internationally excellent in terms of originality, significance and 
rigour but which nonetheless falls short of the highest standards of excellence 
 2*: Quality that is recognised internationally in terms of originality, significance and 
rigour 
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 1*: Quality that is recognised nationally in terms of originality, significance and 
rigour 
 Unclassified: Quality that falls below the standard of nationally recognised work. Or 
work which does not meet the published definition of research for the purposes of 
this exercise 
REF 2014 
 4*: Quality that is world-leading in terms of originality, significance and rigour.  
 3*: Quality that is internationally excellent in terms of originality, significance and 
rigour but which falls short of the highest standards of excellence.  
 2*: Quality that is recognised internationally in terms of originality, significance and 
rigour.  
 1*: Quality that is recognised nationally in terms of originality, significance and 
rigour.  
Unclassified Quality that falls below the standard of nationally recognised work. Or 
work which does not meet the published definition of research for the purposes of this 
exercise. 
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Appendix 1.B: Data processing 
B.1. Data Matching 
Data of RAE 2001 and 2008 has already matched staff with their submissions. However, 
information of outputs of RAE 1996 and REF 2014 does not include the name of staff who 
submitted these outputs. So we have to match outputs with their authors. 
First, we put each output in “google scholar” or “google scholar” to get the name(s) of 
author(s). Second, we check each author’s name with the name list of the same institution 
to pick up the author(s) who had the same institution with the output. After we check all 
outputs in one institution and find at least one author for each output belonging to this 
institution, we match the outputs with their author(s). (In some case, some outputs cannot 
be found online or cannot be recognised authors, and then we have to drop these outputs 
as invalid outputs. Similarly, there are some invalid staff due to no matched outputs.) 
Second, we connect outputs with their authors and count how many connections each 
staff has. If an output only has a single author in the same institution, then we sign this 
author submitted this output. Since as the rule, each staff only can submit no more than 4 
output. Based on this rule, we pick up all single author’s outputs and check if any staff 
already satisfied with 4 outputs . If a staff has more than 4 connections or has some 
connected outputs with more than one author, we use 4 submission rule to exclude 
impossible combinations. If only one combination is left, then we could match those 
outputs with their authors. If more than one combination is left, we sign all these outputs 
as “uncertainty” and these staff as “uncertain staff”. We assign each “uncertain staff” own 
all outputs which connect with her/him. This means some staff has more than 4 outputs 
and some outputs appear more times than the number of times they were submitted. 
There is another important detail we need notice, which is that some staff may submit 
the same papers in different institutions in the same RAE period. If the same staff submits 
the same outputs in two different institutions (e.g. 2 for York, 2 for Essex) and all 
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information on outputs is the same, we drop off the repeated outputs and just keep every 
output appear once. However, if the same staff submits difference outputs in different 
institutions in the same RAE period, we keep all the outputs.  
B.2. Identification and Merge 
After we have matched staff with their submissions, we have each staff’s profile in a 
single period. In order to create a career map for each staff, we have to identify each staff 
in each RAE or REF period.  
We first use information in the economics panel of RAE 1996 to describe each staff who 
had submission(s) in this period, and next, we trace these staff’s footprint in following 
period, RAE 2001. That is, we identify a staff in RAE 1996 by her/his full name and her/his 
submitted output(s), and then we trace this staff’s name to check if there are submission(s) 
with this name appearing in some panel in RAE 2001. if there is only one same name in the 
same institution in RAE 2001, we treat the one in RAE 2001 as the same staff in RAE 1996. 
If we find a same name in a different institution or find more than one same names in RAE 
2001, we use “Ideas”, their personal websites or some other ways to find the staff in RAE 
2001 who holds both outputs in RAE 1996 and outputs in RAE 2001. Then we also treat this 
staff in RAE 2001 as the same one in RAE 1996. After this procedure, we identify a staff in 
both RAE 1996 and RAE 2001.  
Some staff whose name cannot be found in RAE 2001 in the economics panel or other 
possible panels is signed as “x” in RAE 2001. And we use the same procedure to trace all 
staff in RAE 1996 to check their appearance in RAE 2008 and REF 2014. Staff whose name 
cannot be found in a period is also signed as “x” in that period. The tracing procedures of 
the following periods for RAE 2001, RAE 2008 are similar to the one for RAE 1996. Further, 
staff in the economic panel of RAE 2001, RAE 2008 and REF 2014 also need tracing 
procedures of previous periods. Tracing procedures of previous periods are similar to the 
one of the following periods. For staff in the economic panel of RAE 2001, we only need to 
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trace the staff who are not identified in the tracing procedures of following periods of RAE 
1996, and check if there are some outputs with those authors’ names in some panels in RAE 
1996. If found, we identify them. If not, we still sign them “x” in RAE 1996. For staff in 
economic panel of RAE 2008 or REF 2014, they need to be traced for two or three previous 
periods.   
After we trace all staff in economic panel of each period, we draw academic career 
maps from 1996 to 2014 of all staff who submitted at least one output in the economics 
panel, which includes staff’s appearance in each periods and staff’s submissions in each 
period.  
Since in the tracing procedure there are staff signed as “x” in some period(s), we have 
to check their career status in that period. We use “LinkedIn”, “Ideas”, their personal 
website or some other ways to find where and when those staff was and separate them to 
several categories. If a staff still worked in the same institution as the one, which s/he stayed 
in the previous RAE period, (but just did not submit any output), we sign “x-YS” to substitute 
for the “x” in that period. If a staff worked in a different institution with the one, which s/he 
stayed in the previous RAE period, (but still did not submit any output in that new), we sign 
“x-YC” to substitute for the “x” in that period and record the time when s/he moved to the 
new institution. If a staff moved to abroad but still worked in an abroad academic institution, 
we sign “x-Abroad” to substitute for the “x” in that period and record the time when s/he 
moved to abroad. If a staff retired or died, we sign “x-Retire/Dead” to substitute for the “x” 
in that and all following periods and record the time when s/he retired or died. If a staff 
moved to work in a place which is not included by RAE or REF, we sign “x-Company” to 
substitute for the “x” in that period and record the time when s/he moved to the new place. 
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Appendix 1.C: Rating 
In this study, we use 4 references to rate outcomes. The first rank named as “K” in our 
database is based on “Keele List”, which is wrote by Tim Worrall (2006 version) and covers 
442 journals. The second rank named as “G” is created by Ritzberger K. (2008), which 
includes 175 journals. The third and fourth ranks come from “Academic Journal Guide” of 
ABS (2008) and ABS (2015). “Academic Journal Guide” classify journals into several subjects, 
such as Economics, Finance, Management and so on. ABS (2015) includes 1401 journals in 
total, and there are 319 journals categorized to economics and 105 journals to finance.  
We use “K” and “G” rank to rate all submission from RAE 1992 to REF 2014. Meanwhile, 
considering on the disappearing of some journals, devaluing of some journals and quality 
promotion of some quality, we use ABS (2015) rank to rate REF 2014 and use ABS (2008) 
rank to rate RAE 1996, RAE 2001 and RAE 2008 so as to be close to the evaluation to journal 
made by staff who worked in the early time. Since ABS rank categories journals into several 
subjects which all relate to social science, we combine journals of category Economics and 
Finance category as “ABS-EF” rank and use journals in all categories as “ABS-A” rank.  
Then in all rating, we always use 4 ranks to rate journals. If a journal cannot find in one 
rank, then we rate this journal as “n”, and the value is 0. 
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Appendix 1.D. The average rating of outputs by years   
 
  
# Staff submitted in RAE2001, RAE2008 or REF2014 come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel at least 
once in those census period, and staff submitted in 1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel 
in both RAE1996 and RAE2001 
# Working paper is rated as 0. 
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Appendix 1.E. Results on academics submitted by Five-Top economics 
schools in the former exercises 
Table 1.A.1 Comparison between the earliest output and the worst output (Not worse) 
 Expected probability / Actual proportion 
 K G ABS-EF ABS-A 
RAE96-RAE01 84%/95%*** 83%/93%** 85%/96%*** 85%/95%** 
RAE01-RAE08 86%/93% 83%/93%** 86%/95%** 89%/94% 
RAE08-RAE14 82%/91% 78%/94%*** 87%/95%* 88%/94% 
***P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.01 
** P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.05 and larger than 0.01 
# Staff submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercise and submitted at least one 
output in economics or management panel in the following exercise 
# Staff in RAE1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE1996 and 
RAE2001.  
Table 1.A.2 Comparison between the earliest output and the worst output (Better/Equal) 
 Expected probability / Actual proportion 
 K G ABS-EF ABS-A 
RAE96-RAE01 70%/78% 71%/77% 70%/76% 71%/76% 
RAE01-RAE08 68%/80% 73%/84% 72%/82% 74%/86%* 
RAE08-RAE14 56%/70%* 63%/75%* 66%/77% 64%/80%** 
** P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.05 and larger than 0.01 
* P-value in one-side Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.1 and larger than 0.05 
#Staff submitted at least one output in the economics panel in the former exercise and submitted at least one 
output in economics or management panel in the later exercise 
#Staff in RAE1996 only come from the HEIs which submitted to the economics panel in both RAE 1996 and RAE 
2001 
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Level-k Analysis on Dynamic Game with Incomplete 
Information and Uncertainty: An Experimental Study 
2.1 Introduction 
Level-k analysis, first introduced by Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and Nagel (1995), is a 
powerful non-equilibrium model to explain boundedly rational behaviours. A standard 
level-k analysis assumes that a level-k (k>=1) player best responds to his belief. That is, his 
rival behaves as a level-(k-1) player, and a level-0 player follows a simply non-strategic 
decision rule, i.e., randomly choosing. 
A series of experimental studies demonstrate the prominent performance of level-k 
analysis on modelling behaviours deviated from equilibrium predictions on many strictly 
competitive “simple” mutual games. Normal games with complete information and 
certainty are studied by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) and 
Crawford and Iriberri (2007a). Normal games with incomplete information and certainty are 
investigated by Crawford and Iriberri (2007b) and Brocas, et al. (2014). Dynamic games with 
complete information and certainty are explored by Burchardi and Penczynski (2010), 
Kawagoe and Takizawa (2012) and Ho and Su (2013). Moreover, dynamic games with 
incomplete information and certainty are discussed by Kawagoe and Takizawa (2009). 
Currently, there are rarely experimental studies on the level-k analysis in dynamic 
games with incomplete information and uncertainty. Incomplete information and 
uncertainty are two common features in reality, such as in the stock market and insurance 
market.  The primary purpose of the study in this chapter is to enrich the application of the 
level-k analysis by exploring the performance of the level-k analysis in a specific game with 
incomplete information and uncertainty. In order to examine the performance of the level-
k analysis thoroughly, the experimental design in this study includes both the direct-
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response method and the strategy method. The direct-response method is the usual design 
in a dynamic game, and the strategy method reveals more information on the players’ 
intended behaviours. 
Furthermore, the other purpose of the two-method design is to investigate the effect 
of the experimental description on players’ strategic reasoning. A natural expectation is that 
the strategy method induces players to make more thoughtful and 
comprehensive decisions. However, Brandts and Charness (2011) summarised a series of 
experimental studies on the two-game described methods and reported that a majority of 
experimental studies do not find significant differences of behaviours between these two 
methods. Though some studies found different behaviours between the two methods, the 
differences mostly appeared on punishment and cooperation behaviours, as mentioned in 
Brandts and Charness (2003), Brosig et al., (2003), Murphy et al. (2006) and Murphy et al. 
(2007). And the studies related with strategic behaviours show no significant difference 
between behaviours in the two methods, e.g., studies on the repeated prisoner dilemma by 
Reuben and Suetens (2012), Centipede Games by Kawagoe and Takizawa (2012) and Garcia-
Pola et al.  (2016). 
Gambling games in casinos, such as Black Jack and Texas hold’em Poker, usually include 
incomplete information and/or uncertainty. Instinctively, players think strategically facing 
these games (or think that the rules they follow are strategic). Thus, it is accessible and 
reasonable to first extend the level-k analysis on games similar to the ones found in Casinos. 
Therefore, the game designed in this study is a two-stage two-person dynamic game with 
incomplete information and uncertainty generalised from Black Jack. 
In a complex game, it is neither easy nor necessary for players to employ strategic 
thinking. Therefore, some alternative non-strategic models are introduced to compete with 
the strategic thinking models (the level-k analysis and the equilibrium analysis). Referring 
to the classification in CG’s work (Costa-Gomes et al., 2001) on strategic and non-strategic 
thinking types, players’ thinking types are separated into two categories, non-strategic 
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thinking category I (C1) and strategic thinking category II (C2). These categories are based 
on whether players utilise their opponents’ incentive to predict their actions and best 
respond to them.  To elaborate, C1 players either hold non-strategic beliefs (no belief or a 
uniform belief) on their opponents’ actions or cannot respond best to their beliefs. Category 
I (C1) as non-strategic thinking includes four types: Level-0 (L0), Level-1 (L1), Safety type 
(SA), and Expected value calculation (Exp). Paralleled with C1, Level-k (k>1, e.g. L2), 
Equilibrium (Eq) and other Level-k analyses which best respond to SA or Exp (e.g., L1(SA) or 
L1(Exp)), are classified into Category II (C2) as strategic thinking types.  Players in C2 hold 
their specific beliefs and make strategies which respond best to their beliefs. Furthermore, 
C1 players do not consider that their actions have effects on their opponents’ strategies, 
while C2 players apply Bayes’ Rule in their strategies in the games. 
Some types are the foundations of other types, e.g. L0, which exists in the L1 player’s 
belief. In this study, an additional step where the players state their beliefs is added in the 
experimental design. This additional step provides extra information to investigate players’ 
thinking types. Our approach of the belief elicitation adheres to M&G’s proper scoring rule 
(Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker, 2008). Players report their estimations on their opponents’ 
actions and are rewarded for the accuracy of their stated beliefs according to a quadratic 
loss function. 
Corresponding to the two purposes of the experiment, we obtained two main findings. 
One of the main findings indicates that around half of the players behave as strategic 
thinking types, and among strategic players, level-k thinking is dominant. This finding is 
consistent with previous experimental results. The other main finding implies that the 
strategy method impedes strategy thinking. In other words, more players behave as 
strategic thinking types in the direct-response method treatment than in the strategy 
method treatments. This finding is contrary to most of the previous experimental results on 
strategic behaviours (Reuben and Suetens in 2012, Kawagoe and Takizawa in 2012 and 
Garcia-Pola et al. in 2016).  
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The upcoming section (Section 2.2) describes the game used in the experiments. 
Section 2.3 demonstrates a series of theoretical analyses on the strategies and beliefs of 
the game while Section 2.4 reports the experimental design in detail. Section 2.5 further 
discusses the non-parameter and the parameter econometrical analysis on the 
experimental data. Section 2.6 is the conclusion. 
2.2 Game design 
Black Jack (21 points) and Texas hold’em poker are popular games in Casino. Players 
usually need strategic thinking and luck to win. In our experiment, we simplify Black Jack 
and Texas hold’em poker to a two-person dynamic game with two stages.  
Two players play the game. One is the First-Mover (FM), and the other one is the 
Second-Mover (SM). At the beginning of the game, each player gets two cards, 1st card 
(public card) and 2nd card (private card). There is a number, randomly drawn from 1 to 4, 
printed on each card. The number on the 1st card is public information, which is known by 
two players, and the number on the 2nd card is private information, which only can be 
known by the card owner. These 4 cards identify a specific game, which is one of 256 
possible combinations. After both players get their cards, the FM chooses his action first 
and next the SM chooses her action. Actions are either to call a 3rd card or not to call a 3rd 
card. If a player chooses to call a 3rd card, this player will get a 3rd card privately (that is, only 
the cardholder could see the number on this card), on which the number is also randomly 
drawn from 1 to 4.  
After both players choose their actions, the sum of the numbers on each player’s cards 
will be calculated. If a player chooses to call a 3rd card, then the sum of this player consists 
of 3 numbers (including the number on the 3rd card). If a player does not choose to call a 3rd 
card, then the sum of this player consists of 2 numbers. The winner will be picked out 
according to the following rules: 
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a) If Sum(FM) < Sum(SM) ≤ 9, SM wins; 
b) If Sum(SM) < Sum(FM) ≤ 9, FM wins; 
c) If Sum(SM) ≤ 9 < Sum(FM), SM wins; 
d) If Sum(FM) ≤ 9 < Sum(SM), FM wins; 
e) If 9 < Sum(FM) and 9 < Sum(SM), both lose; 
f) If Sum(SM) = Sum(FM) ≤ 9, the winner is randomly chosen. 
According to the winning rules, there is an obviously weakly dominant strategy in some 
specific games, which weakly dominates all of the player’s other strategies. That is, when 
the sum of 1st and 2nd cards is smaller than or equal to 5, “Not call a 3rd card” is always 
weakly dominated by “Call a 3rd card”. In this scenario, “Call a 3rd card” always enhances the 
winning probability but never leads the sum of all three cards larger than 9.  
2.3 Theoretical analysis  
This section discusses a series of theoretical strategies that non-strategic and strategic 
players follow, and beliefs that non-strategic and strategic players build their strategies 
based on. 
Referring to the game design, we use FN1, FN2, SN1 and SN2 to represent, respectively,  
the number on the 1st card of the FM, the number on the 2nd card of the FM, the number 
on the 1st card of the SM, and the number on the 2nd card of the SM. Then the information 
set of the FM is 𝐼ி = {𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝑁2, 𝑆𝑁1}  and the information set of the SM is 𝐼ௌ =
{𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2, 𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝐴}. If the FM calls a 3rd card, the SM updates her information set to 𝐼ௌ =
{𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2, 𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶}  after knowing the FM’s action (or conditional on the FM’s action 
as call a 3rd card). If the FM does not call a 3rd card, the SM updates her information set to 
𝐼ௌ = {𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2, 𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁}  after knowing the FM’s action (or conditional on the FM’s 
action as not call a 3rd card). 
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2.3.1 Equilibrium analysis 
In our game, the FM’s strategy space includes 2଺ସ  strategies and the SM’s strategy 
space includes 2ଵଶ଼  strategies before they know two public cards 39 . To simplify the 
procedures of finding equilibrium(s), we reduce the integrated extensive game to specific 
normal-form games. After both players know their two public cards in a specific game, the 
FM only faces possibilities that are the four possible numbers on his 2nd card. Then the 
strategy space of the FM in the specific games reduces to 2^4=16 strategies, which could 
be represented as (AAAA). Meanwhile, the strategy space of the SM reduces to 2^ (4*2) 
=256 strategies, which could be represented as (AAAA, AAAA).40  
Then, each specific normal-form game with certain two 1st cards has a payoff matrix. 
To lessen the computation of payoffs in each matrix, a trim of each specific game’s strategy 
space is conducted by excluding the dominated strategies. When the sum of the 1st card 
and the 2nd card of a player is smaller than or equal to 5, “No Call” is always weakly 
dominated by “Call”, such as that if the 1st card is 2, “No Call” is a weakly dominated strategy 
when the 2nd card is 1, 2, or 3. Thus, the player should always ask for a 3rd card when his 2nd 
card is 1, 2, or 3. In this case, the trimmed strategy space of the player only has two 
possibilities, {(CCCC), (CCCN)}. By performing one round of elimination of weakly dominated 
                                                          
39 Before they know both showing cards, the information set of FM, 𝐼ி = {𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝑁2, 𝑆𝑁1},  has 4*4*4=64 combinations 
and the information set of SM, 𝐼ௌ = {𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2, 𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝐴}, has 4*4*4*2=128 combinations. In each combination, there 
are two choices of each player. Thus, FM has 2଺ସ strategies and SM has 2ଵଶ଼ strategies.  
40 “AAAA” indicates the FM’s strategy combinations given the four possible numbers on his 2nd card. “A” in the first entry 
denotes the FM’s action when the number on the 2nd card is “1”, either “C” as “Call” or “N” as “No Call”. “A” in the second 
entry denotes the FM’s action when the number on the 2nd card is “2”. “A” in the third entry denotes the FM’s action when 
the number on the 2nd card is “3”. And “A” in the last entry denotes the FM’s action when the number on the 2nd card is 
“4”. In the same way, “AAAA, AAAA” indicates the SM’s strategy combinations given the four possible numbers on her 2nd 
card and her FM’s choices. “A” in the first entry denotes the SM’s action when the number on her 2nd card of SM is “1” 
and her FM’s action is “Call”. “A” in the second entry denotes the SM’s action when the number on her 2nd card of SM is 
“2” and her FM’s action is “Call”. “A” in the third entry denotes the SM’s action when the number on her 2nd card of SM is 
“3” and her FM’s action is “Call”. “A” in the fourth entry denotes the SM’s action when the number on her 2nd card of SM 
is “4” and her FM’s action is “Call”. The entries after the comma, “A” in the fifth entry, denotes the SM’s action when the 
number on her 2nd card of SM is “1” and her FM’s action is “No Call”. 
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strategies41, the trimmed strategy space of each specific game is reduced (to as shown in 
Appendix 2.1). 
Then, for any pair of the strategies of the two players in the payoff matrix, the payoff 
of each player is represented by the expected winning probability. To complete the payoff 
matrix of each specific game, we need to compute the expected winning probability of each 
pair of the strategies from each trimmed strategy space. (Full procedure of computing 
expected winning probabilities is described in Appendix 2.2.)  
After figuring out the payoff matrix of a specific game, we use 2 to 5 steps of iterative 
elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies for both players to find the equilibrium/ 
equilibria of the game. For example, the payoff matrix of the game { 𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2} is 
below (Table 2.F in Appendix 2.2). (CCCN) is an obvious dominant strategy, as its wining 
probability is always higher than the other 3 possible strategies given each strategy of the 
SM. After that, by checking the SM’s possible strategies, (CCCC, CCCC) is also an obvious 
dominant strategy. Then the equilibrium in the red box in this specific game is found by 2 
steps of iterative elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies. 
We find that 14 games have unique equilibriums with 2 to 5 steps of iterative 
elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies, while the other 2 games42 have two equilibria, 
                                                          
41 There is no dominant strategy in any specific game. 
42 The combinations of these two games on (FN1, SN1) are (3,3) and (4,3). 
Table F. FN1=3, SN1=2 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) CCCC, CCCC CCCC, CCCN CCCN, CCCC CCCN, CCCN 
CCCC (0.5000 (0.5000 (0.5508 (0.5508 
0.4688) 0.4688) 0.2500) 0.2500) 
CCCN (0.5664 (0.6211 (0.6016 (0.6563 
0.5469) 0.3906) 0.3438) 0.1875) 
CCNC (0.3867 (0.4648 (0.4023 (0.4805 
0.5859) 0.5234) 0.4375) 0.3750) 
CCNN (0.4531 (0.5859 (0.4531 (0.5859 
0.6172) 0.3984) 0.4688) 0.2500) 
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in which the FM’s action is the same, and the SM’s actions yield the same payoff. The 
summaries in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 show the equilibrium strategies of the FM and the SM 
in each specific game. 
Table 2.1 Strategy Matrix of Eq FM 
SN1 
FN1+FN2 1 2 3 4 
2 Call Call Call Call 
3 Call Call Call Call 
4 Call Call Call Call 
5 Call Call Call Call 
6 Call Call Call Call 
7 No Call No Call No Call Call 
8 No Call No Call No Call No Call 
 
Table 2.2 Strategy Matrix of Eq SM 
FN1 
SN1+SN2 1 2 3 4 
FA=N: 
2 Call Call Call Call 
3 Call Call Call Call 
4 Call Call Call Call 
5 Call Call Call Call 
6 Call Call Call Call 
7 No Call No Call Call/No Call43 Call 
8 No Call No Call No Call No Call 
FA=C:     
2 Call Call Call Call 
3 Call Call Call Call 
4 Call Call Call Call 
5 Call Call Call Call 
6 Call Call Call Call 
7 No Call No Call No Call Call/No Call44 
8 No Call No Call No Call No Call 
 
                                                          
43 When L2 SM faces {SN1=3, SN2=4, FN1=3, FA=N}, the winning probability of “Call” is equal to the winning probability of 
“No Call”. When L2 SM faces {SN1=4, SN2=3, FN1=3, FA=N}, the winning probability of “Call” is lower than the winning 
probability of “No Call”. 
44 When L2 SM faces {SN1=3, SN2=4, FN1=4, FA=C}, the winning probability of “Call” is equal to the winning probability of 
“No Call”. When L2 SM faces {SN1=4, SN2=3, FN1=4, FA=C}, the winning probability of “Call” is lower than the winning 
probability of “No Call”. 
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2.3.2 Level-k analysis  
The theoretical study (Rothschild et al., 2012) combined level-k analysis with the 
Bayesian approach to model player’s behaviours in a continuous-strategy-space two-stage 
dynamic defend-attack game with incomplete information and uncertainty.  
Level-k analysis models human being’s behaviour as a hierarchy and the strategies of 
higher level (Lk) players respond best to their one level lower (Lk-1) players’ strategies. In 
the level-k analysis, high level players generally anchor their beliefs in L0 player, who 
chooses randomly from the strategy set. That is, L0 does not use his opponent’s information 
to choose action. Furthermore, L0 does not care about the information he owns. This 
implies that L0 has a chance to choose dominated strategies. Since L0 player’s strategy 
implies that he does not fully understand the winning rules of the game, L0 is just treated 
as a kind of belief which L1 player holds.  
Following CG’s work, L1 is called naïve categorised into non-strategic types (C1). In our 
games with incomplete information and uncertainty, L1 uses both his public and private 
information and his opponent’s public information to make his choice, but L1 assumes that 
his opponent, L0, does not understand the games. That is, L1 does not think that the 
strategy of his opponent is related to his opponent’s information set and incentive of 
winning. The strategy that L1 player follows is to choose the action which has a higher 
winning probability given two public 1st cards and his private 2nd card. L1 player assumes 
the number on his opponent’s 2nd card has 25% as 1, 2, 3 or 4 and his opponent has 50% to 
calls a 3rd card. Furthermore, Lk (k=2, 3…) players categorised into strategic types (C2) share 
the same strategy matrixes with Eq player in our games, but L2 player holds a different 
belief on his opponent with Eq’s. In the following, we explain the strategy matrixes used by 
Lk (k=1, 2) and beliefs how Lk (k=1, 2) generalises in detail.  
Level-k analysis in our game is based on three assumptions: 
Assumption 1: All players are risk-neutral and maximise their expected earnings except L0.  
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Assumption 2: Players whose levels are above 0 hold belief that L0 player randomly chooses 
between “Call” (call a 3rd card) and “No Call” (not call a 3rd card).  
Assumption 3: Level-k players utilise Bayes’ Rule for k=2, 3, … 
2.3.2.1 L1 player 
Based on Assumption 2, L1 player believes that his opponent is L0 player. That is, if L1 
player is the FM, then he chooses actions without caring about whether his actions will 
affect his opponent’s actions. If L1 player is the SM, then she chooses actions without caring 
about the information implied by her opponent’s actions. Based on Assumption 1, L1 player 
chooses an action which leads to a higher probability to win the game. When the L1 player 
is the FM, he predicts the SM chooses “Call” as 50% possibility. When the L1 player is the 
SM and she knows or equates with knowing the FM’s action, she understands that her 
opponent, FM, randomly selects actions and her opponent’s 2nd card is uniformly 
distributed from 1 to 4. (The detailed procedure of the analysis on the L1 players’ strategies 
is described in Appendix 2.3.)  
Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 present the strategy matrixes of L1 FM and L1 SM. Since L1 FM 
does not think his action has an effect on SM’s action and L1 SM also does not think FM’s 
action implies extra information, L1 players do not apply Bayes’ Rule on their strategy.   
Table 2.3. Strategy Matrix of the L1 FM 
SN1 
FN1+FN2 
1 2 3 4 
2 Call Call Call Call 
3 Call Call Call Call 
4 Call Call Call Call 
5 Call Call Call Call 
6 No Call Call Call Call 
7 No Call No Call No Call Call 
8 No Call No Call No Call No Call 
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Table 2.4. Strategy Matrix of L1 SM 
FN1 
SN1+SN2 1 2 3 4 
FA=N: 
2 Call Call Call Call 
3 Call Call Call Call 
4 Call Call Call Call 
5 Call Call Call Call 
6 No Call No Call Call Call 
7 No Call No Call No Call No Call 
8 No Call No Call No Call No Call 
FA=C:     
2 Call Call Call Call 
3 Call Call Call Call 
4 Call Call Call Call 
5 Call Call Call Call 
6 Call Call Call Call 
7 No Call No Call Call Call 
8 No Call No Call No Call No Call 
 
2.3.2.2 L2 player 
In the level-k analysis, L2 player knows L1 player’s strategies (in Table 2.3 and Table 
2.4), so L2 player makes the best response to L1 player’s strategy. In the games, if L2 player 
is the FM, then he knows that his L1 opponent chooses actions based on his actions. If the 
L2 player is the SM, she knows that her L1 opponent chooses actions based on  𝐼ி. L2 SM 
chooses actions after she knows her FM’s action. Then using Bayes’ rule, L2 SM updates her 
prior distribution, which is the same as L1’s prior distribution, to the posterior probability 
on the distribution of FN2 according to the FM’s action.  
For example, in a scenario of {FN1=3, SN1=1, SN2=3, FA=C}, before L2 SM knows her 
FM’s action, the prior distribution of FN2 is a uniform distribution from 1 to 4. However, 
after L2 SM is informed that her FM’s action is “Call”, L2 SM updates her belief to the 
posterior distribution of FN2 based on Bayes’ Rule by checking Table 2.3. As FN1=3, then 
the {FN1+FN2} only could be 4, 5, 6, or 7. Meanwhile, SN=1, then the first column of Table 
2.3 shows that there are only two cases in which L1 FM calls a 3rd card: either {FN1+FN2=4} 
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or {FN1+FN2=5}. Then L2 SM knows L1 FM’s FN2 only could be 1 or 2. The posterior 
distribution of FN2 of the L1 FM is 50% chance to be 1 or 2 and 0% chance to be 3 or 4.  
L2 player chooses an action with a high winning probability between “Call a 3rd card” 
and “Not call a 3rd card”, similar to L1 player. (The procedure of computing the winning 
probability is described in Appendix 2.4.) Table 2.1 shows the strategy matrix of L2 FM and 
Table 2.2 shows the strategy matrix of L2 SM in each specific game. (As the strategy of L2 
players in each specific game is coincident with the equilibrium)45.  
2.3.2.3 Level-k thinking and equilibrium  
Herbert and Heitmann (2014) apply the level-k analysis on a two-stage Cournot game 
and show that when k goes to infinite, the results converge to sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium. In our game, the equilibrium in each specific game deduced by iterative 
elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies is (are) coincident with the equilibrium 
reached by level-3 player converged to by level-k analysis.  
That is, after knowing L2 players’ strategy matrix (Table 7 and Table 8), L3 players make 
their best response to L2 players’ strategy just as L2 players do. The result shows that the 
strategy matrix of L3 player is the same as the one of L2 player. Furthermore, the strategy 
matrix of L4 player is the same as the one of L3 player by conducting the same procedure. 
That means, given L3 player’s strategy matrix, L4 player has no incentive to deviate from 
this L4 strategy matrix. Meanwhile, since L4 strategy matrix is the same as L2 strategy matrix, 
given L4 (L2) strategy matrix, L3 player has no incentive to deviate from his L3 strategy 
matrix. Then we get an Equilibrium, which is reached by L3 player.  
Generally, based on Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, there are a series of predictions 
on other level players: 
                                                          
45 Based on the previous deducing, the L2 players’ and Equilibrium players’ beliefs could be represents as described in 
the Appendix 2.4. 
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Prediction 1: L1 FM does not think his actions affect his opponent’s actions, and L1 SM takes 
her opponent’s actions into account, but L1 SM does not think her opponent’s actions include 
meaningful information. That is, L1 players do not use Bayes’ rule.  
Prediction 2: L2 FM knows his opponent takes his actions into account, and L2 SM not only 
takes her opponent’s actions into account but also applies Bayes’ Rule to update her belief 
on her opponent’s private information according to her opponent’s actions. 
Prediction 3: L3 plays Equilibrium, which L2’s strategy is coincident with.  
Prediction 3 gives us a new view on how to find equilibrium on games with a large 
strategy space, which is that using level-k analysis could simplify the procedure of finding 
out an equilibrium.   
2.3.3 Safety type (SA) and Expected value calculation type (Exp) 
SA player in our games is specified as a player who always chooses actions which have 
no chance directly to lead losing by himself without considering the opponent’s actions. 
That is, SA player only calls a 3rd card when the sum of his 1st card and 2nd card is smaller 
than or equal to 5. This means that SA player never plays dominated strategies and only 
care his own information when he chooses actions but never cares his opponent’s public 
information. Following this strategy, SA player has no chance to exceed the upper bound 
“9”. This brings SA player no chance to regret his actions. Then all possible scenarios in 
which SA player loses games are due to his opponent’s actions. Since SA player does not 
take account his opponent’s information into his strategy, theoretically SA player has no 
specific belief on his opponent’s action and has a uniform prior distribution on his 
opponent’s 2nd card.  
Exp player represents a player who chooses actions which have higher expected value 
(winning probability) among all selectable actions without considering opponents’ actions. 
That is, Exp player calculates the expected sum of 3 cards if to call a 3rd card and compares 
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with 9. If the sum is smaller or equal than 9, Exp calls a 3rd card. Otherwise, Exp player does 
not call a 3rd card. The expected value of a 3rd card is 2.5, e.g. (1+2+3+4)/4. That is, if the 
sum of his 1st card and 2nd card is <=6, Exp player will call a 3rd card. If the sum of his 1st and 
2nd card is 7 or 8, the expected sum will be 9.5 or 10. In these cases, the expected sum is 
over 9. Then Exp player will not call a 3rd card. Similar with SA, the information Exp player 
uses in his strategy only relates to his own cards but not to his opponent’s 1st card, and then 
theoretically Exp player also has no specific belief on his opponent’s action and has a 
uniform prior distribution on his opponent’s 2nd card.   
Furthermore, Level-k analysis in our game is based on Assumption 2 that L0 chooses 
actions randomly.  Besides, if we relax Assumption 2 to let Exp or SA as L0(Exp) or L0(SA), 
then the L1(Exp) or L2(SA), which is two-step best response to Exp or SA, is also coincided 
with Eq strategy. L1(Exp), L1(SA)46 and L2(SA) are also strategic types (in C1). L1(Exp), L1(SA) 
and L2(SA) follow Bayes’ Rule to build up their beliefs on their opponents’ actions and their 
opponents’ private information. Moreover, L1(Exp), L1(SA) and L2(SA) know their actions 
affect their opponents’ actions. The beliefs that L1(Exp), L1(SA) and L2(SA) build also follows 
formulas in Appendix 2.4 from a) to c). 
2.4. Experimental design 
In this section, we describe the procedure of the experiment in detail and explain the 
theoretical predictions for the games.  
2.4.1 Overview 
Our experiment consisted of two treatments: direct-response treatment (DRT) and 
strategy method treatment (SMT). Each treatment had three sessions. All subjects (54 
                                                          
46 See Appendix 2.5. L1(SA) is coincident with Exp on FM’s strategy and Exp is a subset of L1(SA) on SM’s strategy. So L1(SA) 
and Exp cannot be separated by actions but their beliefs on their opponents are still different, and then L1(SA) and Exp 
could be separated by stated beliefs.  
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subjects in DRT and 54 subjects in SMT) were students and employees from the University 
of St Andrews. The experiment took place in 2018.  
Each session includes 12 games. At the beginning of a session, subjects were randomly 
signed to roles, FM or SM, which stayed the same in 12 games. Following CG’s work, to 
avoid repeated-game effect and learning apart from introspective transfer learning, 
subjects got no feedback between games until 12 games finished, and FM and SM randomly 
paired anew after each game.  
To identify different types of subjects, we select 12 specific games based on some rules 
shown in Table 2.5 from 256 possibilities of card combinations: 
Table 2.5 Games 
 FM SM 
Games 1st Card 2ndcard 1st Card 2nd card 
1 2 4 1 2 
2 4 2 4 3 
3 4 4 3 4 
4 1 2 2 1 
5 4 3 4 3 
6 3 1 3 4 
7 1 1 3 2 
8 3 4 3 4 
9 3 3 1 2 
10 4 2 1 1 
11 3 3 1 1 
12 4 1 4 3 
As numbers on 1st cards are public information, whether to appear as a uniform 
distribution does not affect subjects’ beliefs, and then there was no constraint on numbers 
on 1st cards. However, the numbers on 2nd cards are private information, which is related 
to subjects’ beliefs, and thus, to build up a proper belief on the distribution of numbers on 
2nd cards, each number (1, 2, 3 or 4) appears three times as the number on 2nd card in 12 
games, which was known by subjects. Since a player only has two optional actions, it is 
highly possible that more than one type shares the same optimal action in a game. Then to 
separate the optimal actions and beliefs of different types (e.g. Exp, L1 and L2) as much as 
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possible, these 12 games were picked out based on the strategy spaces of types. 
Furthermore, the order of 12 games was fixed across sessions, which was designed to avoid 
the SM inferring the number on the FM’s 2nd card under the assumption the FM played Eq. 
In each game, the FM chooses his action first, and next stated his belief that the SM 
would call a 3rd card after he chooses his action. Then in the DRT, the SM first states her 
belief that the FM would call a 3rd card before she chooses her action without knowing the 
FM’s action and next chooses her action after knowing the FM’s action. After that, the SM 
states her belief that the number on the FM’s 2nd card was 1, 2, 3 or 4. In SMT, the SM first 
states her belief that the FM will call a 3rd card before she chooses her action without 
knowing the FM’s action and next the SM chose actions twice, one for each of the FM’s 
feasible actions. After that, the SM states her belief that the number on the FM’s 2nd card 
was 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
2.4.2 Belief elicitation 
Since players’ strategies rely on their beliefs on their opponents’ strategies, stated 
beliefs in the experiment also could be used to identify subjects’ types. To elicit subjects’ 
beliefs properly, the rules used in the experiment is a quadratic scoring rule (Costa-Gomes 
and Weizsacker, 2008), which is incentive compatible under risk-neutral expected utility.  
The stated belief that the opponent will call a 3rd card should be an integral number 
between 0 to 100. If a subject states his belief as 𝑏1, the earnings of the stated belief are 
determined as following: 
If his opponent chooses to call a 3rd card, 
𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 (£) =
400 − 0.04 × (𝑏1 − 100)ଶ
100
 
If his opponent does not choose to call a 3rd card, 
𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 (£) =
400 − 0.04 × (𝑏1)ଶ
100
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The stated beliefs that the number on FM’s 2nd card is 1, 2, 3 or 4 should be four integral 
numbers between 0 to 100 and the sum of these four integral numbers should be 100. If a 
subject states her belief as 𝑏2(1), 𝑏2(2), 𝑏2(3) and 𝑏2(4), the earnings of the stated belief 
are determined as following: 
𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 (£) =
400
100
−
0.02 × (𝑏2(1) − 𝐴)ଶ
100
−
0.02 × (𝑏2(1) − 𝐵)ଶ
100
−
0.02 × (𝑏2(1) − 𝐶)ଶ
100
−
0.02 × (𝑏2(1) − 𝐷)ଶ
100
 
If the number on FM’s 2nd card is 1, then A=100, B=C=D=0; If the number on FM’s 2nd card 
is 1, then B=100, A=C=D=0; If the number on FM’s 2nd card is 1, then C=100, A=B=D=0; If the 
number on FM’s 2nd card is 1, then D=100, A=B=C=0. 
2.4.3 Strategy and belief in specific games 
To identify different types, a series of games are picked out from 256 possibilities, 
which lead various paths of actions and beliefs across different types. For the FM, Game 
4,6,7 and 12 have dominated strategies, which are used to check if subjects understand the 
winning rules; for the SM, Game 1,4,7,9,10 and 11 have dominated strategies, which are 
used to check if subjects understand the winning rules. Table 2.6a represents the FM’s 
theoretical actions of different types choose in each game and Table 2.6b represents the 
SM’s theoretical actions of different types choose in each game.  
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Table 2.6a. FM’s Actions of different types in games  
Game SA Exp/L1(SA) L1 L2/Eq/L1(Exp) 
1 N C N C 
2 N C C C 
3 N N N N 
4 C C C C 
5 N N C C 
6 C C C C 
7 C C C C 
8 N N N N 
9 N C N C 
10 N C N C 
11 N C N C 
12 C C C C 
Note: C means “Call a 3rd card”; N means “Not call a 3rd card”.  
Table 2.6b. SM’s Actions of different types in games  
Game SA/Exp L1-C L1-N L2/Eq/L1(Exp)-C L2/Eq/L1(Exp)-N 
1 C C C C C 
2 N C N N C 
3 N C N C/N C 
4 C C C C C 
5 N C N N C 
6 N C N N C/N 
7 C C C C C 
8 N C N N C/N 
9 C C C C C 
10 C C C C C 
11 C C C C C 
12 N C N N C 
Note: “L1-C” and “L2/Eq/L1(Exp)-C” in the second row mean that her FM called a 3rd card; “L1-N” and 
“L2/Eq/L1(Exp)-N” in the second row mean that her FM did not call a 3rd card. “C/N” means the expected 
winning probabilities of two actions are the same. 
If a player holds a belief on his opponent, Table 2.7 represents the possible beliefs 
players could hold. SA play means a player thinks his opponent behaves like SA; Exp play 
means a player thinks his opponent behaves like Exp; L1 means an L1 player thinks his 
opponent behaves like L0; L2 means an L2 player thinks his opponent behaves like L1; L3/Eq 
means an L3/Eq player thinks his opponent plays equilibrium.  
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If a player thinks his opponent plays as SA, he knows his opponent only calls a 3rd card 
when the sum of his opponent’s 1st and 2nd cards is smaller than or equal to 5. Then 
considering his opponent’s 1st card, the player needs to infer which number(s) on his 
opponent’s 2nd card can lead his opponent to call a 3rd card. Since each number appears 
with 25% possibility, the player can calculate his belief. To get belief on Exp Play follows the 
same procedure as SA Play. The L1 player always predicts that L0 chooses each action with 
50% probability.  
Even L2 plays the same strategy with L3 and Eq, L2 and L3/Eq have different beliefs. L2 
predicts his opponent plays as L1, but L3 and Eq predict their opponents play equilibrium 
(or L2 which is coincided with equilibrium), which is different from L1’s strategy. Based on 
formulas a) b) c) in 3.3.2, L2 or L3/Eq could infer his belief on his opponent based on the 
public information and the strategy matrix his opponent should follow. 
2.4.4 Procedure and payment 
Subjects first read the instructions (in Appendix Instructions) on the experiment, and 
next had to pass two understanding tests (in Appendix Understanding Test) of the game and 
belief elicitation rule. Failure leads to dismissal. After that, left subjects were signed as the 
FM and the SM randomly and played three different practice periods without feedback. 
After 12 games, subjects took the bomb task (Crosetto & Filippin, 2013) on risk aversion 
(see Appendix Instruction on Bomb Task & CRT) and Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) 
(Frederick, 2005) in 5 minutes (see Appendix CRT47).  
                                                          
47 CRT includes three questions. In our experiment, the order of three questions are randomly determined in each session.  
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Table 2.7. Beliefs of different types in games  
 FM  SM 
Game SA Play Exp play L1 L2-C L2-N L3/Eq-C L3/Eq-N  SA Play Exp play L1 L2 L3/Eq 
1 100 100 50 100 100 100 100  75 100 50 75 100 
2 25 50 50 75 50 50 75  25 50 50 75 75 
3 50 75 50 100 75 87.5 75  25 50 50 50 50 
4 75 100 50 100 75 100 100  100 100 50 100 100 
5 25 50 50 75 50 50 75  25 50 50 75 75 
6 50 75 50 100 75 75 87.5  50 75 50 75 75 
7 50 75 50 75 50 75 75  100 100 50 100 100 
8 50 75 50 100 75 75 75  50 75 50 75 75 
9 100 100 50 100 100 100 100  50 75 50 50 75 
10 100 100 50 100 100 100 100  25 50 50 25 50 
11 100 100 50 100 100 100 100  50 75 50 50 75 
12 25 50 50 75 50 50 75  25 50 50 75 75 
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Subjects were paid according to their actions, answers and chance as following. The fix 
payoff show-up fee was £4. The variable payoff includes four parts, prizes of games, 
earnings of belief, earnings of bomb task and earnings of CRT. The prize of a game was £4. 
That is, if the subject wins in a game, he could get £4. Otherwise, he could get £0. And 3 out 
of the 12 games were drawn for each subject to win prizes. For FM, 1 out of 12 games drawn 
for each subject was paid for the belief of whether her SM would call the 3rd card (Maximum 
pay £4). For SM, 1 out of 9 games (excluding three games for the prize) drawn for each 
subject was paid for beliefs and next 1 out of 2 beliefs of, whether FM called the 3rd card or 
the number on FM’s 2nd card, was selected to be paid (Maximum pay £4).  
2.5 Data Analysis  
This section analyses the subjects’ actions and beliefs in the experiment. First, we 
report the non-parametric analysis, which is the overview of results. In this part, the 
deviations from the equilibrium predictions (/L2 predictions) are examined and whether 
subjects’ actions best respond to their stated beliefs is checked. Second, we present a 
parametric analysis. In this part, a series of maximum likelihood estimations of mixture type 
models are introduced to identify different thinking types. The MLE of the mixture type 
model with error-rates conducted by CG (Costa-Gomes, 2001) in Section 2.5.2.1 identifies 7 
thinking types using action data. Then, the MLE of the mixture type model with payoff-
sensitive conducted by CG&W (Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker, 2008) in Section 2.5.2.2 is 
generalised to identify stated beliefs on 5 belief types. Furthermore, by combining actions 
and beliefs, the MLE of the mixture type model with integrated payoff-sensitive and error-
rates conducted by CG&C (Costa-Gomes and Crawford, 2006) in Section 2.5.2.3 identifies 9 
thinking types. Section 2.5.3 discusses whether the subject’s strategic think is related to the 
subject’s cognitive reflection and the subject’s risk attitude.  
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2.5.1 Non-parametric analysis  
In this section, we report a series of statistic overviews on subjects’ actions and beliefs 
comparing with theoretical predictions.  
2.5.1.1 Overview of rationality 
In our experiment, the games are grouped by whether there are dominated strategies 
in the games. The FM has the dominated action in the Game 4,6,7 and 12, “Not call a 3rd 
card”, and the SM has the dominated action in the Game 1,4,7,9,10 and 11, “Not call a 3rd 
card”. As discussed in Section 2.2, if a player fully understands the winning rules, he will 
never play the dominated action. Then, in the games with the dominated strategies, players 
should more easily comply with equilibrium than in the games without dominated 
strategies.  
Table 2.8 reports the summary of players’ rates of equilibrium compliance in the games 
with and without the dominated strategy. The rates in the table represent the proportions 
of actions which comply with equilibrium in the specific games. Players’ compliance rates 
are similar across the roles and the treatments in the game with dominated strategies. 
However, the compliance rates show a significant difference between the games with and 
without dominated strategies within the roles and the treatments. Furthermore, the 
compliance rates also show significant difference across the roles within the treatments in 
the games without dominated strategies. 
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Table 2.8 Overview of Actions in Equilibrium48  
 
Game  
with Dominant Strategy  
Game  
without Dominant Strategy  Fisher exact test 
 % Obs % Obs  
DRT      
FM 99.07% (107/108) 83.33% (180/216) 0 *** 
SM 97.53% (158/162) 64.81% (105/162) 0 *** 
Fisher exact test  ***   
SMT      
FM 97.22% (105/108) 82.41% (178/216) 0 *** 
SM 97.84% (317/324) 62.96% (204/324) 0 *** 
Fisher exact test  ***   
*** represents the p-value of Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.01. 
As games with dominated strategies can be used to check the understanding of players 
on the winning rules of the game, the other summary reported by Table 2.9 investigates the 
deviation rate of actions and the deviation rate of beliefs. The deviated actions do not 
comply with equilibrium in the games with dominated strategies, and the deviated beliefs 
are the thought that their opponents will not comply with equilibrium in the games with 
dominated strategies (Not to call a 3rd card when the sum of the 1st and the 2nd card is 
smaller than or equal to 5). In a specific game, when a player is informed that his opponent’s 
1st card is 1, the player who believes his opponent understands the rules of the game should 
state the probability of his opponent to choose “Call a 3rd card” as 100%. 
The right-part columns “Deviated Stated Belief” in Table 2.9 shows the summary on 
deviations of stated beliefs. Furthermore, 21 FMs in DRT state all four beliefs equal to 100 
out of 27 FMs. 20 SMs in DRT state both two beliefs equal to 100 out of 27 SMs. Moreover, 
23 FMs in SMT state all four beliefs equal to 100 out of 27 FMs. 25 SMs in SMT state both 
two beliefs equal to 100 out of 27 SMs. Table 2.9 shows that players hardly play dominated 
actions, which implies that players understand the rules of the game well. Also, most of the 
                                                          
48 For the FM, there are 108 (27 subjects x 1 action x 4 games) observations in Game 4, 6, 7, and 12. 
For the SM in DRT, there are 162 (27 subjects x 1 action x 6 games) observations in Game 1,4,7,9,10 
and 11. For the SM in SMT, there are 324 (27 subjects x 2 conditional actions x 6 games) observations 
in Game 1,4,7,9,10 and 11. 
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subjects believe that their opponents do not play dominated actions. Meanwhile, a series 
of tests on the comparisons of rates of the deviated actions and the deviated beliefs implies 
that subjects show less trust in their opponents’ understanding of the winning rules.  
Table 2.9. Deviation Summary  
 Deviated Action Deviated Stated Belief49 Fisher exact test 
 % Obs % Obs  
DRT      
FM 0.93% (1/108) 19.44% (21/108) *** 
SM 2.47% (4/162) 11.11% (6/54) ** 
SMT      
FM 2.78% (3/108) 14.81% (16/108) *** 
SM 2.16% (7/324) 7.41% (4/54) * 
*** represents the p-value of Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.01. 
** represents the p-value of Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.05. 
* represents the p-value of Fisher exact test is smaller than 0.1. 
 
2.5.1.2 Action and stated belief of FM 
As the discussion in section 2.3 shows how beliefs affect players’ strategies, in this 
section, we investigate how the FM responds to his belief in the 8 games without dominated 
actions.  Since the FM states his belief on the SM’s action after he chooses his action, the 
belief of the other opposite action without chosen could not be elicited. To investigate the 
relations between the chosen actions and the stated beliefs, we make two comparisons. 
One comparison is between the current probability of winning given the FM’s action and 
his stated belief with the probability of winning if the FM chooses the opposite action (i.e. 
instead of calling the 3rd card, he would not call it) and SM calls the 3rd card. The other one 
is between the current probability of winning given the FM’s action and his stated belief 
with the probability of winning if the FM chooses the opposite action (i.e. instead of calling 
the 3rd card, he would not call it) and SM does not call the 3rd card. If the current probability 
                                                          
49 In the experiment, 1st card of the FM’s opponent is 1 in Game 1, 9, 10 and 11; 1st card of the SM’s 
opponent is 1 in Game 4 and 7. So the observations of the FM are 108 (27 subjects x 1 belief x 4 
games) and the observations of the SM are 54 (27 subjects x 1 belief x 2 games). 
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of winning is larger in both comparisons, the current action is defined as “Best Action”. If 
the current probability of winning is smaller in both comparisons, the current action is 
defined as “Worst Action”. If the current probability of winning is larger in one comparison 
and smaller in the other comparison, the current action is defined as “Better Action”. Table 
2.10 shows the summary of comparisons in both treatments.  
Furthermore, we conduct these comparisons based on three possible beliefs. Uniform 
represents belief without Bayes’ Rule, in which actions do not include extra information. 
That is, when the FM predicts his SM’s action, the FM thinks that his SM’s action is 
independent with his SM’s 2nd card, which implies all 4 numbers are equally likely on the 
SM’s 2nd card. Exp and SA, which are the first and second most possible beliefs over 5 beliefs 
reported in Table 2.17 in Section 2.5.2.2, represent beliefs with Bayes’ rule, in which 
information on the SM’s 2nd card is contained by the SM’s action.  
For example, the Exp FM predicts his SM calls a 3rd card as 75% possibility when the FM 
does not call a 3rd card and his SM’s 1st card is 2. According to Bayes’ Rule, if his SM calls a 
3rd card, then his SM’s 2nd card only could be randomly drawn from 1, 2 and 3. If his SM does 
not call a 3rd card, then his SM’s 2nd card must be 4. That means, when the FM calculates his 
probability of winning in this case, the sum of his SM’s 2nd card and 3rd card when his SM 
calls a 3rd card only has 6 possibilities but could never reach 8, and the distribution from 2 
to 7 is {1/12, 2/12, 3/12, 3/12, 2/12, 1/12}. Comparing with Uniform belief, the sum of SM’s 
2nd card and 3rd card when SM calls a 3rd card always has 7 possibilities, and the distribution 
from 2 to 8 is {1/16, 2/16, 3/16, 4/16, 3/16, 2/16, 1/16}.  
Table 2.10 shows the summary of comparisons of each belief in both treatments. In 
general, comparisons across treatments have similar tendency out of 216 observations (8 
games x 1 comparison x 27 FM in each treatment). Furthermore, 48 observations out of 216 
are defined as the Best Action across three beliefs, and 9 observations are defined as the 
Worst Action in DRT; 47 observations out of 216 are defined as Best Action across three 
beliefs, and 10 observations are defined as Worst Action in SMT. 
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Table 2.10. Actions Respond to Stated Beliefs 
 FM in DRT   FM in SMT 
 Uniform Exp SA Uniform Exp SA 
Best Action 82 59 73 86 57 80 
Better Action 110 129 126 107 129 120 
Worst Action 24 28 17 23 30 16 
 
2.5.1.3 Action and stated belief of SM 
In this section, we first examine whether the SM estimates of the FM’s 2nd card’s 
number consistent with Bayes' rule and next check if the actions of the SM best respond to 
his beliefs in 6 games without dominated strategies.  
We measure the deviations of stated estimates from a specific rule as below: 
𝐷𝑒𝑣௞ =
1
12
෍
1
4
෍[
𝑏𝑝(𝑖)௚
100
−
𝑏𝑝(𝑖)௚௞
100
]^2
ସ
௜ୀଵ
ଵଶ
௚ୀଵ
 
𝑏𝑝(𝑖)௚  represents the stated estimate that the number on FM’s 2nd card is 𝑖 in game 𝑔. 
𝑏𝑝(𝑖)௚௞  represents the rule 𝑘’s estimate that the number on FM’s 2nd card is 𝑖 in game 𝑔. 
We compare 𝐷𝑒𝑣௞ across 5 rules and pick up the minimal 𝐷𝑒𝑣௞ to represent the rule that 
subjects followed. As the number on player’s 2nd card is drawn randomly from 1 to 4, the 
prior distribution should be {25, 25, 25, 25} when there is no more information on the 
number on FM’s 2nd card. Then “Uniform” represents the rule, {25, 25, 25, 25}, in which 
players do not use Bayes’ Rule to update their beliefs when they are informed of the FM’s 
actions. The other 4 rules include Bayes’ Rule. That is, players who follow one of these 4 
rules update their information on numbers of the FM’s 2nd card. “SA Play” means that the 
SM thinks her FM plays as SA type, so the SM who follows SA Play rule could update her 
belief based on the formula in Section 2.3.3). “Exp Play” represents the belief that the SM 
thinks her FM plays as Exp type. Similarly, “L1 Play” represents the belief that the SM thinks 
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her FM plays as L1 and “Eq Play” represents the belief that the SM thinks her FM plays as 
Eq.  
Table 2.11 shows the distribution of the rules which the SM subjects followed in both 
treatments.  Most of the subjects follow Bayes’ Rule in both treatments and the most 
popular rules subjects follow is “Exp Play”. 
Table 2.11 Stated Beliefs’ Rules 
 
Uniform 
Bayes’ Rule 
 SA Play Exp Play L1 Play Eq Play 
DRT 4 2 12 1 8 
SMT 3 4 16 2 2 
Furthermore, we check whether subjects best respond to their beliefs by comparing 
the winning probability between actions, “Calla 3rd card” and “Not call a 3rd card”, in 6 
games without dominated strategies. In DRT, there are 62 observations out of 162 
observations (27 subjects x 6 games) which did not best respond to the corresponding 
beliefs. In SMT, there are 54 observations out of 162 observations which did not best 
respond to the corresponding beliefs. (The p-value of the chi-square statistic is 0.3539 
between treatments.) There are no less than 1/3 cases in which subjects fail to choose the 
best responses to their beliefs. Comparing with the FM, whose “Worst Actions” chosen are 
less than 15% cases, it is more difficult for the SM to comply with their beliefs.  
2.5.2 Parametric analysis  
In this section, we discuss the findings of the maximum likelihood estimations of 
several finite mixture models using subjects’ actions and stated beliefs.  
2.5.2.1 Models on the action data 
In this section, we conduct a mixture type analysis with error-rates of actions of the FM 
and the SM in DRT and SMT, by which each thinking type should be identified using the 
subjects’ actions without any other individual information. Recall that the types we 
mentioned in Section 2.3 are divided into two categories, non-strategic types (C1), which 
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includes SA, Exp, L0 and L1, and strategic types (C2), which includes L1(Exp), L1(SA), L2 and 
Eq. 
The summary in Section 2.5.1 shows that subjects hardly play dominated actions. This 
indicates that L0 hardly exists, and L0 cannot be separated in our games. Thus, L0 is 
excluded from the mixture model as types of actions. Meanwhile, SA and Exp cannot be 
separated for the SM in our games, so SA is merged into Exp for the SM. Furthermore, 
L1(Exp) and L2 are merged into Eq, since L1(Exp) and L2 converge to Eq, which means that 
we cannot separate these 3 types only by actions. Next, since L1(SA) FM is coincident with 
Exp FM and the strategy matrix of Exp is a subset of L1(SA)’s, Exp is also merged into L1(SA).  
Then in this section, these types are identified by the MLE of a mixture model with 
error-rate, in which each subject’s type is determined by a common prior distribution over 
these types. Each subject’s type remains constant for all 12 games. We pool the action data 
of each subject and aggregate the number of the periods separately in which the subject’s 
actions coincide with the suggestions of SA/L1(SA)/L1/Eq according to Table 2.6. In our 
error-rate model, subjects who follow one specific type choose actions which comply with 
this type’s strategy with an error with probability from 0 to 1, which is used to explain the 
variance of subject’s actions from his theoretical predictions. Since different types require 
different cognitive difficulties, errors are type-dependent but independently and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) over subjects and games. Formula (2.5.1) and (2.5.2) present the MLE of 
a mixture type model with error-rate,   
(2.5.1) 
𝐿௜௞൫𝑒௞ห𝑥௜௞൯ = (1 − 𝑒௞)௫೔
ೖ
(𝑒௞)ீି௫೔
ೖ
 
which denotes the probability of a particular observation 𝑥௜௞  of a type 𝑘 subject 𝑖:  
(2.5.2) 
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lnL(𝑝, 𝑒|𝑥) = ෍ ln [෍ 𝑝௞𝐿௜௞(𝑒௞|𝑥௜௞)
௄
௞ୀଵ
]
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
which denotes the log-likelihood function for the series of observations of 𝑥௜௞.  
Let 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 index subjects on a role of a treatment and let 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾 represent 
the types. In this Section, N equals to 27 and 𝐾 equals to 4 for the FM, or 3 for the SM.  𝑥௜௞  
represents the number of games out of 𝐺 games in which subject 𝑖 follows type 𝑘’s strategy, 
and 𝑥௜ ≡ (𝑥௜ଵ, … , 𝑥௜௄) and 𝑥 ≡ (𝑥ଵ, … , 𝑥ே)′. 𝐺 represents the number of games which are 
used to identify subjects. Subjects play 12 games for the FM and for the SM in DRT, and 
subjects play 24 games for the SM in SMT, since the SM in SMT makes two conditional 
choices in one game. Furthermore, out of 12 games, there are 4 games which have 
dominant action, “Call a 3rd card” for the FM and 6 games for the SM. Thus, 𝐺 equals to 12 
in “All periods” columns in Table 2.16, equals to 8 in “Exclude…” column for the FM, equals 
to 6 in “Exclude…” column for the SM in DRT and equals to 12 in “Exclude…” column for the 
SM in SMT 𝑒௞  means type 𝑘 ’s error rate, a probability 𝑒௞ ∈ [0,1] , with which type 𝑘 
subject’s actions deviate from type 𝑘’s prediction, and 𝑒 ≡ (𝑒ଵ, … , 𝑒௄). Let 𝑝௞ represents 
the common prior probability of type 𝑘, where ∑ 𝑝௞௄௞ୀଵ  and 𝑝 ≡ (𝑝ଵ, … , 𝑝௄).  
Table 2.12 shows the estimated type probabilities 𝑝௞ and type-dependent error rates 
𝑒௞. The left-part columns “All games (12)” give the estimates on all 12 games (24 games for 
the SM in SMT). And the right-part columns “FM (8)” give the estimates on 8 games for the 
FM, in which the sum of 1st card and 2nd card of the FM is equal to or smaller than 5; the 
column “SM (6)” gives the estimates on 6 games, in which the sum of 1st card and 2nd card 
of the SM in DRT is equal to or smaller than 5; the column “SM (12)” gives the estimates on 
6 pairs of actions in 6 games, in which the sum of 1st card and 2nd card of the SM in SMT is 
equal to or smaller than 5. The analysis of right-part columns target on the games without 
dominant action. As the previous summary shows that fewer subjects play dominated 
actions, excluding games with dominated action helps to estimate parameters more 
accurately. The results between the two analyses show consistency.  
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Finding 2.A1: 𝑝௞  of Exp and L1(SA) shows the highest value across all roles of both 
treatments. 
Finding 2.A2: SM in SMT has the positive probability of L1 and meanwhile all the other roles 
in both treatments hardly play as L1.  
The previous summary in Table 2.9 reports some of the subjects do predict their 
opponents not to play the dominant action in the games with the dominant action, which 
is partly consistent with Finding 2.A2. However, the FMs in Table 2.9 show higher 
proportions of untrusting than the SMs in both DRT and SMT, and Table 2.12 does not imply 
the existence of L1 FMs.  
Finding 2.A3: 𝑝௞ of Eq has no significant difference between DRT and SMT. 
Table 2.12 Parameter Estimates  for 4 Types Mixture Model  for Action Data for All games and 
games without dominant strategy  
  All games (12)  
Exclude games in which 
the sum of 1st and 2nd cards is <=5 
 DRT SMT DRT SMT 
Type FM SM FM SM (24) FM (8) SM (6) FM (8) SM (12) 
SA       
𝑝௞ 0.11 -- 0.04 -- 0.00 -- 0.01 -- 
𝑒௞ 0.00 -- 0.51 -- -- -- 0.52 -- 
Exp, L1(SA)        
𝑝௞ 0.59 0.87 0.72 0.78 0.67 0.89 0.75 0.81 
𝑒௞ 0.08 0.20 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.35 0.16 0.23 
L1         
𝑝௞ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 
𝑒௞ -- -- -- 0.22 -- -- -- 0.51 
L1(Exp), L2, Eq        
𝑝௞ 0.30 0.13 0.24 0.13 0.33 0.11 0.23 0.12 
𝑒௞ 0.19 0.27 0.16 0.08 0.26 0.57 0.26 0.15 
        
 
lnL -80 -111 -90 -181 -76 -79 -75 -130 
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As Exp and L1(SA) cannot be separated from this section, we cannot compare non-strategy 
thinking (C1) and strategy thinking (C2). In the next section, beliefs are introduced to 
provide more information. 
2.5.2.2 Models on the stated belief data 
In this section, a maximum likelihood analysis of subjects’ stated beliefs with payoff-
sensitive following the model in Section 2.4 of M&G (2008) is introduced to estimate the 
common prior distribution of 5 belief types. In this analysis, we assume subjects hold one 
of 5 beliefs based on a common prior distribution on their opponents’ play: SA play, Exp 
play, L0 play (of L1 type), L1 play (of L2 type) or Eq (of Eq type). Subjects keep their beliefs 
for all 12 games.  
Let 𝑔 = 1, … ,12 index 12 games, let 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 index subjects on a role of a treatment 
and let 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾 represent the belief types.  𝑦௜,௚ represents subject 𝑖’s stated belief on 
how possible he estimates his opponent calls a 3rd card in game 𝑔, where 𝑦௜ ≡ (𝑦௜ଵ, … , 𝑦௜௄) 
and 𝑦 ≡ (𝑦ଵ, … , 𝑦ே), and 𝑏௚௞ represent the theoretical belief on what possibility a subject 
who holds 𝑘 belief estimates that his opponent calls a 3rd card in game 𝑔. In the model, a 
positive parameter 𝜆 is used to measure the precision of entire stated beliefs across all 
belief types in a set associated with their corresponding theoretical beliefs. As 𝜆 → ∞ , 
𝑦௜,௚ → 𝑏௚௞  and as 𝜆 → 0 , 𝑦௜,௚  is more likely randomly drawn. Formula (2.5.3) to (2.5.5) 
present the model:  
(2.5.3) 
𝐿௜,௚௞ ൫𝜆ห𝑦௜,௚, 𝑏௚௞൯ =
𝑒ఒ(ସ଴଴ି଴.଴ସ௕೒
ೖ൫௬೔,೒ିଵ଴଴൯
మି଴.଴ସ(ଵି௕೒ೖ)൫௬೔,೒൯
మ)
∫ 𝑒ఒ(ସ଴଴ି଴.଴ସ௕೒
ೖ(௭ିଵ )మି଴.଴ସ(ଵି௕೒ೖ)(௭)మ)𝑑𝑧ଵ଴଴଴
 
which denotes the density function of type k belief of 𝑦௜,௚ given a 𝜆. Given a 𝜆, the closer 
𝑦௜,௚ is to 𝑏௚௞, the larger 𝐿௜,௚௞  is. In this function, 𝑏௚௞ ∈ [0,1], and according to the quadratic 
scoring rule in Section 2.2.3, 𝑦௜,௚ ∈ [0,100].  
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 (2.5.4) 
lnL௜(𝑝, 𝜆|𝑦௜) = ln ෍ 𝑝௞ ቎ෑ 𝐿௜,௚௞ ൫𝜆ห𝑦௜,௚, 𝑏௚௞൯
ଵଶ
௚ୀଵ
቏
୏
௞ୀଵ
 
which denotes the individual log-likelihood function for the 12 games of subject 𝑖, and  
 (2.5.5) 
lnL(𝑝, 𝜆|𝑦) = ෍ lnL௜(𝑝, 𝜆|𝑦௜)
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
which denotes the log-likelihood function for the 12 games of entire subjects.  
Table 2.13 presents the estimated parameters, the common prior probabilities of 5 
belief types and precision parameter λ. The left-hand column shows the 5 belief types: “SA-
Play” belief represents players think their opponents play as “SA” type; “Exp-Play” belief 
represents players think their opponents play as “Exp” type; “L0-Play” belief represents 
players who think their opponents play as L0; “L1-play” belief represents players who think 
their opponents play as L1 and “Eq-play” belief represents the players who think their 
opponents play as Eq. The left-part columns “DRT” give the estimates on direct-response 
treatment and the right-part “SMT” columns give the estimates on strategy-method 
treatment. “FM” columns give estimates on the FM’s stated beliefs, and “SM” columns give 
estimates on the SM’s beliefs. In this model, all beliefs in 12 games are used.  
Finding 2.B1: The probability of the Exp-play belief of each role is the highest over all belief 
types of each role in each treatment. 
Since Exp play cannot be separated with L1(SA) play in the games, we could not infer 
whether a subject, who predicts his opponent as Exp play, thinks that his opponent is a C1 
player (Exp type) or a C2 player (L1(SA) type). In the next Section, this separation will be 
conducted by combining the data of actions and beliefs.  
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Table 2.13 Parameter Estimates for 5 Types Mixture Model for Stated Belief Data for FMs and 
SMs in DRT and SMT  
 DRT  SMT 
Type FM SM  FM SM 
SA Play 0.21 0.47  0.27 0.26 
Exp Play 0.63 0.50  0.68 0.64 
L0 Play 0.04 0.00  0.00 0.06 
L1 play 0.12 0.00  0.05 0.00 
Eq Play 0.00 0.03  0.00 0.04 
λ 0.06 0.03  0.07 0.04 
lnL -1250 -1352  -1224 -1343 
Finding 2.B2: The probabilities of L0-Play and Eq-Play beliefs are close to 0 across all roles 
and treatments. 
As the summary mentioned in Table 2.9, subjects hardly play the dominated action and 
predict their opponents to play the dominated action with low probabilities. Finding 2.B2 is 
consistent with this summary.  
Finding 2.B3: λ of FM is larger than SM.  
A larger λ implies that the FMs generally have more accurate stated beliefs than the 
SMs. One possible explanation is that FMs state their beliefs after they choose their actions, 
and SMs state their beliefs before they choose their actions, which may cause the difference 
in their precision.  
Furthermore, we add one more belief, “No Belief” represented by 𝐿௜,௚௞ =
ଵ
ଵ଴ଵ
, into the 
model. Since a stated belief is an integer number from 0 to 100, there are 101 choices from 
which subjects pick out their beliefs. If a subject randomly picks out his belief, then the 
probability of each choice picked out is ଵ
ଵ଴ଵ
. The tendency of estimates in Table 2.14 is 
almost consistent with the tendency in Table 2.13.  
Finding 2.B4: The probabilities of No Belief of SM are higher than FM in both treatments.  
SM knows that she will be told about the action of her FM when she states her belief, 
which may weaken the incentive on estimating her FM’s action carefully for the SM. Even 
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though SM fails to predict her FM’s action correctly, the SM still can amend her action with 
accurate information on her FM’s action when she chooses her action.  
Table 2.14 Parameter Estimates for 6 Types Mixture Model for Stated Belief Data for FMs and 
SMs in DRT and SMT  
 DRT  SMT 
Type FM SM  FM SM 
No Belief 0.05 0.16  0.00 0.19 
SA Play 0.22 0.43  0.27 0.19 
Exp Play 0.59 0.36  0.68 0.54 
L1 0.04 0.00  0.00 0.04 
L2 0.10 0.00  0.05 0.00 
Eq 0.00 0.05  0.00 0.04 
λ 0.07 0.06  0.07 0.07 
lnL -1246 -1317  -1224 -1324 
 
2.5.2.3 Models for Action and Stated Belief Data 
In this section, a maximum likelihood model with payoff-sensitive and error rate works 
on subjects’ actions and stated beliefs to identify 7 thinking types. Each thinking type 
consists of a specific path of actions and beliefs over 12 games.  
C1 includes three non-strategic types: Exp-No belief, SA-No belief and L1 play. Exp-No 
belief represents the type of subjects who choose actions based on the strategy matrix of 
Exp and have no specific belief on their opponents’ actions. SA-No belief represents the 
type of subjects who choose actions based on the strategy matrix of SA and have no specific 
belief on their opponents’ actions. That is, Exp-No belief and SA-No belief state belief 
randomly. Since SA and Exp players do not take their opponents’ incentive and information 
into account on their strategies, any specific belief does not affect SA and Exp players’ 
strategies. The last type in C1 is L1, which follows the regular definition of level-k analysis. 
Play as L1 and best respond to his belief that his opponent is an L0 player, who randomly 
choose actions.  
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The other four types belonging to C2 are L2, L1(SA), L1(Exp) and Eq. Types in C2 include 
Bayes’ Rule into their strategies and best respond to their beliefs. L2 following the regular 
level-k analysis represents subjects who predict their opponents as L1 and respond best to 
L1’s strategy. L1(SA) is built on a similar hierarchy analysis, which predicts his opponent play 
SA’s strategy and responds best to his prediction. Similarly, L1(Exp) predicts his opponent is 
Exp type without any belief and responds best to his prediction. Eq describes the classic 
equilibrium analysis, in which players play equilibrium and think their opponents also play 
equilibrium. 
Coincidences on actions among different types mentioned in Section 2.5.1 lead some 
types cannot be separated. In this section, two dimensions, action and belief, are combined 
to identify types, since the combinations of actions and beliefs give more possibilities of 
types. Following the notations and formulas in Section 2.5.1 and 2.5.2, the maximum 
likelihood model with payoff-sensitive and error rate is described as: 
(2.5.6) 
𝐿௜(𝑒, 𝑝, 𝜆|𝑥௜ , 𝑦௜) = ෍[𝑝௞𝐿௜௞൫𝑒௞ห𝑥௜௞൯ ෑ 𝐿௜,௚௞ ൫𝜆ห𝑦௜,௚, 𝑏௚௞൯
ீୀଵଶ
௚ୀଵ
]
௄
௞ୀଵ
 
(2.5.7) 
lnL(𝑒, 𝑝, 𝜆|𝑥, 𝑦) = ෍ ln𝐿௜(𝑒, 𝑝, 𝜆|𝑥௜ , 𝑦௜)
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
When type 𝑘 represents Exp-No belief type, 𝐿௜,௚௞ ൫𝜆ห𝑦௜,௚, 𝑏௚௞൯ =
ଵ
ଵ଴ଵ
.  
Table 2.15 reports the parameter estimates of 7 thinking types. The left-part columns 
“All games (12)” shows the estimates on actions and beliefs of all 12 games (24 games for 
the SM in SMT). And the right-part columns “FM (8)” give the estimates on actions of 8 
games and beliefs of all 12 games for the FM; the column “SM (6)” gives the estimates on 
actions of 6 games and beliefs of all 12 games for the SM in DRT; the column “SM (12)” gives 
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the estimates on 6 pairs of actions in 6 games and beliefs of all 12 games. The results 
between the two parts are almost consistent.  
Table 2.15 Parameter Estimates for 7 Types Mixture Model for Action & Stated Belief data for All 
games and games without a dominant strategy 
  All games (12)  
Exclude games in which 
the sum of 1st and 2nd cards is <=5 
 DRT SMT DRT SMT 
Type FM SM FM SM FM (8) SM (6) FM (8) SM (12) 
SA-No belief         
   𝑝௞ 0.04 -- 0.00 -- 0.00 -- 0.00 -- 
   𝑒௞ 1.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Exp- No belief         
   𝑝௞ 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.16 0.11 0.17 0.08 0.04 
   𝑒௞ 0.49 0.08 0.49 0.33 0.13 0.08 0.49 0.09 
L1         
   𝑝௞ 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.00 
   𝑒௞ 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 
C1         
   𝑒௞ 0.26 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.04 
L1(SA)         
   𝑝௞ 0.39 0.48 0.43 0.65 0.35 0.45 0.41 0.42 
   𝑒௞ 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.08 
L1(Exp)         
   𝑝௞ 0.19 0.22 0.45 0.13 0.20 0.22 0.46 0.47 
   𝑒௞ 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.05 0.20 0.36 0.16 0.44 
L2         
   𝑝௞ 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.07 
   𝑒௞ -- 0.50 -- 0.50 0.68 0.50 -- 0.49 
Eq         
   𝑝௞ 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   𝑒௞ 0.11 -- -- -- 0.16 -- -- -- 
         
λ 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.04 
lnL -1325 -1426 -1323 -1571 -1316 -1393 -1304 -1506 
Finding 2.D1: 𝑝௞  of either L1(SA) or L1(Exp) of both roles has the highest value in both 
treatments. 
This finding is consistent with Finding 2.A1 in Section 2.5.2.1. L1(SA) and L1(Exp) occupy 
the most proportion, and C2 dominates subjects’ strategies mostly.  
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Finding 2.D2: 𝑝௞ of L1 for the FM is above 0 and for the SM is 0. 
As the SM knew the FM’s action, the SM could correct her strategy by updating her 
belief. Summary in Section 2.5.1.1 shows the FM hardly play dominated action, so after the 
SM saw her FM’s action, she could choose the best response to the FM’s action but not her 
previous belief. However, the FM has no chance to know his SM’s action in advance. The 
summary in Section 2.5.1.1 shows that the FM appears more distrustful to the SM than the 
SM to the FM and predicts the SM will play dominated action sometimes. This consists of 
Finding 2.D2. 
Finding 2.D3: 𝑝௞ of L2 for the SM is above 0 and for the FM is close to 0. 
Following Finding 2.D2, the proportions of L2 SM in both treatments are close the 
proportions of the corresponding L1 FM. Since L2 best responds to L1, L2 SM in our games 
almost correctly predicts the proportion of her FM’s type 
Currently, there is no obvious difference for both roles for comparison on C1 and C2 
between two treatments. Then besides 7 types we have discussed before, the other two 
types are added into the mixture type model to broaden the possible strategies subjects 
could follow. “SA-SA Play” and “Exp-Exp Play” are categorised into C1* with other previous 
C1 types, which have non-randomly specific beliefs but cannot best respond to their beliefs 
as their intelligence limit. “SA-SA Play” play as SA and thinks his opponent also plays as SA. 
“Exp-Exp Play” plays as Exp and thinks his opponent also plays as Exp. As Exp-No belief or 
Exp-Exp plays do not take his opponent’s information and actions account in his strategy, 
their playing strategy has no difference. Then L1(Exp) only predicts his opponent’s playing 
strategy but not beliefs, so it has no difference on whether the prediction of L1(Exp) is Exp-
No belief or Exp-Exp. And the same as L1(SA). Table 2.16 reports the parameter estimates 
of 9 thinking types. 
Finding 2.D4: Except for the SM in DRT, 𝑝௞ of Exp-Exp play has the highest probability across 
all roles of both treatment; 𝑝௞ of L1(SA) has the highest probability for the SM in DRT. 
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This finding overturns Finding 2.D1 as the decrease of L1(Exp). However, the belief of 
Exp play still occupies the dominant proportion except for the SM in DRT, which is consistent 
with Finding 2.B1. 
Finding 2.D5: Finding 2.D2 on 𝑝௞ of L1 and Finding 2.D3 on 𝑝௞ of L2 still hold in the analysis 
on 9 types.  
However, the values of 𝑒௞ of L1 and L2 are obviously higher than the values of other 
types’ 𝑒௞  across all roles in both treatments in both 7-type model and 9-type model. 
Meanwhile, the values of 𝑒௞ of L1(SA) and L1(Exp) are relatively acceptable. This implies 
that it’s generally hardly to use level-k analysis based on classic L0 assumption in this game, 
but level-k thinking works well by anchoring the fundamental level (new L0) on a properly  
Finding 2.D6: The proportion of C2 for the SM in DRT is significantly higher than the one for 
the SM in SMT (P-value of Fisher exact test is 0.035 for columns “All games”.) Meanwhile, 
the proportion of C2 for the FM in DRT is no significant difference from the one for the FM 
in SMT. 
In general, the proportion of C1* in DRT is less than in SMT.  The finding is 
counterintuitive, which implies the strategy method impedes strategy thinking. (More 
discussions are displayed in the Section 2.5.4.) Meanwhile, the proportion of C1* for the 
SM is less than for the FM. That is, the SM shows more strategic thinking. (Each subject’s 
type is identified in the Appendix 2.6.) 
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Table 2.16 Parameter Estimates for 9 Types Mixture Model for Action & Stated Belief data for All 
games and games without a dominant strategy 
  All games (12)  
Exclude games in which 
the sum of 1st and 2nd cards is <=5 
 DRT SMT DRT SMT 
Type FM SM FM SM FM (8) SM (6) FM (8) SM (12) 
SA-No belief         
   𝑝௞ 0.04 -- 0.00 -- 0.00 -- 0.00 -- 
   𝑒௞ 1.00 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Exp- No belief         
   𝑝௞ 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.00 
   𝑒௞ 0.50 0.08 0.45 0.33 0.13 0.08 0.36 0.38 
SA-SA Play         
   𝑝௞ 0.00 -- 0.04 -- 0.00 -- 0.03 -- 
   𝑒௞ -- -- 0.26 -- -- -- 0.26 -- 
Exp- Exp Play         
   𝑝௞ 0.34 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.32 0.09 0.48 0.48 
   𝑒௞ 0.05 -- 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.63 0.04 0.28 
L1         
   𝑝௞ 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.00 
   𝑒௞ 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 
C1*         
   𝑝௞ 0.58 0.13 0.65 0.43 0.53 0.27 0.64 0.48 
L1(SA)         
   𝑝௞ 0.26 0.48 0.32 0.30 0.25 0.46 0.33 0.30 
   𝑒௞ 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.09 
L1(Exp)         
   𝑝௞ 0.00 0.22 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.11 0.03 0.06 
   𝑒௞ -- 0.18 0.09 0.08 -- 0.26 0.14 0.13 
L2         
   𝑝௞ 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.04 0.15 0.00 0.16 
   𝑒௞ -- 0.51 -- 0.50 0.63 0.50 -- 0.50 
Eq         
   𝑝௞ 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   𝑒௞ 0.11 -- -- -- 0.16 -- -- -- 
         
λ 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 
lnL -1313 -1426 -1301 -1558 -1306 -1393 -1287 -1496 
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2.5.3 CRT and Bomb Task  
This section discusses how subjects’ strategic thinking relates to their cognitive 
reflection test score and elicited risk attitude.  
2.5.3.1 CRT 
We compare the distribution of thinking types of subjects with high cognitive reflection 
score (HC subjects) with the one that includes all subjects. Subjects answer three questions 
in CRT, and their scores are equal to the numbers of correct answers, which vary between 
0 and 3. If a subject answers more than two questions correctly, we assign this subject to 
HC subject.  
Table 2.17 reports the estimates for two subject groups. In general, there is no obvious 
difference between the all subject group and the HC subject group in DRT. However, there 
is a slight increase of the proportion of C2 in SMT for the group of HC subjects. 
In general, CRT score in Table 2.18 has no obvious correlation with the strategic 
thinking of FMs, but meanwhile, the CRT score has a positive correlation with the strategic 
thinking of SMs. 
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Table 2.17 Parameter Estimates on 9-Types between All subjects and HC subjects 
  All subjects  HC subjects (CRT=2 or 3) 
 DRT SMT DRT SMT 
Role 
Type FM SM FM SM FM (8) SM (6) FM (8) 
SM 
(12) 
# of Subjects 27 27 27 27 23 19 19 16 
SA-No belief         
   𝑝௞ 0.04 -- 0.00 -- 0.05 -- 0.00 -- 
   𝑒௞ 1.00 -- -- -- 1.00 -- 0.49 -- 
Exp- No belief         
   𝑝௞ 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   𝑒௞ 0.50 0.08 0.45 0.33 1.00 0.50 0.49 0.50 
SA-SA Play         
   𝑝௞ 0.00 -- 0.04 -- 0.00 -- 0.00 -- 
   𝑒௞ -- -- 0.26 -- 0.47 -- 0.47 -- 
Exp- Exp Play         
   𝑝௞ 0.34 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.05 0.54 0.28 
   𝑒௞ 0.05 -- 0.02 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.13 
L1         
   𝑝௞ 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   𝑒௞ 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
C1*         
   𝑝௞ 0.58 0.13 0.67 0.55 0.59 0.16 0.59 0.42 
L1(SA)         
   𝑝௞ 0.26 0.48 0.32 0.30 0.24 0.52 0.34 0.30 
   𝑒௞ 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.03 
L1(Exp)         
   𝑝௞ 0.00 0.22 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.22 
   𝑒௞ -- 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.25 0.14 0.26 0.12 
L2         
   𝑝௞ 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.07 
   𝑒௞ -- 0.51 -- 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.42 0.50 
Eq         
   𝑝௞ 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   𝑒௞ 0.11 -- -- -- 0.11 0.50 0.54 0.50 
         
λ 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 
lnL -1313 -1426 -1301 -1558 -1113 -980 -895 -883 
Table 2.18 Mean of CRT Scores 
 DRT SMT 
 FM SM FM SM 
C1* 2.27 1.67 2.00 1.36 
C2 2.31 2.14 2.00 2.06 
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2.5.3.2 Bomb Task 
In this section, we introduce the risk attitude of subjects into the analysis with models. 
Following the study of Crosetto and Filippin (2013), we use a dynamic visual version to elicit 
subjects’ risk attitudes. Then the coefficient of risk aversion, “𝑟”, is determined by the 
number (𝑘) of boxed collected. That is,  
𝑘 =
100𝑟
1 + 𝑟
 
Then,  
𝑟 =
𝑘
100 − 𝑘
 
Subjects who collected no more than 49 boxes are risk-averse. Subjects who collected 50 
boxes are risk neutral. Subjects who collected more than 50 boxes are risk seeker.  
We compare the distribution of thinking types of risk-averse and risk-neutral subjects 
with the one that includes all subjects. Table 2.19 reports the estimates of two groups of 
subjects. There is a slightly increase of the proportion of C1* in the group of not-risk-seek 
subjects for all roles except the SM in SMT. Meanwhile, P-value of Fisher exact test on 
comparison of the distributions of C1* and C2 between two groups for the SM in SMT is 
0.051. This implies that risk attitude has a significantly negative correlation with strategic 
thinking for the SM in SMT. 
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Table 2.19 Parameter Estimates for 9-Types Mixture Model for All subjects and Not risk-seekers 
  All subjects  
Not risk-seeker 
(Boxes Collected<=50) 
 DRT SMT DRT SMT 
Role 
Type FM SM FM SM FM (8) SM (6) FM (8) SM (12) 
# of Subjects 27 27 27 27 23 19 19 16 
SA-No belief         
   𝑝௞ 0.04 -- 0.00 -- 0.06 -- 0.00 -- 
   𝑒௞ 1.00 -- -- -- 1.00 -- 0.50 -- 
Exp- No belief         
   𝑝௞ 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.16 0.07 0.00 
   𝑒௞ 0.50 0.08 0.45 0.33 0.50 0.06 0.49 0.22 
SA-SA Play         
   𝑝௞ 0.00 -- 0.04 -- 0.00 -- 0.00 -- 
   𝑒௞ -- -- 0.26 -- 0.49 -- 0.43 -- 
Exp- Exp Play         
   𝑝௞ 0.34 0.00 0.50 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.63 0.27 
   𝑒௞ 0.05 -- 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.33 0.03 0.08 
L1         
   𝑝௞ 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.00 
   𝑒௞ 1.00 -- 1.00 -- 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
C1*         
   𝑝௞ 0.58 0.13 0.67 0.55 0.63 0.16 0.77 0.27 
L1(SA)         
   𝑝௞ 0.26 0.48 0.32 0.30 0.17 0.46 0.23 0.28 
   𝑒௞ 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.04 
L1(Exp)         
   𝑝௞ 0.00 0.22 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.26 
   𝑒௞ -- 0.18 0.09 0.08 0.29 0.22 0.46 0.09 
L2         
   𝑝௞ 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.19 
   𝑒௞ -- 0.51 -- 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.51 0.50 
Eq         
   𝑝௞ 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.19 
   𝑒௞ 0.11 -- -- -- 0.00 0.50 0.51 0.50 
         
λ 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05 
lnL -1313 -1426 -1301 -1558 -891 -781 -941 -907 
Table 2.20 reports the mean of boxes collected by each subject of each category for 
each role in each treatment. C1* subject for the FM in SMT shows more risk-averse than C2. 
Page 80 of 238 
 
However, there is no statistically significant difference in the means between two 
categories in any role of treatments.  
Table 2.20 Mean of Number of Boxes Collected 
 DRT SMT 
 FM SM FM SM 
C1* 45.91 46.33 39.00 44.93 
C2 44.13 47.83 44.67 44.42 
 
2.5.4 Further Discussions on the Two Treatments  
In contrast with the previous experimental studies on strategic thinking in two 
described methods (Reuben and Suetens, 2012, Kawagoe and Takizawa, 2012 and Garcia-
Pola et al., 2016), Finding 2.D6 in Section 2.5.2.3 indicates that strategic behaviours are 
affected by the game described methods and that the strategy method has a negative effect 
on strategic thinking. Unlike the previous studies, the game used in our study is the first 
game with incomplete information and uncertainty, and therefore the complexity of the 
game is more than games in the studies before. Then in this section, further discussions are 
presented to investigate that whether the lower probability of strategic behaviours in the 
strategy-method treatment does exist and that if so, how the complexity of the game 
influences the strategic thinking.  
2.5.4.1 Robust analysis of the existence  
Before investigating the explanations on the weakened strategic thinking in the SMT, 
a series of robust analyses are done to verify the existence of Finding 2.D6.  
Table 2.21 demonstrates three series of estimates for the 9 types mixture model for 
the SM in SMT. The estimates in the column, named “24G” (the same as the results in the 
Table 2.16 in the Section 2.5.2.3), are gotten by using all 24 choices of the SM in the SMT 
into the formula (2.5.6), G=24. The estimates in the column, named “12G (DRT-FM)”, are 
gotten by using 12 choices of the SM in the SMT determined by the corresponding FM’s 
choices into the formula (2.5.6), G=12. The estimates in the column, named “12G (SMT-
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FM)”, are gotten by using 12 choices of the SM in the SMT determined by the choices of 
corresponding the FM in the DRT, whose corresponding SM in the DRT has the same order 
as the SM in the SMT.  
Table 2.21. Parameter Estimates for 9 Types Mixture Model for Action & Stated Belief data for SM 
in SMT 
Type 24G 12G (DRT-FM) 12G (SMT-FM) 
SA-No belief    
   𝑝௞ -- -- -- 
   𝑒௞ -- -- -- 
Exp- No belief    
   𝑝௞ 0.11 0.08 0.10 
   𝑒௞ 0.33 0.26 0.27 
SA-SA Play    
   𝑝௞ -- -- -- 
   𝑒௞ -- -- -- 
Exp- Exp Play    
   𝑝௞ 0.33 0.42 0.36 
   𝑒௞ 0.13 0.13 0.12 
L1    
   𝑝௞ 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   𝑒௞ -- -- -- 
C1*    
   𝑝௞ 0.43 0.50 0.46 
L1(SA)    
   𝑝௞ 0.30 0.27 0.28 
   𝑒௞ 0.03 0.04 0.02 
L1(Exp)    
   𝑝௞ 0.16 0.06 0.12 
   𝑒௞ 0.08 0.00 0.07 
L2    
   𝑝௞ 0.11 0.16 0.15 
   𝑒௞ 0.50 0.51 0.51 
Eq    
   𝑝௞ 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   𝑒௞ -- -- -- 
    
λ 0.05 0.06 0.06 
lnL -1558 -1442 -1438 
These three series of estimates show similar distributions. The proportions of C1* are 
0.43, 0.5 and 0.46. The column “24G” implies that more observations bring more chances 
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for the SMs to be identified as strategic thinking types. As the comparison of the C1* 
proportions between two treatments (0.13 of DRT and 0.43 of SMT) shows a significant 
difference in the previous section. If we consider the robust tests between 0.13 and 
0.5/0.46, the difference between two treatment can be more significant. 
2.5.4.2 Effecting Factors analysis  
After justifying the existence of the significant difference, we check a series of possible 
effecting factors which may affect strategic behaviours.  
Firstly, the distributions of types of the FM in two treatment are compared to examine 
whether the weakened strategic thinking of the SMs in the SMT is caused by the different 
distributions of the FMs. The proportion of C1* of the FM in DRT is 0.58, which is not 
significantly lower than 0.65 of the FM in SMT in Fisher exact test. Then it is reasonable to 
assume that the SMs in both treatments face similar distributions of strategic thinking types 
of FMs. Then we can exclude the constitution of the FMs from the effecting factors.   
Secondly, by comparing Table 2.15 and Table 2.16, adding two more types, SA-SA play 
and Exp-Exp play, brings the conflict between 7-type model and 9-type model, which 
concentrates on the transferring from L1(Exp) and L1(SA) to Exp-Exp play. Except for the SM 
in DRT, all the other groups of subjects transfer more than 30% from L1(Exp) and L1(SA) to 
Exp-Exp play between the 7-type model and the 9-type model. The proportions of all the 
other types almost have no change between the two models. Then the following analyses 
focus on these three types.  
As shocking may affect the strategic thinking, we check that how many times the SMs 
identified as these three types (in Table A2.6.2 in Appendix 2.6) meet their stated beliefs on 
the FM’s action against to their FMs’ actual actions. The average of the number of the 
against of SMs in DRT is 4.3, and the one of SMs in SMT is 4.1 out of 12 stated beliefs of 
each subject. There is no significant difference. Then shocking from FMs’ actions is excluded 
from the effecting factors.  
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Furthermore, Table 2.22, summarising the information from Table 2.14 and Table 2.16, 
shows that the SMs in both treatments hold similar sums of the two beliefs on their FMs’ 
actions. However, when we check the three thinking types (L1(Exp) and L1(SA) to Exp-Exp 
play), which can be leaded by these two beliefs (SA play and Exp Play), the SM in SMT shows 
a higher relative proportion of Exp-Exp play type than the SM in DRT out of the two types 
with the Exp-play belief. As Exp-Exp play type and L1(Exp) type both hold the Exp-play belief 
on their opponents, but only L1(Exp) type chooses actions which are best responses to their 
beliefs, then this implies that the higher proportion of the SMs holding the Exp-play belief 
in SMT fail to make their best responses to their beliefs. This means that when the SMs in 
the two treatments holds similar belief distributions, more SMs in SMT do not choose the 
best responses but think that their FMs play the same as themselves.  
Table 2.22 Summary on the distribution of the three types and the two beliefs 
Type SM in DRT SM in SMT 
Exp-Exp play 0 0.33 
L1(SA) 0.48 0.3 
L1(Exp) 0.22 0.16 
Sum 0.7 0.79 
   
SA-play belief 0.43 0.19 
Exp-play belief 0.36 0.54 
Sum 0.79 0.73 
To replenish the implication above, we check the individual SM subject’s thinking type 
and individual SM subject’s belief type (in Table A2.6.2 in Appendix 2.6) and select SM 
subjects who hold the Exp-play belief (23 subjects) to study their responses to the Exp-play 
belief. Table 2.23 presents the distribution of 23 SM subjects, in which the number in each 
cell represents the number of subjects of each role in each treatment. Fisher Exact test 
shows a significant difference (p-values are 0.067) for the distributions of the SMs between 
DRT and SMT. The capability of responding best to beliefs has a significant effect on strategic 
thinking.  
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Table 2.23. Summary of the Exp-Play Belief 
 SM in DRT SM in SMT 
Exp-Exp play 1 8 
L1(Exp) 7 5 
Other C1* types 0 0 
Other C2 types 2 1 
Thirdly, we examine the effect of intelligence on the failure of responding best. We 
calculate the average of CRT of the SMs in the three types in Table 2.24. There is no obvious 
difference of the average CRT of each type between the two treatments. Then intelligence 
is excluded from the effecting factors. 
Table 2.24. Summary of the Exp-Play Belief 
 SM in DRT SM in SMT 
Exp-Exp play 1.5 1.75 
L1(Exp) 2 2 
 
2.5.4.2 Alternative explanation   
There are some other factors which may result in the weaken strategic behaviours, but 
in our current experiment design, these factors cannot be investigated. One possible factor 
is decision duration. As the total duration of the sessions between both treatments is similar, 
that means that the SM in SMT may use shorter time on each choice. This may cause a lower 
proportion of strategic behaviours. Meanwhile, facing more questions and more complex 
questioning may cause tired or bored. This also could impede players’ careless thinking.  
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper reports the findings of the experiment designed to investigates the player’s 
strategic behaviours and discusses the performance of level-k analysis on explaining players’ 
behaviours in the game with incomplete information and uncertainty. The experiment 
requires subjects to play a series of 12 two-person two-stage dynamic games and to state a 
series of their beliefs. Then a series of maximum likelihood estimations of mixture type 
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models are introduced to identify subjects’ behavioural types, which are separated into 
non-strategic thinking types and strategic thinking types. Our findings show that around 50% 
of subjects play as strategic thinking types and the level-k analysis is the dominant analysis 
across all strategic thinking types. 
Furthermore, the two methods of game description are compared to study how the 
description method influences subjects’ behaviours. A counterintuitive finding is found that 
the direct-response method is more helpful for subjects to play as strategic thinking types 
than the strategy method for the Second Mover. This finding is helpful for experimental 
design when subjects are needed to show more strategic thinking. As the Second Mover in 
the strategy method treatment makes conditional choices, the procedure that more 
decisions are made may distract subjects’ mentality. Then, subjects are hard to make both 
choices properly. However, the Second Mover is generally more strategic thinking than the 
First Mover. This implies that getting more information facilitates subjects to make more 
accurate responses. Also, this means different roles in a multi-stage dynamic game leads to 
different thinking types. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the Second Mover in direct-
response treatment benefiting from a proper game-describing method and more 
information shows the best capability on making the best response to beliefs.  
A cognitive reflection test and risk attitude test are conducted in the experiment to 
elicit more features of subjects, which are used to study on factors that have related to 
subjects thinking types. The findings show that cognitive reflection and risk attitude are only 
statistically related to the SM in SMT. Higher cognitive reflection prompts strategic thinking 
and more risk averse brings higher possible to play as strategic thinking types. 
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Appendix 2.1 Trimmed Strategy Space of Each Specific Game 
 
Combination of 
(FN1, SN1) 
Number of Possibilities 
on FM’s Strategies 
Number of Possibilities 
on SM’s Strategies 
(1,1) 1 1 
(2,1) 2 1 
(3,1) 4 1 
(4,1) 8 1 
(1,2) 1 2 
(2,2) 2 4 
(3,2) 4 4 
(4,2) 8 4 
(1,3) 1 4 
(2,3) 2 16 
(3,3) 4 16 
(4,3) 8 16 
(1,4) 1 8 
(2,4) 2 64 
(3,4) 4 64 
(4,4) 8 64 
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Appendix 2.2 Payoff Matrix   
Generally, when we compute a winning probability of a strategy (AAAA) of the FM in a 
specific scenario given the two 1st cards and the SM’s strategy (AAAA, AAAA), we compute 
as the following function50:  
𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴))
= ෍[𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠) ∗ 𝑃ி(𝑠)]
ସ
௦ୀଵ
 
𝑃ி(𝑠) is the probability of a specific number on the 2nd card of the FM and 𝑃ி(𝑠) = ଵ
ସ
. 
𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠)  represents the expected winning 
probability of the FM in the specific scenario, {𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝑆𝑁2 =
𝑠}. Given the specific scenario, (AAAA) indicates the specific action, “Call” or “Not Call”, 
according to the specific "𝑠" . Then the wining probability of a (AAAA) is computed as 
following: 
𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠)
= 𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠)
= ෍ൣ𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖)
଼
௜ୀଵ
∗ 𝑃ௌ൫𝑖| 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)൯൧ 
𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖) represents if the FM wins in the specific scenario 
{ 𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝑁2, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑖 }. “𝑖” is the sum of 2nd card and possible 3rd card of the SM. 
Then given the known sum of the SM (S𝑁1 + 𝑖), the conditional sum of the FM is computed 
as following according to the specific strategy “AAAA”: 
                                                          
50 In the following functions, “𝑗” represents the number on the 3rd card if a player asks for a 3rd card and 
“s” represents the number on the 2nd card of a player. (Then 𝑖 = 𝑠 + 𝑗.) 
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𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖)
= ෍[𝑃ி(𝐹𝑁3 = 𝑗|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖)
ସ
௝ୀ଴
∗ 𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖, 𝑗)] 
Given the information { 𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖 }, the probability of the number on 
the possible 3rd card is given by 𝑃ி(𝐹𝑁3 = 𝑗|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖) . “𝑗 = 0” 
means the strategy A is “No Call”. And given { 𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖, 𝑗 }, the sum of the two 
players could be known. Then 𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖, 𝑗) is 1 or 0, which 
means whether the FM wins in this scenario {F𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖, 𝑗}. The whole 
function of the expected winning probability of the FM is described as following: 
𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴))
= ෍ ቎ቌ෍ ቐ቎෍[𝑃ி(𝐹𝑁3 = 𝑗|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖)
ସ
௝ୀ଴
଼
௜ୀଵ
ସ
௦ୀଵ
∗ 𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖, 𝑗)]቏
∗ 𝑃ௌ൫𝑖| 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)൯ቑቍ ∗ 𝑃ி(𝑠)቏ 
Similarly, the SM’s winning probability function is described as the following: 
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𝑃ௌ(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴))
= ෍ ቎ቌ෍ ቐ቎෍[𝑃ௌ(𝑆𝑁3 = 𝑗|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖)
ସ
௝ୀ଴
଼
௜ୀଵ
ସ
௦ୀଵ
∗ 𝑃ௌ(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖, 𝑗)]቏
∗ 𝑃ி൫𝑖| 𝐹𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴)൯ቑቍ ∗ 𝑃௦(𝑠)቏ 
As players only need to consider the strategies which are not weakly dominant, we only 
discuss the cases in which players have no weakly dominant strategies when we compute 
the expected winning probability. For example, in a specific game, the 1st card of the FM is 
3, and the 1st card of SM is 2. Then the trimmed strategy space of the FM is {(CCCC), (CCCN), 
(CCNC), (CCNN)} as only when the 2nd card of the FM is 3 or 4, the FM needs to consider 
whether to call a 3rd card or not. Likewise, the trimmed strategy space of the SM is {(CCCC, 
CCCC), (CCCC, CCCN), (CCCN, CCCC), (CCCN, CCCN)}. Then when the 2nd card “𝑠” is 1 or 2, 
the expected winning probability 
𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠) 
is always the same across all strategies in the trimmed strategy space for the same “𝑠”. As 
the process of iterative elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies in a game is only 
related with the ranks of the payoffs of the strategies within a player, it does not change 
the ranks of strategies by excluding the same part from the payoffs of the strategies. Then 
to lessen the computation, we also cut down the cases within the games with the same two 
1st cards in which there are dominant strategies. In the example, when we compute the 
expected winning probability, we assume 𝑃ி(𝑠 = 1|𝐹𝑁1 = 3) = 𝑃ி(𝑠 = 2|𝐹𝑁1 = 3) = 0 
and 𝑃ி(𝑠 = 3|𝐹𝑁1 = 3) = 𝑃ி(𝑠 = 4|𝐹𝑁1 = 3) = ଵ
ଶ
. Then the following example 
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demonstrates how to compute the FM’s expected winning probability in the case, {FN1=3, 
SN1=2, (CCCN), (CCCC, CCCN)}: 
𝑃ி൫𝑤𝑖𝑛ห𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁), (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁)൯
= ෍ ቎ቌ෍ ቐ቎෍[𝑃ி(𝐹𝑁3 = 𝑗|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖)
ସ
௝ୀ଴
଼
௜ୀଵ
ସ
௦ୀଵ
∗ 𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁), 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑖, 𝑗)]቏
∗ 𝑃ௌ൫𝑖| 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁)൯ቑቍ ∗ 𝑃ி(𝑠|𝐹𝑁1 = 3)቏ 
When 𝑠 = 4, the FM will choose to “No Call” according to the strategy, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁). Then,  
𝑃ி(𝐹𝑁3 = 𝑗|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁), 𝐹𝑁2 = 4, 𝑖) = 0, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 1 𝑡𝑜 4 
𝑃ி(𝐹𝑁3 = 𝑗|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁), 𝐹𝑁2 = 4, 𝑖) = 1, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑗 = 0 
For each combination of “𝑖” and “𝑗”, the sums of the FM and the SM are determined. 
For example, when 𝑖 = 4 and 𝑗 = 0, the sum of the FM is 6 (=FN1+FN2+j=3+3+0) and the 
sum of the SM is 6 (=SN1+i=2+4). Then the FM wins in this case, so 
𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁), 𝐹𝑁2 = 4, 𝑖, 𝑗) =
1
2
, 𝑎𝑠 𝑡𝑖𝑒 
Next, we need to check the probability of the appearance of (𝑖 = 4). As the FM calls a 
3rd card, the SM will call a 3rd card if SN2 is 1, 2, or 3 but will not call a 3rd card when SN2=4. 
Then if 𝑖 = 4 , it could be (SN2=1, SN3=3), (SN2=2, SN3=2), (SN2=3, SN3=2) or (SN2=4, 
SN3=0). There are 4 possible cases in which 𝑖 = 4 and each case happens as 25%:  
𝑃ௌ൫𝑖 = 4| 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁)൯ =
1
4
∗
1
4
+
1
4
∗
1
4
+
1
4
∗
1
4
+
1
4
∗
1
4
=
1
4
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Based on the information above, we could know the value of the wining probability of the 
case, {𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶), 𝐹𝑁2 = 4, 𝑖 = 4},  
𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶), 𝐹𝑁2 = 4, 𝑖 = 4)
= 𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶), 𝐹𝑁2 = 4, 𝑖 = 4, 𝑗 = 0) =
1
2
 
And the expected wining probability of the case, { 𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶), 𝐹𝑁2 =
4, 𝑖 = 4}, is as following:  
ൣ𝑃ி(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶), 𝐹𝑁2 = 4, 𝑖 = 4)
∗ 𝑃ௌ൫𝑖 = 4| 𝑆𝑁1 = 2, (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁)൯൧ =
1
2
∗
1
4
=
1
8
 
Repeating the procedure above, we get the full payoff matrix of each specific normal-form 
game (described as following: Table 2.A to Table 2.O). 
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Table 2.A. FN1=2, SN1=1 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) CCCC, CCCC 
CCCC 0.6406 
CCCN 0.5000 
*The probabilities in this table is the winning probability of first mover in each specific game. Since SN1=1, 
there is only one strategy left for second mover after deleting dominated strategies. Then there is no need to 
show the winning probability or the second mover.  
Table 2.B. FN1=3, SN1=1 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) CCCC, CCCC 
CCCC 0.5508 
CCCN 0.6797 
CCNC 0.4805 
CCNN 0.6094 
Table 2.C. FN1=4, SN1=1 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) CCCC, CCCC 
CCCC 0.4479 
CCCN 0.6589 
CCNC 0.5339 
CCNN 0.7448 
CNCC 0.4010 
CNCN 0.6120 
CNNC 0.4870 
CNNN 0.6979 
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Table 2.D. FN1=1, SN1=2 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) CCCC, _ _ _ _ CCCN, _ _ _ _ 
CCCC 0.6406 0.5000 
*First mover never chooses “No Call” in this game, so there is no need to show the possible strategy of second 
mover in the part after the comma. The matrix only shows the winning probabilities of the SM, since the FM 
only has one strategy. 
Table 2.E. FN1=2, SN1=2 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) CCCC, CCCC CCCC, CCCN CCCN, CCCC CCCN, CCCN 
CCCC (0.5703 (0.5703 (0.6406 (0.6406 
0.5703) 0.5703) 0.3438) 0.3438) 
CCCN (0.3438 (0.4063 (0.3438 (0.4063 
0.6406) 0.4063) 0.6406) 0.4063) 
*Probabilities displayed at the top inside each parentheses denote the winning probability for the FM and 
probabilities displayed at the bottom denote the winning probability for the SM. 
Table 2.F. FN1=3, SN1=2 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) CCCC, CCCC CCCC, CCCN CCCN, CCCC CCCN, CCCN 
CCCC (0.5000 (0.5000 (0.5508 (0.5508 
0.4688) 0.4688) 0.2500) 0.2500) 
CCCN (0.5664 (0.6211 (0.6016 (0.6563 
0.5469) 0.3906) 0.3438) 0.1875) 
CCNC (0.3867 (0.4648 (0.4023 (0.4805 
0.5859) 0.5234) 0.4375) 0.3750) 
CCNN (0.4531 (0.5859 (0.4531 (0.5859 
0.6172) 0.3984) 0.4688) 0.2500) 
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Table 2.G. FN1=4, SN1=2 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) CCCC, CCCC CCCC, CCCN CCCN, CCCC CCCN, CCCN 
CCCC 
(0.4115 (0.4115 (0.4479 (0.4479 
0.5078) 0.5078) 0.4063) 0.4063) 
CCCN 
(0.5938 (0.6250 (0.6276 (0.6589 
0.45313) 0.3594) 0.3125) 0.2188) 
CCNC 
(0.4557 (0.5078 (0.4818 (0.5339 
0.5391) 0.3828) 0.4375) 0.2813) 
CCNN 
(0.6380 (0.7214 (0.6927 (0.7448 
0.4844) 0.2344) 0.3438) 0.0938) 
CNCC 
(0.3359 (0.3568 (0.3490 (0.3698 
0.5781) 0.5156) 0.5313) 0.4688) 
CNCN 
(0.5182 (0.5703 (0.5286 (0.5807 
0.5234) 0.3672) 0.4375) 0.2813) 
CNNC 
(0.3802 (0.4531 (0.3828 (0.4557 
0.6094) 0.3906) 0.5625) 0.3438) 
CNNN 
(0.5625 (0.6667 (0.5625 (0.6667 
0.5547) 0.2422) 0.4688) 0.1563) 
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Table 2.H. FN1=1, SN1=3 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) CCCC, ---- CCCC, ---- CCCN, ---- CCCN, ---- 
CCCC 0.5508 0.6797 0.4805 0.6094 
 
 
Table 2.I. FN1=2, SN1=3 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCC, 
CCCC 
CCCC, 
CCCN 
CCCC, 
CCNC 
CCCC, 
CCNN 
CCCN, 
CCCC 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCCC 
(0.4844 (0.4844 (0.4844 (0.4844 (0.5469 (0.5469 (0.5469 (0.5469 
0.5352) 0.5352) 0.5352) 0.5352) 0.5898) 0.5898) 0.5898) 0.5898) 
CCCN 
(0.3125 (0.1875 (0.3750 (0.2500 (0.3125 (0.1875 (0.3750 (0.2500 
0.5859) 0.6484) 0.5547) 0.6172) 0.6406) 0.7031) 0.6094) 0.6719) 
 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCNC, 
CCNC 
CCNC, 
CCNN 
CCNN, 
CCCC 
CCNN, 
CCCN 
CCNN, 
CCNC 
CCNN, 
CCNN 
CCCC 
(0.5547 (0.5547 (0.5547 (0.5547 (0.6172 (0.6172 (0.6172 (0.6172 
0.3984) 0.3984) 0.3984) 0.3984) 0.4531) 0.4531) 0.4531) 0.4531) 
CCCN 
(0.3125 (0.1875 (0.3750 (0.2500 (0.3125 (0.1875 (0.3750 (0.2500 
0.4766) 0.5391) 0.4453) 0.5078) 0.5313) 0.5938) 0.5000) 0.5625) 
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Table 2.J. FN1=3, SN1=3 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCC, 
CCCC 
CCCC, 
CCCN 
CCCC, 
CCNC 
CCCC, 
CCNN 
CCCN, 
CCCC 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCCC (0.2285 (0.2285 (0.2285 (0.2285 (0.2441 (0.2441 (0.2441 (0.2441 0.2285) 0.2285) 0.2285) 0.2285) 0.2461) 0.2461) 0.2461) 0.2461) 
CCCN (0.2461 (0.2461 (0.2852 (0.2852 (0.2539 (0.2539 (0.2930 (0.2930 0.2441) 0.2441) 0.2051) 0.2051) 0.2539) 0.2539) 0.2148) 0.2148) 
CCNC (0.1777 (0.1465 (0.1934 (0.1621 (0.1855 (0.1543 (0.2012 (0.1699 0.2539) 0.2852) 0.2383) 0.2695) 0.2715) 0.3027) 0.2559) 0.2871) 
CCNN (0.1953 (0.1641 (0.2500 (0.2188 (0.1953 (0.1641 (0.2500 (0.2188 0.2695) 0.3008) 0.2148) 0.2461) 0.2793) 0.3105) 0.2246) 0.2559) 
 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCNC, 
CCNC 
CCNC, 
CCNN 
CCNN, 
CCCC 
CCNN, 
CCCN 
CCNN, 
CCNC 
CCNN, 
CCNN 
CCCC (0.2539 (0.2539 (0.2539 (0.2539 (0.2695 (0.2695 (0.2695 (0.2695 0.1777) 0.1777) 0.1777) 0.1777) 0.1953) 0.1953) 0.1953) 0.1953) 
CCCN (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.3027 (0.3027 (0.2715 (0.2715 (0.3105 (0.3105 0.2305) 0.2305) 0.1914) 0.1914) 0.2402) 0.2402) 0.2012) 0.2012) 
CCNC (0.1855 (0.1543 (0.2012 (0.1699 (0.1934 (0.1621 (0.2090 (0.1777 0.2168) 0.2480) 0.2012) 0.2324) 0.2344) 0.2656) 0.2188) 0.2500) 
CCNN (0.1953 (0.1641 (0.2500 (0.2188 (0.1953 (0.1641 (0.2500 (0.2188 0.2324) 0.2637) 0.1777) 0.2090) 0.2422) 0.2734) 0.1875) 0.2188) 
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Table 2.K. FN1=4, SN1=3 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCC, 
CCCC 
CCCC, 
CCCN 
CCCC, 
CCNC 
CCCC, 
CCNN 
CCCN, 
CCCC 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCCC (0.3802 (0.3802 (0.3802 (0.3802 (0.4036 (0.4036 (0.4036 (0.4036 0.4453) 0.4453) 0.4453) 0.4453) 0.5039) 0.5039) 0.5039) 0.5039) 
CCCN (0.5339 (0.5651 (0.5651 (0.5964 (0.5547 (0.5859 (0.5859 (0.6172 0.4141) 0.3672) 0.3672) 0.3203) 0.4297) 0.3828) 0.3828) 0.3359) 
CCNC (0.4036 (0.4036 (0.4557 (0.4557 (0.4167 (0.4167 (0.4688 (0.4688 0.4766) 0.4766) 0.3984) 0.3984) 0.5195) 0.5195) 0.4414) 0.4414) 
CCNN (0.5573 (0.5885 (0.6406 (0.6719 (0.5677 (0.5990 (0.6510 (0.6823 0.4453) 0.3984) 0.3203) 0.2734) 0.4453) 0.3984) 0.3203) 0.2734) 
CNCC (0.3125 (0.2708 (0.3333 (0.2917 (0.3255 (0.2839 (0.3464 (0.3047 0.4961) 0.5586) 0.4648) 0.5273) 0.5547) 0.6172) 0.5234) 0.5859) 
CNCN (0.4661 (0.4557 (0.5182 (0.5078 (0.4766 (0.4661 (0.5286 (0.5182 0.4648) 0.4805) 0.3867) 0.4023) 0.4805) 0.4961) 0.4023) 0.4180) 
CNNC (0.3359 (0.2943 (0.4089 (0.3672 (0.3385 (0.2969 (0.4115 (0.3698 0.5273) 0.5898) 0.4180) 0.4805) 0.5703) 0.6328) 0.4609) 0.5234) 
CNNN (0.4896 (0.4792 (0.5938 (0.5833 (0.4896 (0.4792 (0.5938 (0.5833 0.4961) 0.5117) 0.3398) 0.3555) 0.4961) 0.5117) 0.3398) 0.3555) 
(Continue) 
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(Continuation) 
SM-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
FM-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCNC, 
CCNC 
CCNC, 
CCNN 
CCNN, 
CCCC 
CCNN, 
CCCN 
CCNN, 
CCNC 
CCNN, 
CCNN 
CCCC (0.4167 (0.4167 (0.4167 (0.4167 (0.4401 (0.4401 (0.4401 (0.4401 0.3945) 0.3945) 0.3945) 0.3945) 0.4531) 0.4531) 0.4531) 0.4531) 
CCCN (0.5677 (0.5990 (0.5990 (0.6302 (0.5885 (0.6198 (0.6198 (0.6510 0.3438) 0.2969) 0.2969) 0.2500) 0.3594) 0.3125) 0.3125) 0.2656) 
CCNC (0.4297 (0.4297 (0.4818 (0.4818 (0.4427 (0.4427 (0.4948 (0.4948 0.4258) 0.4258) 0.3477) 0.3477) 0.4688) 0.4688) 0.3906) 0.3906) 
CCNN (0.5807 (0.6120 (0.6641 (0.6953 (0.5911 (0.6224 (0.6745 (0.7057 0.3750) 0.3281) 0.2500) 0.2031) 0.3750) 0.3281) 0.2500) 0.2031) 
CNCC (0.3255 (0.2839 (0.3464 (0.3047 (0.3385 (0.2969 (0.3594 (0.3177 0.4727) 0.5352) 0.4414) 0.5039) 0.5313) 0.5938) 0.5000) 0.5625) 
CNCN (0.4766 (0.4661 (0.5286 (0.5182 (0.4870 (0.4766 (0.5391 (0.5286 0.4219) 0.4375) 0.3438) 0.3594) 0.4375) 0.4531) 0.3594) 0.3750) 
CNNC (0.3385 (0.2969 (0.4115 (0.3698 (0.3411 (0.2995 (0.4141 (0.3724 0.5039) 0.5664) 0.3945) 0.4570) 0.5469) 0.6094) 0.4375) 0.5000) 
CNNN (0.4896 (0.4792 (0.5938 (0.5833 (0.4896 (0.4792 (0.5938 (0.5833 0.4531) 0.4688) 0.2969) 0.3125) 0.4531) 0.4688) 0.2969) 0.3125) 
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Table 2.L. FN1=1, SN1=4 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCC, 
_ _ _ _ 
CCCN, 
_ _ _ _ 
CCNC, 
_ _ _ _ 
CCNN, 
_ _ _ _ 
CCCC 0.4479 0.6589 0.5339 0.7448 
 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CNCC, 
_ _ _ _ 
CNCN, 
_ _ _ _ 
CNNC, 
_ _ _ _ 
CNNN, 
_ _ _ _ 
CCCC 0.4010 0.6120 0.4010 0.6979 
Table 2.M. FN1=2, SN1=4 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCNC, 
CCNC 
CCNC, 
CCNN 
CCNN, 
CCCC 
CCCC (0.4531 (0.4531 (0.4531 (0.5391 (0.5391 (0.5391 (0.5391 (0.4844 0.5938) 0.5938) 0.5938) 0.4557) 0.4557) 0.4557) 0.4557) 0.6380) 
CCCN (0.2188 (0.2813 (0.0938 (0.4063 (0.2188 (0.2813 (0.0938 (0.4063 0.6589) 0.6380) 0.7005) 0.4922) 0.5547) 0.5339) 0.5964) 0.6406) 
 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNN, 
CCCN 
CCNN, 
CCNC 
CCNN, 
CCNN 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCCC (0.4844 (0.4844 (0.4844 (0.4531 (0.4531 (0.4531 (0.5391 (0.5391 0.6380) 0.6380) 0.6380) 0.5938) 0.5938) 0.5938) 0.4557) 0.4557) 
CCCN (0.2188 (0.2813 (0.0938 (0.2188 (0.2813 (0.0938 (0.4063 (0.2188 0.7031) 0.6823) 0.7448) 0.6589) 0.6380) 0.7005) 0.4922) 0.5547) 
(continue) 
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CNCN, 
CCCN 
CNCN, 
CCNC 
CNCN, 
CCNN 
CNNC, 
CCCC 
CNNC, 
CCCN 
CNNC, 
CCNC 
CNNC, 
CCNN 
CNNN, 
CCCC 
CCCC (0.5234 (0.5234 (0.5234 (0.6094 (0.6094 (0.6094 (0.6094 (0.5547 0.5182) 0.5182) 0.5182) 0.3802) 0.3802) 0.3802) 0.3802) 0.5625) 
CCCN (0.2188 (0.2813 (0.0938 (0.4063 (0.2188 (0.2813 (0.0938 (0.4063 0.6016) 0.5807) 0.6432) 0.4349) 0.4974) 0.4766) 0.5391) 0.5833) 
 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CNNN, 
CCCN 
CNNN, 
CCNC 
CNNN, 
CCNN 
CNCN, 
CCCN 
CNCN, 
CCNC 
CNCN, 
CCNN 
CNNC, 
CCCC 
CNNC, 
CCCN 
CCCC (0.5547 (0.5547 (0.5547 (0.5234 (0.5234 (0.5234 (0.6094 (0.6094 0.5625) 0.5625) 0.5625) 0.5182) 0.5182) 0.5182) 0.3802) 0.3802) 
CCCN (0.2188 (0.2813 (0.0938 (0.2188 (0.2813 (0.0938 (0.4063 (0.2188 0.6458) 0.6250) 0.6875) 0.6016) 0.5807) 0.6432) 0.4349) 0.4974) 
 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCN, 
CNCN 
CCCN, 
CNNC 
CCCN, 
CNNN 
CCNC, 
CNCC 
CCNC, 
CNCN 
CCNC, 
CNNC 
CCNC, 
CNNN 
CCNN, 
CNCC 
CCCC (0.4531 (0.4531 (0.4531 (0.5391 (0.5391 (0.5391 (0.5391 (0.4844 0.5938) 0.5938) 0.5938) 0.4557) 0.4557) 0.4557) 0.4557) 0.6380) 
CCCN (0.2813 (0.3438 (0.1563 (0.4688 (0.2813 (0.3438 (0.1563 (0.4688 0.6380) 0.6172) 0.6797) 0.4714) 0.5339) 0.5130) 0.5755) 0.6198) 
 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNN, 
CNCN 
CCNN, 
CNNC 
CCNN, 
CNNN 
CCCN, 
CNCN 
CCCN, 
CNNC 
CCCN, 
CNNN 
CCNC, 
CNCC 
CCNC, 
CNCN 
CCCC (0.4844 (0.4844 (0.4844 (0.4531 (0.4531 (0.4531 (0.5391 (0.5391 0.6380) 0.6380) 0.6380) 0.5938) 0.5938) 0.5938) 0.4557) 0.4557) 
CCCN (0.2813 (0.3438 (0.1563 (0.2813 (0.3438 (0.1563 (0.4688 (0.2813 0.6823) 0.6615) 0.7240) 0.6380) 0.6172) 0.6797) 0.4714) 0.5339) 
(continue) 
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CNCN, 
CNCN 
CNCN, 
CNNC 
CNCN, 
CNNN 
CNNC, 
CNCC 
CNNC, 
CNCN 
CNNC, 
CNNC 
CNNC, 
CNNN 
CNNN, 
CNCC 
CCCC (0.5234 (0.5234 (0.5234 (0.6094 (0.6094 (0.6094 (0.6094 (0.5547 0.5182) 0.5182) 0.5182) 0.3802) 0.3802) 0.3802) 0.3802) 0.5625) 
CCCN (0.2813 (0.3438 (0.1563 (0.4688 (0.2813 (0.3438 (0.1563 (0.4688 0.5807) 0.5599) 0.6224) 0.4141) 0.4766) 0.4557) 0.5182) 0.5625) 
 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CNNN, 
CNCN 
CNNN, 
CNNC 
CNNN, 
CNNN 
CNCN, 
CNCN 
CNCN, 
CNNC 
CNCN, 
CNNN 
CNNC, 
CNCC 
CNNC, 
CNCN 
CCCC (0.5547 (0.5547 (0.5547 (0.5234 (0.5234 (0.5234 (0.6094 (0.6094 0.5625) 0.5625) 0.5625) 0.5182) 0.5182) 0.5182) 0.3802) 0.3802) 
CCCN (0.2813 (0.3438 (0.1563 (0.2813 (0.3438 (0.1563 (0.4688 (0.2813 0.6250) 0.6042) 0.6667) 0.5807) 0.5599) 0.6224) 0.4141) 0.4766) 
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Table 2.N. FN1=3, SN1=4 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCNC, 
CCNC 
CCNC, 
CCNN 
CCNN, 
CCCC 
CCCC (0.2226 (0.2226 (0.2226 (0.2226 (0.2070 (0.2070 (0.2070 (0.2070 0.2852) 0.2852) 0.2852) 0.2852) 0.4004) 0.4004) 0.4004) 0.4004) 
CCCN (0.2520 (0.2051 (0.2520 (0.2051 (0.2383 (0.1914 (0.2383 (0.1914 0.3027) 0.3496) 0.3027) 0.3496) 0.3926) 0.4395) 0.3926) 0.4395) 
CCNC (0.1973 (0.1504 (0.1660 (0.1191 (0.1953 (0.1484 (0.1641 (0.1172 0.3125) 0.3594) 0.3438) 0.3906) 0.4023) 0.4492) 0.4336) 0.4805) 
CCNN (0.2266 (0.1328 (0.1953 (0.1016 (0.2266 (0.1328 (0.1953 (0.1016 0.3301) 0.4238) 0.3613) 0.4551) 0.3945) 0.4883) 0.4258) 0.5195) 
 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNN, 
CCCN 
CCNN, 
CCNC 
CCNN, 
CCNN 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCCC (0.2382 (0.2382 (0.2382 (0.2382 (0.2226 (0.2226 (0.2226 (0.2226 0.3027) 0.3027) 0.3027) 0.3027) 0.4180) 0.4180) 0.4180) 0.4180) 
CCCN (0.2598 (0.2129 (0.2598 (0.2129 (0.2461 (0.1992 (0.2461 (0.1992 0.3125) 0.3594) 0.3125) 0.3594) 0.4023) 0.4492) 0.4023) 0.4492) 
CCNC (0.2051 (0.1582 (0.1738 (0.1270 (0.2031 (0.1563 (0.1719 (0.1250 0.3301) 0.3770) 0.3613) 0.4082) 0.4199) 0.4668) 0.4512) 0.4980) 
CCNN (0.2266 (0.1328 (0.1953 (0.1016 (0.2266 (0.1328 (0.1953 (0.1016 0.3398) 0.4336) 0.3711) 0.4648) 0.4043) 0.4980) 0.4355) 0.5293) 
(continue) 
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CNCN, 
CCCN 
CNCN, 
CCNC 
CNCN, 
CCNN 
CNNC, 
CCCC 
CNNC, 
CCCN 
CNNC, 
CCNC 
CNNC, 
CCNN 
CNNN, 
CCCC 
CCCC (0.2480 (0.2480 (0.2480 (0.2480 (0.2324 (0.2324 (0.2324 (0.2324 0.2344) 0.2344) 0.2344) 0.2344) 0.3496) 0.3496) 0.3496) 0.3496) 
CCCN (0.2695 (0.2227 (0.2695 (0.2227 (0.2559 (0.2090 (0.2559 (0.2090 0.2520) 0.2988) 0.2520) 0.2988) 0.3418) 0.3887) 0.3418) 0.3887) 
CCNC (0.2051 (0.1582 (0.1738 (0.1270 (0.2031 (0.1563 (0.1719 (0.1250 0.2754) 0.3223) 0.3066) 0.3535) 0.3652) 0.4121) 0.3965) 0.4434) 
CCCN (0.2266 (0.1328 (0.1953 (0.1016 (0.2266 (0.1328 (0.1953 (0.1016 0.2930) 0.3867) 0.3242) 0.4180) 0.3574) 0.4512) 0.3887) 0.4824) 
 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CNNN, 
CCCN 
CNNN, 
CCNC 
CNNN, 
CCNN 
CNCN, 
CCCN 
CNCN, 
CCNC 
CNCN, 
CCNN 
CNNC, 
CCCC 
CNNC, 
CCCN 
CCCC (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.2480 (0.2480 (0.2480 (0.2480 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.3672) 0.3672) 0.3672) 0.3672) 
CCCN (0.2773 (0.2305 (0.2773 (0.2305 (0.2637 (0.2168 (0.2637 (0.2168 0.2617) 0.3086) 0.2617) 0.3086) 0.3516) 0.3984) 0.3516) 0.3984) 
CCNC (0.2129 (0.1660 (0.1816 (0.1348 (0.2109 (0.1641 (0.1797 (0.1328 0.2930) 0.3398) 0.3242) 0.3711) 0.3828) 0.4297) 0.4141) 0.4609) 
CCCN (0.2266 (0.1328 (0.1953 (0.1016 (0.2266 (0.1328 (0.1953 (0.1016 0.3027) 0.3965) 0.3340) 0.4277) 0.3672) 0.4609) 0.3984) 0.4922) 
(continue) 
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCN, 
CNCN 
CCCN, 
CNNC 
CCCN, 
CNNN 
CCNC, 
CNCC 
CCNC, 
CNCN 
CCNC, 
CNNC 
CCNC, 
CNNN 
CCNN, 
CNCC 
CCCC (0.2227 (0.2227 (0.2227 (0.2227 (0.2070 (0.2070 (0.2070 (0.2070 0.2852) 0.2852) 0.2852) 0.2852) 0.4004) 0.4004) 0.4004) 0.4004) 
CCCN (0.2910 (0.2441 (0.2910 (0.2441 (0.2773 (0.2305 (0.2773 (0.2305 0.2637) 0.3105) 0.2637) 0.3105) 0.3535) 0.4004) 0.3535) 0.4004) 
CCNC (0.2129 (0.1660 (0.1816 (0.1348 (0.2109 (0.1641 (0.1797 (0.1328 0.2969) 0.3438) 0.3281) 0.3750) 0.3867) 0.4336) 0.4180) 0.4648) 
CCCN (0.2813 (0.1875 (0.2500 (0.1563 (0.2813 (0.1875 (0.2500 (0.1563 0.2754) 0.3691) 0.3066) 0.4004) 0.3398) 0.4336) 0.3711) 0.4648) 
 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNN, 
CNCN 
CCNN, 
CNNC 
CCNN, 
CNNN 
CCCN, 
CNCN 
CCCN, 
CNNC 
CCCN, 
CNNN 
CCNC, 
CNCC 
CCNC, 
CNCN 
CCCC (0.2383 (0.2383 (0.2383 (0.2383 (0.2227 (0.2227 (0.2227 (0.2227 0.3027) 0.3027) 0.3027) 0.3027) 0.4180) 0.4180) 0.4180) 0.4180) 
CCCN (0.2988 (0.2520 (0.2988 (0.2520 (0.2852 (0.2383 (0.2852 (0.2383 0.2734) 0.3203) 0.2734) 0.3203) 0.3633) 0.4102) 0.3633) 0.4102) 
CCNC (0.2207 (0.1738 (0.1895 (0.1426 (0.2188 (0.1719 (0.1875 (0.1406 0.3145) 0.3613) 0.3457) 0.3926) 0.4043) 0.4512) 0.4355) 0.4824) 
CCCN (0.2813 (0.1875 (0.2500 (0.1563 (0.2813 (0.1875 (0.2500 (0.1563 0.2852) 0.3789) 0.3164) 0.4102) 0.3496) 0.4434) 0.3809) 0.4746) 
(continue) 
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CNCN, 
CNCN 
CNCN, 
CNNC 
CNCN, 
CNNN 
CNNC, 
CNCC 
CNNC, 
CNCN 
CNNC, 
CNNC 
CNNC, 
CNNN 
CNNN, 
CNCC 
CCCC (0.2480 (0.2480 (0.2480 (0.2480 (0.2324 (0.2324 (0.2324 (0.2324 0.2344) 0.2344) 0.2344) 0.2344) 0.3496) 0.3496) 0.3496) 0.3496) 
CCCN (0.3086 (0.2617 (0.3086 (0.2617 (0.2949 (0.2480 (0.2949 (0.2480 0.2129) 0.2598) 0.2129) 0.2598) 0.3027) 0.3496) 0.3027) 0.3496) 
CCNC (0.2207 (0.1738 (0.1895 (0.1426 (0.2188 (0.1719 (0.1875 (0.1406 0.2598) 0.3066) 0.2910) 0.3379) 0.3496) 0.3965) 0.3809) 0.4277) 
CCCN (0.2813 (0.1875 (0.2500 (0.1563 (0.2813 (0.1875 (0.2500 (0.1563 0.2383) 0.3320) 0.2695) 0.3633) 0.3027) 0.3965) 0.3340) 0.4277) 
 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CNNN, 
CNCN 
CNNN, 
CNNC 
CNNN, 
CNNN 
CNCN, 
CNCN 
CNCN, 
CNNC 
CNCN, 
CNNN 
CNNC, 
CNCC 
CNNC, 
CNCN 
CCCC (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.2480 (0.2480 (0.2480 (0.2480 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.3672) 0.3672) 0.3672) 0.3672) 
CCCN (0.3164 (0.2695 (0.3164 (0.2695 (0.3027 (0.2559 (0.3027 (0.2559 0.2227) 0.2695) 0.2227) 0.2695) 0.3125) 0.3594) 0.3125) 0.3594) 
CCNC (0.2285 (0.1816 (0.1973 (0.1504 (0.2266 (0.1797 (0.1953 (0.1484 0.2773) 0.3242) 0.3086) 0.3555) 0.3672) 0.4141) 0.3984) 0.4453) 
CCCN (0.2813 (0.1875 (0.2500 (0.1563 (0.2813 (0.1875 (0.2500 (0.1563 0.2480) 0.3418) 0.2793) 0.3730) 0.3125) 0.4063) 0.3438) 0.4375) 
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Table 2.O. FN1=4, SN1=4 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCNC, 
CCNC 
CCNC, 
CCNN 
CCNN, 
CCCC 
CCCC (0.2773 (0.2773 (0.2773 (0.2773 (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.2637 0.2773) 0.2773) 0.2773) 0.2773) 0.3867) 0.3867) 0.3867) 0.3867) 
CCCN (0.3867 (0.3711 (0.4102 (0.3945 (0.3711 (0.3555 (0.3945 (0.3789 0.2637) 0.2793) 0.2402) 0.2559) 0.3398) 0.3555) 0.3164) 0.3320) 
CCNC (0.3066 (0.2598 (0.3066 (0.2598 (0.2949 (0.2480 (0.2949 (0.2480 0.2949) 0.3418) 0.2949) 0.3418) 0.3789) 0.4258) 0.3789) 0.4258) 
CCNN (0.4160 (0.3535 (0.4395 (0.3770 (0.4023 (0.3398 (0.4258 (0.3633 0.2813) 0.3438) 0.2578) 0.3203) 0.3320) 0.3945) 0.3086) 0.3711) 
CNCC (0.2520 (0.2051 (0.2207 (0.1738 (0.2520 (0.2051 (0.2207 (0.1738 0.3047) 0.3516) 0.3359) 0.3828) 0.3887) 0.4355) 0.4199) 0.4668) 
CNCN (0.3613 (0.2988 (0.3535 (0.2910 (0.3594 (0.2969 (0.3516 (0.2891 0.2910) 0.3535) 0.2988) 0.3613) 0.3418) 0.4043) 0.3496) 0.4121) 
CNNC (0.3203 (0.2266 (0.2891 (0.1953 (0.3223 (0.2285 (0.2910 (0.1973 0.3223) 0.4160) 0.3535) 0.4473) 0.3809) 0.4746) 0.4121) 0.5059) 
CNNN (0.4297 (0.3203 (0.4219 (0.3125 (0.4297 (0.3203 (0.4219 (0.3125 0.3086) 0.4180) 0.3164) 0.4258) 0.3340) 0.4434) 0.3418) 0.4512) 
(continue) 
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNN, 
CCCN 
CCNN, 
CCNC 
CCNN, 
CCNN 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCCC (0.2949 (0.2949 (0.2949 (0.2949 (0.2813 (0.2813 (0.2813 (0.2813 0.3066) 0.3066) 0.3066) 0.3066) 0.4160) 0.4160) 0.4160) 0.4160) 
CCCN (0.4023 (0.3867 (0.4258 (0.4102 (0.3867 (0.3711 (0.4102 (0.3945 0.2715) 0.2871) 0.2480) 0.2637) 0.3477) 0.3633) 0.3242) 0.3398) 
CCNC (0.3164 (0.2695 (0.3164 (0.2695 (0.3047 (0.2578 (0.3047 (0.2578 0.3164) 0.3633) 0.3164) 0.3633) 0.4004) 0.4473) 0.4004) 0.4473) 
CCNN (0.4238 (0.3613 (0.4473 (0.3848 (0.4102 (0.3477 (0.4336 (0.3711 0.2813) 0.3438) 0.2578) 0.3203) 0.3320) 0.3945) 0.3086) 0.3711) 
CNCC (0.2617 (0.2148 (0.2305 (0.1836 (0.2617 (0.2148 (0.2305 (0.1836 0.3340) 0.3809) 0.3652) 0.4121) 0.4180) 0.4648) 0.4492) 0.4961) 
CNCN (0.3691 (0.3066 (0.3613 (0.2988 (0.3672 (0.3047 (0.3594 (0.2969 0.2988) 0.3613) 0.3066) 0.3691) 0.3496) 0.4121) 0.3574) 0.4199) 
CNNC (0.3223 (0.2285 (0.2910 (0.1973 (0.3242 (0.2305 (0.2930 (0.1992 0.3438) 0.4375) 0.3750) 0.4688) 0.4023) 0.4961) 0.4336) 0.5273) 
CNNN (0.4297 (0.3203 (0.4219 (0.3125 (0.4297 (0.3203 (0.4219 (0.3125 0.3086) 0.4180) 0.3164) 0.4258) 0.3340) 0.4434) 0.3418) 0.4512) 
(Continue) 
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCNC, 
CCNC 
CCNC, 
CCNN 
CCNN, 
CCCC 
CCCC (0.3047 (0.3047 (0.3047 (0.3047 (0.2910 (0.2910 (0.2910 (0.2910 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.3613) 0.3613) 0.3613) 0.3613) 
CCCN (0.4121 (0.3965 (0.4355 (0.4199 (0.3965 (0.3809 (0.4199 (0.4043 0.2285) 0.2441) 0.2051) 0.2207) 0.3047) 0.3203) 0.2813) 0.2969) 
CCNC (0.3262 (0.2793 (0.3262 (0.2793 (0.3145 (0.2676 (0.3145 (0.2676 0.2695) 0.3164) 0.2695) 0.3164) 0.3535) 0.4004) 0.3535) 0.4004) 
CCNN (0.4336 (0.3711 (0.4570 (0.3945 (0.4199 (0.3574 (0.4434 (0.3809 0.2461) 0.3086) 0.2227) 0.2852) 0.2969) 0.3594) 0.2734) 0.3359) 
CNCC (0.2617 (0.2148 (0.2305 (0.1836 (0.2617 (0.2148 (0.2305 (0.1836 0.2930) 0.3398) 0.3242) 0.3711) 0.3770) 0.4238) 0.4082) 0.4551) 
CNCN (0.3691 (0.3066 (0.3613 (0.2988 (0.3672 (0.3047 (0.3594 (0.2969 0.2695) 0.3320) 0.2773) 0.3398) 0.3203) 0.3828) 0.3281) 0.3906) 
CNNC (0.3223 (0.2285 (0.2910 (0.1973 (0.3242 (0.2305 (0.2930 (0.1992 0.3105) 0.4043) 0.3418) 0.4355) 0.3691) 0.4629) 0.4004) 0.4941) 
CNNN (0.4297 (0.3203 (0.4219 (0.3125 (0.4297 (0.3203 (0.4219 (0.3125 0.2871) 0.3965) 0.2949) 0.4043) 0.3125) 0.4219) 0.3203) 0.4297) 
(Continue) 
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNN, 
CCCN 
CCNN, 
CCNC 
CCNN, 
CCNN 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCCC (0.3223 (0.3223 (0.3223 (0.3223 (0.3086 (0.3086 (0.3086 (0.3086 0.2813) 0.2813) 0.2813) 0.2813) 0.3906) 0.3906) 0.3906) 0.3906) 
CCCN (0.4277 (0.4121 (0.4512 (0.4355 (0.4121 (0.3965 (0.4355 (0.4199 0.2363) 0.2520) 0.2129) 0.2285) 0.3125) 0.3281) 0.2891) 0.3047) 
CCNC (0.3359 (0.2891 (0.3359 (0.2891 (0.3242 (0.2773 (0.3242 (0.2773 0.2910) 0.3379) 0.2910) 0.3379) 0.3750) 0.4219) 0.3750) 0.4219) 
CCNN (0.4414 (0.3789 (0.4648 (0.4023 (0.4277 (0.3652 (0.4512 (0.3887 0.2461) 0.3086) 0.2227) 0.2852) 0.2969) 0.3594) 0.2734) 0.3359) 
CNCC (0.2715 (0.2246 (0.2402 (0.1934 (0.2715 (0.2246 (0.2402 (0.1934 0.3223) 0.3691) 0.3535) 0.4004) 0.4063) 0.4531) 0.4375) 0.4844) 
CNCN (0.3770 (0.3145 (0.3691 (0.3066 (0.3750 (0.3125 (0.3672 (0.3047 0.2773) 0.3398) 0.2852) 0.3477) 0.3281) 0.3906) 0.3359) 0.3984) 
CNNC (0.3242 (0.2305 (0.2930 (0.1992 (0.3262 (0.2324 (0.2949 (0.2012 0.3320) 0.4258) 0.3633) 0.4570) 0.3906) 0.4844) 0.4219) 0.5156) 
CNNN (0.4297 (0.3203 (0.4219 (0.3125 (0.4297 (0.3203 (0.4219 (0.3125 0.2871) 0.3965) 0.2949) 0.4043) 0.3125) 0.4219) 0.3203) 0.4297) 
 (Continue)  
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCNC, 
CCNC 
CCNC, 
CCNN 
CCNN, 
CCCC 
CCCC (0.2773 (0.2773 (0.2773 (0.2773 (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.2637 (0.2637 0.2773) 0.2773) 0.2773) 0.2773) 0.3867) 0.3867) 0.3867) 0.3867) 
CCCN (0.4102 (0.3945 (0.4336 (0.4180 (0.3945 (0.3789 (0.4180 (0.4023 0.2402) 0.2559) 0.2168) 0.2324) 0.3164) 0.3320) 0.2930) 0.3086) 
CCNC (0.3457 (0.2988 (0.3457 (0.2988 (0.3340 (0.2871 (0.3340 (0.2871 0.2559) 0.3027) 0.2559) 0.3027) 0.3398) 0.3867) 0.3398) 0.3867) 
CCNN (0.4785 (0.4160 (0.5020 (0.4395 (0.4648 (0.4023 (0.4883 (0.4258 0.2188) 0.2813) 0.1953) 0.2578) 0.2695) 0.3320) 0.2461) 0.3086) 
CNCC (0.2676 (0.2207 (0.2363 (0.1895 (0.2676 (0.2207 (0.2363 (0.1895 0.2891) 0.3359) 0.3203) 0.3672) 0.3730) 0.4199) 0.4043) 0.4512) 
CNCN (0.4004 (0.3379 (0.3926 (0.3301 (0.3984 (0.3359 (0.3906 (0.3281 0.2520) 0.3145) 0.2598) 0.3223) 0.3027) 0.3652) 0.3105) 0.3730) 
CNNC (0.3359 (0.2422 (0.3047 (0.2109 (0.3379 (0.2441 (0.3066 (0.2129 0.2676) 0.3613) 0.2988) 0.3926) 0.3262) 0.4199) 0.3574) 0.4512) 
CNNN (0.4688 (0.3594 (0.4609 (0.3516 (0.4688 (0.3594 (0.4609 (0.3516 0.2305) 0.3398) 0.2383) 0.3477) 0.2559) 0.3652) 0.2637) 0.3730) 
(Continue) 
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNN, 
CCCN 
CCNN, 
CCNC 
CCNN, 
CCNN 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCCC (0.2949 (0.2949 (0.2949 (0.2949 (0.2813 (0.2813 (0.2813 (0.2813 0.3066) 0.3066) 0.3066) 0.3066) 0.4160) 0.4160) 0.4160) 0.4160) 
CCCN (0.4258 (0.4102 (0.4492 (0.4336 (0.4102 (0.3945 (0.4336 (0.4180 0.2480) 0.2637) 0.2246) 0.2402) 0.3242) 0.3398) 0.3008) 0.3164) 
CCNC (0.3555 (0.3086 (0.3555 (0.3086 (0.3438 (0.2969 (0.3438 (0.2969 0.2773) 0.3242) 0.2773) 0.3242) 0.3613) 0.4082) 0.3613) 0.4082) 
CCNN (0.4863 (0.4238 (0.5098 (0.4473 (0.4727 (0.4102 (0.4961 (0.4336 0.2188) 0.2813) 0.1953) 0.2578) 0.2695) 0.3320) 0.2461) 0.3086) 
CNCC (0.2773 (0.2305 (0.2461 (0.1992 (0.2773 (0.2305 (0.2461 (0.1992 0.3184) 0.3652) 0.3496) 0.3965) 0.4023) 0.4492) 0.4336) 0.4805) 
CNCN (0.4082 (0.3457 (0.4004 (0.3379 (0.4063 (0.3438 (0.3984 (0.3359 0.2598) 0.3223) 0.2676) 0.3301) 0.3105) 0.3730) 0.3184) 0.3809) 
CNNC (0.3379 (0.2441 (0.3066 (0.2129 (0.3398 (0.2461 (0.3086 (0.2148 0.2891) 0.3828) 0.3203) 0.4141) 0.3477) 0.4414) 0.3789) 0.4727) 
CNNN (0.4688 (0.3594 (0.4609 (0.3516 (0.4688 (0.3594 (0.4609 (0.3516 0.2305) 0.3398) 0.2383) 0.3477) 0.2559) 0.3652) 0.2637) 0.3730) 
(Continue)  
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCNC, 
CCNC 
CCNC, 
CCNN 
CCNN, 
CCCC 
CCCC (0.3047 (0.3047 (0.3047 (0.3047 (0.2910 (0.2910 (0.2910 (0.2910 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.2520) 0.3613) 0.3613) 0.3613) 0.3613) 
CCCN (0.4355 (0.4199 (0.4590 (0.4434 (0.4199 (0.4043 (0.4434 (0.4277 0.2051) 0.2207) 0.1816) 0.1973) 0.2813) 0.2969) 0.2578) 0.2734) 
CCNC (0.3652 (0.3184 (0.3652 (0.3184 (0.3535 (0.3066 (0.3535 (0.3066 0.2305) 0.2773) 0.2305) 0.2773) 0.3145) 0.3613) 0.3145) 0.3613) 
CCNN (0.4961 (0.4336 (0.5195 (0.4570 (0.4824 (0.4199 (0.5059 (0.4434 0.1836) 0.2461) 0.1602) 0.2227) 0.2344) 0.2969) 0.2109) 0.2734) 
CNCC (0.2773 (0.2305 (0.2461 (0.1992 (0.2773 (0.2305 (0.2461 (0.1992 0.2773) 0.3242) 0.3086) 0.3555) 0.3613) 0.4082) 0.3926) 0.4395) 
CNCN (0.4082 (0.3457 (0.4004 (0.3379 (0.4063 (0.3438 (0.3984 (0.3359 0.2305) 0.2930) 0.2383) 0.3008) 0.2813) 0.3438) 0.2891) 0.3516) 
CNNC (0.3379 (0.2441 (0.3066 (0.2129 (0.3398 (0.2461 (0.3086 (0.2148 0.2559) 0.3496) 0.2871) 0.3809) 0.3145) 0.4082) 0.3457) 0.4395) 
CNNN (0.4688 (0.3594 (0.4609 (0.3516 (0.4688 (0.3594 (0.4609 (0.3516 0.2090) 0.3184) 0.2168) 0.3262) 0.2344) 0.3438) 0.2422) 0.3516) 
(Continue) 
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(Continuation) 
S-strategy (AAAA, AAAA) 
F-strategy (AAAA) 
CCNN, 
CCCN 
CCNN, 
CCNC 
CCNN, 
CCNN 
CCCN, 
CCCN 
CCCN, 
CCNC 
CCCN, 
CCNN 
CCNC, 
CCCC 
CCNC, 
CCCN 
CCCC (0.3223 (0.3223 (0.3223 (0.3223 (0.3086 (0.3086 (0.3086 (0.3086 0.2813) 0.2813) 0.2813) 0.2813) 0.3906) 0.3906) 0.3906) 0.3906) 
CCCN (0.4512 (0.4355 (0.4746 (0.4590 (0.4355 (0.4199 (0.4590 (0.4434 0.2129) 0.2285) 0.1895) 0.2051) 0.2891) 0.3047) 0.2656) 0.2813) 
CCNC (0.3750 (0.3281 (0.3750 (0.3281 (0.3633 (0.3164 (0.3633 (0.3164 0.2520) 0.2988) 0.2520) 0.2988) 0.3359) 0.3828) 0.3359) 0.3828) 
CCNN (0.5039 (0.4414 (0.5273 (0.4648 (0.4902 (0.4277 (0.5137 (0.4512 0.1836) 0.2461) 0.1602) 0.2227) 0.2344) 0.2969) 0.2109) 0.2734) 
CNCC (0.2871 (0.2402 (0.2559 (0.2090 (0.2871 (0.2402 (0.2559 (0.2090 0.3066) 0.3535) 0.3379) 0.3848) 0.3906) 0.4375) 0.4219) 0.4688) 
CNCN (0.4160 (0.3535 (0.4082 (0.3457 (0.4141 (0.3516 (0.4063 (0.3438 0.2383) 0.3008) 0.2461) 0.3086) 0.2891) 0.3516) 0.2969) 0.3594) 
CNNC (0.3398 (0.2461 (0.3086 (0.2148 (0.3418 (0.2480 (0.3105 (0.2168 0.2773) 0.3711) 0.3086) 0.4023) 0.3359) 0.4297) 0.3672) 0.4609) 
CNNN (0.4688 (0.3594 (0.4609 (0.3516 (0.4688 (0.3594 (0.4609 (0.3516 0.2090) 0.3184) 0.2168) 0.3262) 0.2344) 0.3438) 0.2422) 0.3516) 
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Appendix 2.3 Analysis on the L1 Player 
To get the strategy matrix of the L1 players, we need to compute the wining probability 
of each action and select the action with the higher wining probability as the strategy of the 
L1 player in a specific game.  
We use  𝑃௞ோ(𝑖|𝐼ோ)  to represent type k player’s prior probability based on his 
information set 𝐼ோ on that the sum of his opponent’s 2nd and 3rd cards51 is “𝑖”. ‘’ 𝑘’’ index 
types, e.g., L1, L2 or Eq. “𝑅” represents roles of players and if a player is FM/SM, then “𝑅” 
equals to “F/S”. When L1 player is the FM, he predicts that the SM chooses “Call” as 50% 
possibility. Then the distribution of  𝑃ଵி(𝑖|𝐼ி) , in which the number on FM’s 2nd card is a 
uniform distribution from 1 to 4, can be drawn in Table A2.3.1: 
Based on the FM’s information set, 𝐼ி = {𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝑁2, 𝑆𝑁1} , the FM can calculate the 
winning probability of each action: 
𝑃𝐶ଵி = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤𝑖𝑛| 𝐼ி , 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙) = ෍
1
4
∗ (෍[Prob(win|𝐼ி , 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑗, 𝑖) ∗ 𝑃ଵி(𝑖|𝐼ி)]
଼
௜ୀଵ
)
ସ
௝ୀଵ
  
𝑃𝑁ଵி = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐼ி , 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙) = ෍[Prob(win|𝐼ி , 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑖) ∗ 𝑃ଵி(𝑖|𝐼ி)]
଼
௜ୀଵ
  
“𝑃𝐶ଵி” represents the probability of winning the game when L1 FM calls a 3rd card and “𝑃𝑁ଵி” 
represents the probability of winning the game when L1 FM does not call a 3rd card. 
According to the winning rules (in Section 2.2),   
 
 
 
  
                                                          
51 If the opponent player does not call a 3rd card, then we uniform the number on the 3rd card as 0. 
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Table A2.3.1 Distribution of the Prior Belief of the L1 FM on his SM’s the sum of 2nd card and 3rd card  
𝑖 𝑠 𝑗 𝑃ଵி(𝑖|𝐼ி) 
1 1 0 𝑃ଵி൫1หI୊൯ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  1) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗 = 0) = 1/4 ∗ 1/2, 52 1/8 
2 
2 0 𝑃ଵி൫2หI୊൯ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  2) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗 = 0) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 1) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 1)
= 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2, 53 
5/32 
1 1 
3 
3 0 𝑃ଵி൫3หI୊൯ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 3) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗 = 0) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 2) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 1)
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 1) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 2)
= 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 
3/16 2 1 
1 2 
4 
4 0 
𝑃ଵி൫4หI୊൯ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 4) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗 = 0) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 3) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j =  1)
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 2) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 2) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 1) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 3)
= 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4
∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 
7/32 3 1 
2 2 
1 3 
5 
4 1 
𝑃ଵி൫5หI୊൯ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  4) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 1) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 3) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 2)
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 2) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 3) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 1) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 4)
= 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2
+ 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 
1/8 3 2 
2 3 
1 4 
6 
4 2 
𝑃ଵி൫6หI୊൯ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  4) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 2) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 3) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 3)
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 2) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 4)
= 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 
3/32 3 3 
2 4 
7 
4 3 
𝑃ଵி൫7หI୊൯ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 4) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 3) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 3) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 4)  
= 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 
1/16 
3 4 
8 4 4 𝑃ଵி൫8หI୊൯ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 4) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 4) = 1/4 ∗ 1/4 ∗ 1/2 1/32 
Note: 𝑖 = 𝑠 (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 2𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑) + 𝑗 (𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 3𝑟𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑑), 𝑖: 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 1 𝑡𝑜 8  
 
  
                                                          
52 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  1) is the probability that s =1 is equal to the number’s random drawn probability, i.e., 25%. The same for s 
=2, 3, and 4. And the probability that j =0 is 50%, since this probability is equal to the probability of “No Call”. 
53 The probability that j =1 is equal to the number’s random drawn probability times the 50% probability of “Call”. The 
same for j =2, 3, and 4. 
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Prob(win|𝐼ி , 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑗, 𝑖) 
= ൞
1, 𝑖𝑓 9 ≥ FN1 + FN2 + 𝑗 > 𝑆𝑁1 + 𝑖, 𝑜𝑟 FN1 + FN2 + 𝑗 ≤ 9 < 𝑆𝑁1 + 𝑖
 0, 𝑖𝑓 FN1 + FN2 + 𝑗 < 𝑆𝑁1 + 𝑖 ≤ 9, 𝑜𝑟 FN1 + FN2 + 𝑗 > 9                      
1
2
, 𝑖𝑓 FN1 + FN2 + 𝑗 = 𝑆𝑁1 + 𝑖 ≤ 9                                                                
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐼ி , 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑖) 
= ൞
1, 𝑖𝑓 9 ≥ FN1 + FN2 > 𝑆𝑁1 + 𝑖, 𝑜𝑟 FN1 + FN2 + 𝑗 ≤ 9 < 𝑆𝑁1 + 𝑖        
0, 𝑖𝑓FN1 + FN2 < 𝑆𝑁1 + 𝑖 ≤ 9, 𝑜𝑟 FN1 + FN2 + 𝑗 > 9                              
1
2
, 𝑖𝑓 FN1 + FN2 = 𝑆𝑁1 + 𝑖 ≤ 9                                                                        
 
Comparing 𝑃𝐶ଵி and 𝑃𝑁ଵி , L1 FM chooses the action with a higher winning probability in the 
scenario of 𝐼ி. (Table 2.3 in Section 2.3.2.1 shows the strategy matrix of the L1 FM.) 
Since the L1 SM knows or equates with knowing the FM’s action, the procedure to get 
the distribution of 𝑃ଵௌ(𝑖|𝐼ௌ) is divided into two parts as below Table A2.3.2a and Table 
A2.3.2b:  
Table A2.3.2a Distribution of the Posterior Belief of the L1 SM on her FM’s the sum of 2nd card and 
3rd card when the FM does not call a 3rd card (𝐼ௌ = {SN1, SN2, FN1, FA=N}) 
𝑖 s j 𝑃ଵௌ(𝑖|𝐼ௌ) 
1 1 0 𝑃ଵௌ(1|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  1) = 1/4 1/4 
2 2 0 𝑃ଵௌ(2|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  2) = 1/4 1/4 
3 3 0 𝑃ଵௌ(3|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  3) = 1/4 1/4 
4 4 0 𝑃ଵௌ(4|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  3) = 1/4 1/4 
Note: If FM does not call a 3rd card, there is no possible that “𝑖” is equal to 5, 6, 7, or 8. If FM calls for a 3rd card, 
there is no possible that “𝑖” is equal to 1. 
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Table A2.3.2b Distribution of the Posterior Belief of the L1 SM on her FM’s the sum of 2nd card and 
3rd card when the FM calls a 3rd card (𝐼ௌ = {SN1, SN2, FN1, FA=C}) 
𝑖 s j 𝑃ଵி(𝑖|𝐼ி) 
2 1 1 𝑃ଵௌ(2|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  1) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗 = 1) = 1/4 ∗ 1/4 1/16 
3 
2 1 𝑃ଵௌ(3|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  2) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗 = 1) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 1) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 2)
= 1/4 ∗ 1/4 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 1/8 1 2 
4 
3 1 
𝑃ଵௌ(4|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 3) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗 = 1) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 2) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 2)
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 1) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 3)
= 1/4 ∗ 1/4 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 
3/16 2 2 
1 3 
5 
4 1 
𝑃ଵௌ(5|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 4) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑗 = 1) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 3) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j =  2)
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 2) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 3) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 1)
∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 4)
= 1/4 ∗ 1/4 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 
1/4 
3 2 
2 3 
1 4 
6 
4 2 
𝑃ଵௌ(6|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s =  4) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 2) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 3) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 3)
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 2) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 4)
= 1/4 ∗ 1/4 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 
3/16 3 3 
2 4 
7 
4 3 𝑃ଵௌ(7|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 4) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 3) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 3) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(j = 4)  
= 1/4 ∗ 1/4 + 1/4 ∗ 1/4 1/8 3 4 
8 4 4 𝑃ଵௌ(8|𝐼ௌ) = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 4) ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(s = 4) = 1/4 ∗ 1/4 1/16 
Based on the same process 54  as the L1 FM, the SM chooses the action with a higher 
probability of winning in the scenario of 𝐼ௌ. (Table 2.4 in Section 2.3.2.1 shows the strategy 
matrix of the L1 SM.) 
                                                          
54 𝑃𝐶ଵௌ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤𝑖𝑛| 𝐼ௌ, 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙) = ∑
ଵ
ସ
∗ (∑ [Prob(win|𝐼ௌ, 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑗, 𝑖) ∗ 𝑃ଵௌ(𝑖|𝐼ௌ)]଼௜ୀଵ )ସ௝ୀଵ   
𝑃𝑁ଵௌ = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤𝑖𝑛| 𝐼ௌ, 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙) = ෍[Prob(win|𝐼ௌ, 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑖) ∗ 𝑃ଵௌ(𝑖|𝐼ௌ)]
଼
௜ୀଵ
  
Prob(win|𝐼ௌ, 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑗, 𝑖) ൞
= 1, 𝑖𝑓 9 ≥ SN1 + SN2 + 𝑗 > 𝐹𝑁1 + 𝑖, 𝑜𝑟 SN1 + SN2 + 𝑗 ≤ 9 < 𝐹𝑁1 + 𝑖    
= 0, 𝑖𝑓 SN1 + SN2 + 𝑗 < 𝐹𝑁1 + 𝑖 ≤ 9, 𝑜𝑟 SN1 + SN2 + 𝑗 > 9                          
=
1
2
, 𝑖𝑓 SN1 + SN2 + 𝑗 = 𝐹𝑁1 + 𝑖 ≤ 9                                                                      
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Appendix 2.4 Analysis on the L2 Player 
The L2 FM chooses an action with a high winning probability between 𝑃𝐶ଶி (“Call a 3rd 
card”), and 𝑃𝑁ଶி  (“Not call a 3rd card”). To get 𝑃𝐶ଶி  and 𝑃𝑁ଶி , L2 FM needs to deduce 
𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி), which is the prior belief ta the L2 FM on the distribution of “i” of his L1 SM. Since 
the L1 SM chooses actions based on his FM’s action, 𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி)  is updated to 
𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶) if L2 FM plans to call a 3rd card, or 𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁) if L2 FM plans not to 
call a 3rd card.  
“𝑖” is composed of “s” (number on the 2nd card) and “j” (number on the 3rd card), and 
meanwhile “j” depends on the action of the L1 SM, which is affected by the action of the 
FM. The L2 FM draws a prior probability on the action of the L1 SM according to Table 2.4. 
For example, in a scenario of {FN1=3, FN2=4, SN1=3, FA=N}, the combinations of the sum 
of L1 SM’s 1st and 2nd cards are from 4 to 7. When the L1 SM faces {SN1=3, FN1=3, FA=N}, 
there is 75% probability that the L1 SM chooses to call a 3rd card, since when SN2 is equal 
to 1, 2 or 3, the sum of the L1 SM’s 1st and 2nd cards can be 4, 5 or 6. Only in these three 
cases, the L1 SM’s strategy is “Call”. Then the sum  𝑖 can be from 2 to 7. However, when 
SN2=4, Table 2.4 shows the strategy of the L1 SM is “No Call”. The sum 𝑖 only can be 4 in 
this case. Table A2.4.1 shows the distribution of 𝑖 in the scenario of {FN1=3, FN2=4, SN1=3, 
FA=N}. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Prob(win|𝐼ௌ, 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙, 𝑖) ൞
= 1, 𝑖𝑓 9 ≥ SN1 + SN2 > 𝐹𝑁1 + 𝑖, 𝑜𝑟 SN1 + SN2 + 𝑗 ≤ 9 < 𝐹𝑁1 + 𝑖    
= 0, 𝑖𝑓SN1 + SN2 < 𝐹𝑁1 + 𝑖 ≤ 9, 𝑜𝑟 SN1 + SN2 + 𝑗 > 9                           
=
1
2
, 𝑖𝑓 SN1 + SN2 = 𝐹𝑁1 + 𝑖 ≤ 9                                                                     
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Table A2.4.1. Distribution of 𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝐹𝑁2 = 4, 𝑆𝑁1 = 3, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁) 
𝑖 Combination 𝑃ଶி(𝑖|FN1 = 3, FN2 = 4, SN1 = 3, FA = N) 
2 {s=1, j=1} 1/4*1/4=1/16 
3 {s=1, j=2; 
s=2, j=1} 
1/4*1/4+1/4*1/4=1/8 
4 {s=4, j=0; 
s=1, j=3, 
s=2, j=2; 
s=3, j=1} 
1/4+1/4*1/4+1/4*1/4+1/4*1/4=7/16 
5 {s=1, j=4; 
s=2, j=3; 
s=3, j=2} 
1/4*1/4+1/4*1/4+1/4*1/4=3/16 
6 {s=2, j=4; 
s=3, j=3} 
1/4*1/4+1/4*1/4=1/8 
7 {s=3, j=4} 1/4*1/4=1/16 
We generalize that the probability on that the action of the L1 SM is “Call” is  
𝑃ଵௌ(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝐹𝐴)  in the scenario of {FN1, SN1, SN2=s, FA} and the 
probability on that the action of L1 SM is “No Call” is 𝑃ଵௌ(𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝐹𝐴) 
in the scenario of {FN1, SN1, SN2=s, FA} based on L1 SM’s strategy matrix. Then the prior55 
distribution of “𝑖” of the L2 FM is shown in each action as below: 
                                                          
55 As L2 FM actually does not get new information on L1 SM, the belief of L2 FM on L1 SM’s action is still a prior estimate. 
𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴) could be expanded as below: 
𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴) = 𝑃ଶி(𝑖 = 𝑆𝑁2 + 𝑗|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴) = ෍ 𝑃ଵௌ(𝑗, 𝑆𝐴|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠) ∗ 𝑃(𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴)
ସ
௦ୀଵ
 
According to Bayes’ Rule, 
𝑃ଵௌ(𝑗, 𝑆𝐴|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠) = 𝑃ଵௌ(𝑆𝐴|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠) ∗ 𝑃(𝑗 = 𝑖 − 𝑠|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑆𝐴) 
Then  
𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴) = ෍ 𝑃ଵௌ(𝑆𝐴|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠) ∗ 𝑃(𝑗 = 𝑖 − 𝑠|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑆𝐴) ∗ 𝑃(𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴)
ସ
௦ୀଵ
 
SA denotes SM’s action, and 𝑃ଵௌ(𝑆𝐴|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠) denotes the probability for the L1 SM’s action, either “C” or “N”, 
when {𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠 }. 𝑃(𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴) which denotes the probability for the number on the SM’s 2nd card, i.e., 1, 2, 
3, or 4, is always equal to ¼ as 𝑠 is randomly drawn from 1 to 4. 𝑃(𝑗 = 𝑖 − 𝑠|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑆𝐴) denotes the probability 
for the number on the SM’s 3rd card in the scenario of {𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑆𝐴 }, which is either equal to ¼ when j is from 1 
to 4 or equal to 0 when j is nonsexist. 
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𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶)
= ෍[𝑃ଵௌ(𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶) ∗ 𝑃(𝑖 − 𝑠 = 0) ∗ 𝑃(𝑠)]
ସ
௦ୀଵ
+ ෍[𝑃ଵௌ(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶) ∗ 𝑃(𝑗 = 𝑖 − 𝑠) ∗ 𝑃(𝑠)]
ସ
௦ୀଵ
 
𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁)
= ෍[𝑃ଵௌ(𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁) ∗ 𝑃(𝑖 − 𝑠 = 0) ∗ 𝑃(𝑠)]
ସ
௦ୀଵ
+ ෍[𝑃ଵௌ(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁) ∗ 𝑃(𝑗 = 𝑖 − 𝑠) ∗ 𝑃(𝑠)]
ସ
௦ୀଵ
 
𝑃(𝑖 − 𝑠 = 0) represents the probability of 𝑖 − 𝑠 = 0. If 𝑖 − 𝑠 = 0, the probability is equal 
to 1. Otherwise, this probability is equal to 0. 𝑃(𝑗 = 𝑖 − 𝑠) represents the probability of the 
value 𝑗 of the 3rd card, which equals to (𝑖 − 𝑠). If 0 < 𝑖 − 𝑠 ≤ 4 , the probability is equal to 
1/4. Otherwise, this probability is equal to 0. 𝑃(𝑠) represents the probability of the value 𝑗 
of the 2nd card equal to 𝑠, which is 1/4. 
When the L2 FM call a 3rd card, the procedure of inference is similar to the case above. 
Then L2 FM compares 𝑃𝐶ଶி with 𝑃𝑁ଶி 56 and picks up the higher one. Table 2.1 shows the 
strategy matrix of the L2 FM in each scenario after comparison. 
In contrast to the L2 FM, the L2 SM chooses an action after she knows her FM’s action, 
which helps L2 SM to update her belief on the distribution of FN2 using Bayes’ Rule. For 
example, in a scenario of {FN1=3, SN1=1, SN2=3, FA=C}, before L2 SM knows her FM’s action, 
the prior distribution of FN2, 𝑃ଵௌ(𝑖|𝐼ௌ), is a uniform distribution from 1 to 4. However, after 
                                                          
56 𝑃𝐶ଶி = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤𝑖𝑛| 𝐼ி , 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙) = ∑
ଵ
ସ
∗ (∑ [Prob(win|𝐼ி , 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙, j, i) ∗ 𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶)]଼௜ୀଵ )ସ௝ୀଵ   
𝑃𝑁ଶி = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑤𝑖𝑛|𝐼ி , 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙) = ෍[Prob(win|𝐼ி , 𝑁𝑜 𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙, i) ∗ 𝑃ଶி(𝑖|𝐼ி , 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁)]
଼
௜ୀଵ
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L2 SM is informed that her FM’s action is “Call”, the L2 SM updates her belief to the 
posterior distribution of FN2, 𝑃ଶௌ(𝑖|𝐼ௌ)57, based on Bayes’ Rule following the steps below: 
𝑃ଶௌ(𝐹𝑁2|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶)
= 𝑃ଶௌ( 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝐹𝑁2, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1)
∗ 𝑃(𝐹𝑁2|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1)/𝑃ଶௌ( 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1) 
When FN1=3, which means “FN1+FN2” can be chosen randomly from 4 to 7, and SN1=1, 
according to Table 3 L2 SM knows the probability of L1 FM calls a 3rd card is 50%, which only 
occurs when FN2=1 or FN2=2. Then that means 𝑃ଶௌ( 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1) = 50%. 
And the distribution of FN2 is independent of FN1 and SN1, so 𝑃(𝐹𝑁2|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 =
1) = ଵ
ସ
. Furthermore, Table 3 shows when FN2 is equal to 1 or 2, the strategy of L1 FM is 
“Call”. Then 𝑃ଶௌ( 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶|𝐹𝑁2, 𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1) = 1 when FN1=1 or FN1=2. Otherwise, 
𝑃ଶௌ( 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶|𝐹𝑁2, 𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1) = 0. That is, 
𝑃ଶௌ(𝐹𝑁2 = 1|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶) = 1/2 
𝑃ଶௌ(𝐹𝑁2 = 2|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶) = 1/2 
𝑃ଶௌ(𝐹𝑁2 = 3|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶) = 0 
𝑃ଶௌ(𝐹𝑁2 = 4|𝐹𝑁1 = 3, 𝑆𝑁1 = 1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶) = 0 
By updating the belief with Bayes’ Rule, L2 SM knows FN2 only can be 1 or 2. Next, the range 
of 𝑖 could be from 2 to 6, and the distribution could be drawn58 by 𝑃(𝑖) = 𝑃(𝐹𝑁2 + 𝑗) =
𝑃(𝐹𝑁2) ∗ 𝑃(𝑗). In general, the posterior probability of “𝑖” in scenario of {FN1, SN1, SN2, FA} 
is drawn as below:  
 
                                                          
57 If L2 SM does not use Bayes’ Rule to update the prediction on the distribution of the number on FM’s 2nd card, the 
prediction without Bayesian updated is the same as L1 SM’s prediction, which is that the numbers on FM’s 2nd card is 
uniformly distributed from 1 to 4.  
58 Since SN2 and 𝑗 are independent to each other. 
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𝑃ଶௌ(𝑖|𝐼ௌ) 
= 𝑃ଶௌ(𝐹𝑁2 + 𝑗|𝐼ௌ) 
= 𝑃ଶௌ(𝐹𝑁2|𝐼ௌ) ∗ 𝑃ଶௌ(𝑗|𝐼ௌ)59 
= [𝑃ଶௌ( 𝐹𝐴|𝐹𝑁2, 𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1) ∗ 𝑃(𝐹𝑁2|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1)/𝑃ଶௌ( 𝐹𝐴|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1)] ∗ 𝑃ଶௌ(𝑗|𝐼ௌ) 
Similar with other level players, L2 SM gets 𝑃𝐶ଶௌ  and 𝑃𝑁ଶௌ  by inferring 𝑃ଶௌ(𝑖|𝐼ௌ)  and 
compares them to pick out the higher one. Table 2.2 shows the strategy matrix of the L2 
SM. 
Furthermore, based on the deducing above, the L2 SM’s beliefs could be represents as 
following: 
a) for the L2 FM, the belief that his opponent calls a 3rd card is  
𝑃(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶) 
= ෍ ෍[𝑃ଵௌ(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶) ∗ 𝑃ଵௌ(0 < 𝑖 − 𝑠 ≤ 4) ∗
1
4
]
ସ
௦ୀଵ
଼
௜ୀଵ
 
𝑃(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁) 
= ෍ ෍[𝑃ଵௌ(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁) ∗ 𝑃ଵௌ(0 < 𝑖 − 𝑠 ≤ 4) ∗
1
4
]
ସ
௦ୀଵ
଼
௜ୀଵ
 
b) for the L2 SM, the belief that her opponent calls a 3rd card is 
𝑃(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1) = ෍ ෍[𝑃ଵி(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑆𝑁1) ∗ 𝑃ଵி(0 < 𝑖 − 𝑠 ≤ 4) ∗
1
4
]
ସ
௦ୀଵ
଼
௜ୀଵ
 
c) for the L2 SM, the beliefs that the number on her opponent’s 2nd card is   
                                                          
59 If FM calls a 3rd card, 𝑃ଶௌ(𝑗|𝐼ௌ) =
ଵ
ସ
 when 𝑗 is from 1 to 4 and 𝑃ଶௌ(𝑗|𝐼ௌ) = 0 for 𝑗 =0. If FM does not call a 3rd card, 
𝑃ଶௌ(𝑗|𝐼ௌ) = 0 when 𝑗 is from 1 to 4 and 𝑃ଶௌ(𝑗|𝐼ௌ) = 1 for 𝑗 =0. 
Page 126 of 238 
 
𝑃ଶௌ(𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶)
= 𝑃ଶௌ( 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶|𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑆𝑁1)
∗ 𝑃(𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1)/𝑃ଶௌ( 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1) 
As in each specific game, the equilibrium players (Eq) also respond best to their beliefs, 
the inferring procedure on Bayes’ Rule of building beliefs is the same as the L2 players as 
described above. Then the equilibrium players’ beliefs use the same representations as the 
L2: 
d) for the Eq FM, the belief that his opponent calls a 3rd card is  
𝑃(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶)
= ෍ ෍ ൤𝑃ா௤ௌ (𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶) ∗ 𝑃ா௤ௌ (0 < 𝑖 − 𝑆𝑁2 ≤ 4)
ସ
௦ୀଵ
଼
௜ୀଵ
∗
1
4
൨ 
𝑃(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁)
= ෍ ෍[𝑃ா௤ௌ (𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝑁) ∗ 𝑃ா௤ௌ (0 < 𝑖 − 𝑆𝑁2 ≤ 4)
ସ
௦ୀଵ
଼
௜ୀଵ
∗
1
4
] 
e) for the Eq SM, the belief that her opponent calls a 3rd card is 
𝑃(𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1)
= ෍ ෍[𝑃ா௤ி (𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙|𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑆𝑁1) ∗ 𝑃ா௤ி (0 < 𝑖 − 𝐹𝑁2 ≤ 4) ∗
1
4
]
ସ
௦ୀଵ
଼
௜ୀଵ
 
f) for Eq SM, the beliefs that the number on her opponent’s 2nd card is   
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𝑃ா௤ௌ (𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1, 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶)
= 𝑃ா௤ௌ ( 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶|𝐹𝑁1, 𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠, 𝑆𝑁1)
∗ 𝑃ா௤(𝐹𝑁2 = 𝑠|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1)/𝑃ா௤ௌ ( 𝐹𝐴 = 𝐶|𝐹𝑁1, 𝑆𝑁1) 
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Appendix 2.5. L1(SA) SM’s Strategy 
FN1 
SN1+SN2 1 2 3 4 
FA=N: 
2 Call Call Call Call 
3 Call Call Call Call 
4 Call Call Call Call 
5 Call Call Call Call 
6 Call Call Call Call 
7 No Call No Call No Call No Call 
8 No Call No Call No Call No Call 
FA=C:     
2 Call Call Call Call 
3 Call Call Call Call 
4 Call Call Call Call 
5 Call Call Call Call 
6 Call Call Call Call 
7 No Call No Call No Call Call/No Call 
8 No Call No Call No Call No Call 
Note: The winning probability of “Call” is equal to the winning probability of “No Call”, when {SN1+SN2=7, 
FN1=4, FA=C}. 
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Appendix 2.6. Subjects’ Types 
Furthermore, we identify each subject’s thinking type and belief type with the given 
parameters from the models in previous sections and investigate their capabilities to make 
best responses on their beliefs. 
Given 𝑒௞  and 𝜆 which are got from the previous 7-type model or 9-type model, 𝑆௜௞ 
evaluates the likelihood value of type 𝑘 subject 𝑖 as described in formula (5.8), and then by 
comparing all 𝑆௜௞ along with 𝑘, a specific 𝑘∗ is picked, which leads a highest value of 𝑆௜௞. This 
𝑘∗ represents the thinking type of subject 𝑖.  
(5.8) 
𝑆௜௞ = 𝐿௜௞൫𝑒௞ห𝑥௜௞൯ ෑ 𝐿௜,௚௞ ൫𝜆ห𝑦௜,௚, 𝑏௚௞൯
ீୀଵଶ
௚ୀଵ
 
Table A2.6.1 presents the numbers of subjects who are identified as a specific type 
under two models. Table A2.6.1 shows the consistent findings with Table 20 in Section 5.2.3. 
And the proportions of transferring from L1(Exp) and L1(SA) to Exp-Exp increase to more 
than 40% except for the SM in DRT.  
Table A2.6.1. Summary on Identifications on Action & Stated Belief Data for Individual Subject (All 
games) 
  7-type model  9-type model 
 DRT SMT DRT SMT 
Type FM SM FM SM FM SM FM SM 
SA-No belief 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 - 
Exp- No belief 2 4 0 3 2 4 0 4 
SA-SA Play - - - - 0 - 1 - 
Exp- Exp Play - - - - 9 5 11 11 
L1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C1* 2 4 0 3 11 9 12 15 
L1(SA) 9 13 10 15 6 9 7 4 
L1(Exp) 8 9 15 7 1 8 6 7 
L2 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 
Eq 6 1 1 2 7 1 1 1 
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The result by identifying each subject’s type is corresponding to the previous finding that 
strategy method impedes strategy thinking. Details for each subject’s type shown as the 
table below: 
 
Table A2.6.2. Type of Each Subject 
Treatment Session Subject Role Action Belief Action & Belief 7 Type 
Action & Belief 
9 Type 
DRT 1 1 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 1 2 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 1 3 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 1 4 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 1 5 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 1 6 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 1 7 FM L1(SA)/Exp no belief L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 1 8 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 1 9 FM L1(SA)/Exp Eq L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 2 1 FM SA SA Play Exp-No belief Exp-No belief 
DRT 2 2 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play Exp-No belief Exp-No belief 
DRT 2 3 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 2 4 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 2 5 FM SA Exp play Eq Eq 
DRT 2 6 FM Eq SA Play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
DRT 2 7 FM SA Exp play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 2 8 FM Eq Eq L2 L2 
DRT 3 1 FM SA L1 Eq Eq 
DRT 3 2 FM Eq Exp play Eq Eq 
DRT 3 3 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 3 4 FM Eq Exp play Eq Eq 
DRT 3 5 FM Eq Exp play Eq Eq 
DRT 3 6 FM Eq no belief Eq Eq 
DRT 3 7 FM Eq no belief L1(Exp) Eq 
DRT 3 8 FM L1(SA)/Exp no belief L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 3 9 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 3 10 FM Eq no belief L2 L2 
SMT 1 1 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 1 2 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 1 3 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 1 4 FM L1(SA)/Exp no belief Exp-No belief Exp-No belief 
SMT 1 5 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 1 6 FM Eq Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 1 7 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
       (continue) 
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(Continuation)       
SMT 1 8 FM L1(SA)/Exp no belief Exp-No belief Exp-No belief 
SMT 1 9 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 2 1 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 2 2 FM L1(SA)/Exp no belief Exp-No belief Exp-No belief 
SMT 2 3 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 2 4 FM L1(SA)/Exp Eq Eq Exp-Exp play 
SMT 2 5 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 2 6 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 2 7 FM Eq Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 2 8 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 2 9 FM Eq Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 3 1 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 3 2 FM L1(SA)/Exp no belief Exp-No belief Exp-No belief 
SMT 3 3 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 3 4 FM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
SMT 3 5 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 3 6 FM L1(SA)/Exp Eq Eq Eq 
SMT 3 7 FM Eq Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 3 8 FM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 3 9 FM Eq Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
DRT 1 10 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 1 11 SM Eq Eq Eq Eq 
DRT 1 12 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 1 13 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 1 14 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 1 15 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 1 16 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 1 17 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 1 18 SM L1(SA)/Exp L2 L2 L2 
DRT 2 9 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 2 10 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 2 11 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 2 12 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
DRT 2 13 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 2 14 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 2 15 SM Eq L2 L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
DRT 2 16 SM Eq Eq L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
DRT 3 11 SM Eq Eq L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
DRT 3 12 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 3 13 SM Eq no belief L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
DRT 3 14 SM SA SA Play L1(SA) SA-SA play 
DRT 3 15 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 3 16 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 3 17 SM Eq Eq L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
       (continue) 
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(Continuation)       
DRT 3 18 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) Exp-Exp play 
DRT 3 19 SM Eq Eq L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
DRT 3 20 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 1 10 SM L1 Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
SMT 1 11 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 1 12 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 1 13 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play Eq Exp-Exp play 
SMT 1 14 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
SMT 1 15 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
SMT 1 16 SM L1(SA)/Exp no belief Exp-No belief Exp-No belief 
SMT 1 17 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 1 18 SM Eq Eq L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 2 10 SM Eq SA Play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 2 11 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
SMT 2 12 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 2 13 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 2 14 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 2 15 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 2 16 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
SMT 2 17 SM L1(SA)/Exp Eq Eq Eq 
SMT 2 18 SM L1(SA)/Exp L1 L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 3 10 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
SMT 3 11 SM L1(SA)/Exp SA Play L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 3 12 SM L1(SA)/Exp Exp play L1(SA) Exp-Exp play 
SMT 3 13 SM Eq Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 3 14 SM L1 no belief Exp-No belief Exp-No belief 
SMT 3 15 SM L1(SA)/Exp no belief L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 3 16 SM L1(SA)/Exp no belief L1(SA) L1(SA) 
SMT 3 17 SM Eq Exp play L1(Exp) L1(Exp) 
SMT 3 18 SM L1 no belief Exp-No belief Exp-No belief 
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Appendix Instructions 
Instruction of DRT 
WELCOME! 
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO START 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment in interdependent decision making. If 
you follow the instructions and pass the Understanding Test, you will be allowed to continue 
in the experiment. By continuing in the experiment, you will then be able to earn a 
considerable amount of money. The amount that you earn will be determined by your 
decisions, the decisions of other participants in the experiment, and chance. All that you 
earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you in private, in cash, after today's session. 
 
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other people's work. 
If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loudly, etc., you will be asked to 
leave, and you will forfeit your earnings. Thank you. 
 
 
 
The experiment consists of two parts, Part I and Part II.  
In Part I, you and all the other participants will first be randomly assigned to one of 
two roles: “First Mover” and “Second Mover”. You will have the same role throughout all 
of Part I. 
In Part I, you and everybody else will then be presented with 12 interdependent 
decision situations, one in each round. In each round of Part I, you will be anonymously 
matched with one of the other participants assigned to the other role, a new one in each 
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round. Both of you will face the same interdependent decision situation in that round. 
You will not know which of the other participants you are matched with, and your 
identity and the identities of the other participants will never be revealed. We will refer to 
the other participant as "S/He."  
In the interdependent decision situation of each round you and “S/He” make 
decisions, as explained below. Your decisions in a round will neither influence the matching 
of participants nor the assignment of interdependent decision situations in later rounds.  
Once a round is over, you will not be able to change your decisions in that round. In 
each round of Part I, you will have to wait until everyone is done with his/her own decisions, 
before proceeding to the next round.  
 
In Part II, neither you nor anyone else will interact with anyone else. You will first 
face a decision situation and next answer the questions of a quiz. In this part, your earnings 
will depend on your decision and chance in the decision situation and on your answers to 
the quiz’s questions. Your Part I decisions will not influence what you will be asked to do in 
Part II.  
  
You will receive the instructions that correspond to each part immediately before 
that part begins. 
 
 
PART I INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Each interdependent decision situation you will face in Part I is as follows: 
The First Mover will be given two cards, a 1st card and a 2nd card. Each of the First 
Mover’s two cards has a number on it, 1, 2, 3 or 4. The Second Mover will also be given two 
cards, a 1st card and a 2nd card. Each of the Second Mover’s cards has a number on it, 1, 2, 
3 or 4. 
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The First Mover will see the numbers on her/his 1st and 2nd cards, but will only see 
the number on the Second Mover’s 1st card, not the number on the Second Mover’s 2nd 
card. The Second Mover will see the numbers on her/his 1st and 2nd cards, but only the 
number on the First Mover’s 1st card, not the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card. 
In this interdependent decision situation, the First Mover, is the first to make a 
choice: to call or not call the 3rd card. The First Mover’s choice is then revealed to the 
Second Mover, who then chooses whether or not to call the 3rd card. The First and Second 
Mover 3rd cards each have a number on them, that is drawn independently, that can be 1, 
2, 3 or 4. 
 
The next screens display an illustrative example (IT IS ONLY AN ILLUSTRATION): The 
first screen displays the example from the point of view of the participant assigned to the 
role of First Mover (refers to the First Mover as “You,” while the Second Mover is “S/He”). 
It shows the choice that the First Mover has to make. (The dark grey rectangle indicates that 
there is a number on the Second Mover’s 2nd card that cannot be seen by “You”, the First 
Mover.) 
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Suppose the First Mover calls the 3rd card. Then, in the example, the First Mover 
would then see the next screen: 
 
(At this stage please ignore the sentence at the bottom of the screen “Please enter your 
estimate (enter a whole (i.e. integer) number between 0 and 100) that S/He will call the 3rd 
card?” We will explain this later.) 
 
In the case the First Mover calls the 3rd card, the next screen displays this 
interdependent decision situation example from the point of view of the participant 
assigned to the role of Second Mover (and therefore, refers to the Second Mover as “You”, 
while the First Mover is “S/He”). (The dark grey rectangle shows that there is a number on 
the First Mover’s 2nd card that cannot be seen by “You”, the Second Mover.) The screen 
shows that the Second Mover has to choose whether to call the 3rd card. 
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Instead suppose the First Mover does not call the 3rd card. Then, in this 
interdependent decision situation example, the First Mover would then see the next screen: 
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(At this stage please ignore the sentence at the bottom of the screen “Please enter your 
estimate (enter a whole (i.e. integer) number between 0 and 100) that S/He will call the 3rd 
card?” We will explain this later.) 
 
In the case the First Mover does not call the 3rd card, the next screen displays the 
interdependent decision situation example from the point of view of the participant 
assigned to the role of Second Mover (and therefore, refers to the Second Mover as “You”, 
while the First Mover is “S/He”). (The dark grey rectangle shows that there is a number on 
the First Mover’s 2nd card that cannot be seen by “You”, the Second Mover.) The screen 
shows that the Second Mover has to choose whether to call a 3rd card. 
 
 
 
After the Second Mover makes her/his choice on whether to call the 3rd card, the 
sum of the numbers on the First Mover’s cards (either the sum of the numbers on the two 
initial cards, or the sum of the numbers on all three cards if the First Mover called the 3rd 
card) is compared to the sum of the numbers on the Second Mover’s cards (either the sum 
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of the numbers on the two initial cards, or the sum of the numbers on all three cards if the 
Second Mover called the 3rd card), and the WINNER of the interdependent decision 
situation is selected as follows: 
 
 If both sums are larger than 9, no one wins; 
 If both sums are smaller than 9, the participant in the role with the largest sum wins; 
 If one of the sums is equal to 9, and the other sum is either smaller or larger than 9, 
then the participant in the role whose numbers on the cards sum to 9 wins. 
 If one of the sums is smaller than 9, and the other sum is larger than 9, then the 
participant in the role whose numbers on the cards sum to less than 9 wins. 
 If both sums are equal and also smaller than or equal to 9, then they tie, and the 
winner is determined randomly by the computer. In this case both participants have 
the same chance of winning, one in two. 
 
 
Neither you nor the other participants will learn the WINNER in any round before Part II. 
How are the numbers on the 2nd cards selected? 
 
In the 12 decision situations both the First Mover’s 2nd card and the Second Mover’s 
2nd card will have the number 1, 2, 3 or 4 on it an equal number of times. In other words, 
the First Mover’s 2nd card will have the number 1 on it 3 times, number 2 also 3 times, 
number 3 also 3 times and number 4 also 3 times. The same is true for the Second Mover. 
Since neither the First Mover nor the Second Mover will find out the number on the 2nd 
card of the participant in the other role until they have completed all 12 rounds, i.e., the 
end of Part I, they should think of the number on the other role’s 2nd card as having an 
equal chance of being 1, 2, 3 or 4 in each interdependent decision situation. In other words, 
in each of the 12 interdependent decision situations it is as if the other role’s 2nd card has 
one in four chances of being each of the numbers, 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
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How are the numbers on the 3rd cards selected? 
 
Every time the First or the Second Mover calls the 3rd card, a number from 1, 2, 3, 
or 4 is drawn by the computer. Each number has one in four chances of being drawn every 
time the 3rd card is called. This means that across all 12 interdependent decision situations 
the four different numbers might appear a different number of times, even if the four 
different numbers have the same chance of being drawn every time the 3rd card is called. 
 
How will you be paid for your decisions? 
 
Your payment will be determined as follows: 
 
Three of the 12 rounds will be selected at random by the computer to determine 
your earnings for your choices on whether or not to call a third card. For each of the three 
rounds that you won you will earn £4.  
 
 
If you have questions about the instructions so far please raise your hand. 
Next, you will take an Understanding Test, to demonstrate that you understand all 
the instructions so far. You need to pass the test in order to continue in the experiment. 
After that you will be assigned your role for Part I, First or Second Mover. 
Appendix Instructions: Instruction of ST 
 
WELCOME! 
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO START 
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You are about to participate in an experiment in interdependent decision making. If 
you follow the instructions and pass the Understanding Test, you will be allowed to continue 
in the experiment. By continuing in the experiment, you will then be able to earn a 
considerable amount of money. The amount that you earn will be determined by your 
decisions, the decisions of other participants in the experiment, and chance. All that you 
earn is yours to keep, and will be paid to you in private, in cash, after today's session. 
 
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other people's work. 
If you have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loudly, etc., you will be asked to 
leave, and you will forfeit your earnings. Thank you. 
 
 
 
The experiment consists of two parts, Part I and Part II.  
In Part I, you and all the other participants will first be randomly assigned to one of 
two roles: “First Mover” and “Second Mover”. You will have the same role throughout all 
of Part I. 
In Part I, you and everybody else will then be presented with 12 interdependent 
decision situations, one in each round. In each round of Part I, you will be anonymously 
matched with one of the other participants assigned to the other role, a new one in each 
round. Both of you will face the same interdependent decision situation in that round. 
You will not know which of the other participants you are matched with, and your 
identity and the identities of the other participants will never be revealed. We will refer to 
the other participant as "S/He."  
In the interdependent decision situation of each round you and “S/He” make 
decisions, as explained below. Your decisions in a round will neither influence the matching 
of participants nor the assignment of interdependent decision situations in later rounds.  
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Once a round is over, you will not be able to change your decisions in that round. In 
each round of Part I, you will have to wait until everyone is done with his/her own decisions, 
before proceeding to the next round.  
 
In Part II, neither you nor anyone else will interact with anyone else. You will first 
face a decision situation and next answer the questions of a quiz. In this part, your earnings 
will depend on your decision and chance in the decision situation and on your answers to 
the quiz’s questions. Your Part I decisions will not influence what you will be asked to do in 
Part II.  
  
You will receive the instructions that correspond to each part immediately before 
that part begins. 
 
 
PART I INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Each decision situation you will face in Part I is as follows: 
The First Mover will be given two cards, a 1st card and a 2nd card. Each of the First 
Mover’s two cards has a number on it, 1, 2, 3 or 4. The Second Mover will also be given two 
cards, a 1st card and a 2nd card. Each of the Second Mover’s cards has a number on it, 1, 2, 
3 or 4. 
The First Mover will see the numbers on her/his 1st and 2nd cards, but will only see 
the number on the Second Mover’s 1st card, not the number on the Second Mover’s 2nd 
card. The Second Mover will see the numbers on her/his 1st and 2nd cards, but only the 
number on the First Mover’s 1st card, not the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card. 
In this interdependent decision situation, the First Mover, is the first to make a 
choice: to call or not call a 3rd card. Next, the Second mover has to make a choice: to call 
or not to call a 3rd card. The Second Mover makes this choice without knowing the First 
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Mover’s choice. However, Second Mover can condition her/his choice on the First Mover’s 
choice. The First and Second Mover 3rd cards each have a number on them, that is drawn 
independently, and that can be 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
The next screens display an illustrative example (IT IS ONLY AN ILLUSTRATION): The 
first screen displays the example from the point of view of the participant assigned to the 
role of First Mover (refers to the First Mover as “You,” while the Second Mover is “S/He”). 
It shows the choice that the First Mover has to make. (The dark grey rectangle indicates that 
there is a number on the Second Mover’s 2nd card that cannot be seen by “You”, the First 
Mover.) 
 
Suppose the First Mover calls the 3rd card. Then, in the example, the First Mover 
would then see the next screen: 
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(At this stage please ignore the sentence at the bottom of the screen “Please enter your 
estimate (enter a whole (i.e. integer) number between 0 and 100) that S/He will call the 3rd 
card?” We will explain this later.) 
Instead suppose the First Mover does not call the 3rd card. Then, in the example, 
the First Mover would then see the next screen: 
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(At this stage please ignore the sentence at the bottom of the screen “Please enter your 
estimate (enter a whole (i.e. integer) number between 0 and 100) that S/He will call the 3rd 
card?” We will explain this later.) 
 
After the First Mover makes her/his choice of whether to call the 3rd card, the next 
screen displays this interdependent decision situation example from the point of view of 
the participant assigned to the role of Second Mover (and therefore, refers to the Second 
Mover as “You”, while the First Mover is “S/He”). (The dark grey rectangle shows that there 
is a number on the First Mover’s 2nd card that cannot be seen by “You”, the Second Mover.) 
The Second Mover is not told the First Mover’s choice (the question mark “?” in the First 
Mover’s 3rd card indicates that). Therefore, the Second Mover sees the same screen 
independently of the First Mover’s choice. The Second Mover then decides what her/his 
choice for the two possible choices the First Mover could have made, i.e., in the case the 
First Mover called the 3rd card, and in the case the First Mover did not call the 3rd card.  
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After the Second Mover makes her/his choice on whether to call the 3rd card, the 
sum of the numbers on the First Mover’s cards (either the sum of the numbers on the two 
initial cards, or the sum of the numbers on all three cards if the First Mover called the 3rd 
card) is compared to the sum of the numbers on the Second Mover’s cards (either the sum 
of the numbers on the two initial cards, or the sum of the numbers on all three cards if the 
Second Mover called the 3rd card), and the WINNER of the interdependent decision 
situation is selected as follows: 
 
 If both sums are larger than 9, no one wins; 
 If both sums are smaller than 9, the participant in the role with the largest sum wins; 
 If one of the sums is equal to 9, and the other sum is either smaller or larger than 9, 
then the participant in the role whose numbers on the cards sum to 9 wins. 
 If one of the sums is smaller than 9, and the other sum is larger than 9, then the 
participant in the role whose numbers on the cards sum to less than 9 wins. 
 If both sums are equal and also smaller than or equal to 9, then they tie, and the 
winner is determined randomly by the computer. In this case both participants have  
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the same chance of winning, one in two. 
 
Neither you nor the other participants will learn the WINNER in any round before Part II. 
How are the numbers on the 2nd cards selected? 
 
In the 12 decision situations both the First Mover’s 2nd card and the Second Mover’s 
2nd card will have the number 1, 2, 3 or 4 on it an equal number of times. In other words, 
the First Mover’s 2nd card will have the number 1 on it 3 times, number 2 also 3 times, 
number 3 also 3 times and number 4 also 3 times. The same is true for the Second Mover. 
Since neither the First Mover nor the Second Mover will find out the number on the 2nd 
card of the participant in the other role until they have completed all 12 rounds, i.e., the 
end of Part I, they should think of the number on the other role’s 2nd card as having an 
equal chance of being 1, 2, 3 or 4 in each interdependent decision situation. In other words, 
in each of the 12 interdependent decision situations it is as if the other role’s 2nd card has 
one in four chances of being each of the numbers, 1, 2, 3 or 4. 
 
How are the numbers on the 3rd cards selected? 
 
Every time the First or the Second Mover calls the 3rd card, a number from 1, 2, 3, 
or 4 is drawn by the computer. Each number has one in four chances of being drawn every 
time the 3rd card is called. This means that across all 12 interdependent decision situations 
the four different numbers might appear a different number of times, even if the four 
different numbers have the same chance of being drawn every time a 3rd card is called. 
 
How will you be paid for your decisions? 
 
Your payment will be determined as follows: 
Three of the 12 rounds will be selected at random by the computer to determine 
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your earnings for your choices on whether or not to call the 3rd card. For each of the three 
rounds that you won you will earn £4.  
 
 
 
If you have questions about the instructions so far please raise your hand. 
Next, you will take an Understanding Test, to demonstrate that you understand all 
the instructions so far. You need to pass the test in order to continue in the experiment. 
After that you will be assigned your role for Part I, First or Second Mover. 
Appendix Instructions: Instruction of FM 
You have now been assigned the role of First Mover.  
 
In each round, after you make your choice of whether to call a 3rd card you will be asked to 
provide an estimate of how likely it is that the Second Mover will call a 3rd card, after the 
S/He knows whether you call a 3rd card. That is, we ask you to think about the chance in 
percentage terms (i.e., out of 100%) that the Second Mover will call a 3rd card, once S/He 
knows your choice. The next screens display an illustrative example (IT IS ONLY AN 
ILLUSTRATION): 
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If you are absolutely sure that the Second Mover will call a 3rd card, then you would want 
to enter 100%. If you are absolutely sure that the Second Mover will not call the 3rd card, 
you want to enter 0%. If you are less sure about the Second Mover’s choice, you would want 
to respond with an intermediate percentage number, reflecting what you think. A higher 
number would indicate a stronger tendency towards the Second Mover calling the 3rd card, 
and a lower number would indicate a stronger tendency towards the Second Mover not 
calling the 3rd card. 
In each round you will be rewarded for the accuracy of your estimate, as follows. You 
receive 400 points, minus a number "L" (short for "loss") that indicates how well your 
estimate indicates the Second Mover’s choice. This number L is determined in several 
simple steps. 
The computer first looks up the Second Mover’s choice. If the Second Mover called a 3rd 
card, we take the difference between your answer, which we call "ESTIMATE", and the 
number 100. If the Second Mover did not call a 3rd card, we take the difference between 
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your answer, which we call "ESTIMATE", and the number 0. Then, this difference is 
multiplied by itself, and then multiplied by 0.04, yielding the number L. 
 
Expressed as a formula, your earnings from the estimate are therefore given by  
400 – L, where 
If the Second Mover called a 3rd card: 
L = 0.04 x (ESTIMATE -100) x (ESTIMATE -100). 
If the Second Mover did not call a 3rd card: 
L = 0.04 x ESTIMATE x ESTIMATE. 
 
You can convince yourself that with this formula, you will earn a number of points of at least 
0 and at most 400, and that you will earn more points if your ESTIMATE is closer to indicating 
correctly the Second Mover’s choice. It will therefore pay off for you to report a good guess. 
In fact, your expected earnings are maximal if you report truthfully what you think is the 
average likelihood of the Second Mover calling a 3rd card. (We skip a more mathematical 
version of this property, and you can trust us on this. But fairly obviously, it has to do with 
the fact that L is a positive number, and that the better your estimate, the smaller L will be.) 
 
Example: Suppose that the Second Mover’s choice is to call a 3rd card. Your task is to 
estimate this choice – you earn more points if your estimate better reflects the Second 
Mover’s choice. With the above formula, you can verify that for this choice of the Second 
Mover, you would receive 
 400-0.04×(100-100) × (100-100)=400-0=400 points if your estimate of the Second 
Mover calling a 3rd card is 100%, or 
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 400-0.04× (30-100) × (30-100)=400-196=204 points if your estimate of the Second 
Mover calling a 3rd card is 30%, or 
 400-0.04× (10-100) × (10-100)=400-364=36 points if your estimate of the Second 
Mover calling a 3rd card is 10%. 
 
 
 
How will you be paid for your estimates? 
 
After you have submitted your estimates for all 12 rounds, your earnings will be determined 
as follows: 
One of the 9 rounds not selected to determine your earnings from your choice of whether 
you called a 3rd card will be selected at random by the computer. You will earn 1 pence for 
each point you received for your estimate in that round. 
  
 
 
 
 
If you have questions about this part of the instructions so far please raise your hand. 
Next, you will take an Understanding Test, to demonstrate that you understand how your 
estimate earns you points. You need to pass the test in order to continue in the experiment. 
After that we will start Part I. 
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Appendix Instructions: Instruction of FM 
You have now been assigned the role of Second Mover.  
 
In each round, before you make your choice of whether to call the 3rd card you will be asked 
to provide an estimate of how likely it is that the First Mover will call the 3rd card. That is, 
we ask you to think about the chance in percentage terms (i.e., out of 100%) that the First 
Mover will call the 3rd card. The next screens display an illustrative example (IT IS ONLY AN 
ILLUSTRATION): 
 
If you are absolutely sure that the First Mover will call the 3rd card, then you would want 
to enter 100%. If you are absolutely sure that the First Mover will not call the 3rd card, you 
want to enter 0%. If you are less sure about the First Mover’s choice, you would want to 
respond with an intermediate percentage number, reflecting what you think. A higher 
number would indicate a stronger tendency towards the First Mover calling the 3rd card, 
and a lower number would indicate a stronger tendency towards the First Mover not calling 
the 3rd card. 
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In each round you will be rewarded for the accuracy of your estimate, as follows. You 
receive 400 points, minus a number "L" (short for "loss") that indicates how well your 
estimate indicates the First Mover’s choice. This number L is determined in several simple 
steps. 
If the First Mover called the 3rd card, we take the difference between your answer, which 
we call "ESTIMATE", and the number 100. If the First Mover did not call the 3rd card, we 
take the difference between your answer, which we call "ESTIMATE", and the number 0. 
Then, this difference is multiplied by itself, and then multiplied by 0.04, yielding the number 
L. 
Expressed as a formula, your earnings from the estimate are therefore given by  
400 – L, where 
If the First Mover calls the 3rd card: 
L = 0.04 x (ESTIMATE-100) x (ESTIMATE-100). 
 
If the First Mover does not call the 3rd card: 
L = 0.04 x ESTIMATE x ESTIMATE. 
 
You can convince yourself that with this formula, you will earn a number of points of at least 
0 and at most 400, and that you will earn more points if your ESTIMATE is closer to indicating 
correctly the First Mover’s choice. It will therefore pay off for you to report a good guess. 
In fact, your expected earnings are maximal if you report truthfully what you think is the 
average likelihood of the First Mover calling a 3rd card. (We skip a more mathematical 
version of this property, and you can trust us on this. But fairly obviously, it has to do with 
the fact that L is a positive number, and that it is smaller the better is your estimate.) 
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Example: Suppose that the First Mover’s choice is to call a 3rd card. Your task is to estimate 
this choice – you earn more points if your estimate better reflects the First Mover’s choice. 
With the above formula, you can verify that for this choice of the First Mover, you would 
receive 
 400-0.04×(100-100) × (100-100)=400-0=400 points if your estimate of the Second 
Mover calling a 3rd card is 100%, or 
 400-0.04× (30-100) × (30-100)=400-196=204 points if your estimate of the Second 
Mover calling a 3rd card is 30%, or 
 400-0.04× (10-100) × (10-100)=400-364=36 points if your estimate of the Second 
Mover calling a 3rd card is 10%. 
 
 
If you have questions about this part of the instructions above please raise your hand. 
Next, you will take an Understanding Test, to demonstrate that you understand how your 
estimate earns you points. You need to pass the test in order to continue in the experiment. 
 
In addition to providing the above estimate we will also ask you to estimate the number on 
the First Mover’s 2nd card. You will be asked to provide this estimate after you make your 
choice of whether to call the 3rd card. That is, we ask you to think about the chance in 
percentage terms (i.e., out of 100%) that the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card is a 1, 
2, 3 or 4. Your estimate has four percentage entries, one percentage entry for each of the 
feasible numbers. The sum of the four entries has to be 100%. The next screens display an 
illustrative example (IT IS ONLY AN ILLUSTRATION): 
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If you are absolutely sure that the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card is 1, you would 
enter 100%, 0%, 0% and 0%.  On the other hand, if you are absolutely sure that the number 
on the First Mover’s 2nd card is 3 then you would want to enter 0%, 0%, 100% and 0%. If 
you are less certain about the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card, your percentage 
entries would be intermediate percentages, i.e. neither 0% nor 100% (but would sum to 
100%), reflecting what you think. A higher percentage entry for any of the four numbers 
would indicate a stronger tendency towards the First Mover’s 2nd card being that number, 
while a lower percentage entry would indicate a weaker tendency towards the First Mover’s 
2nd card being that number. For example, if after seeing the First Mover’s 1st card and 
being told whether S/He called the 3rd card, you still think that the number on the First 
Mover’s 2nd card is equally likely to be 1, 2, 3, or 4, you would enter 25%, 25%, 25% and 
25%.   
Caution: The numbers used in these examples were selected arbitrarily. They are NOT 
intended to suggest how anyone might respond in any situation. 
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In each round you will be rewarded for the accuracy of your estimate, as follows. You 
receive 400 points, minus a number "L" (short for "loss") that indicates how well your 
estimate indicates the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card. This number L is determined 
in several steps. 
For each of the possible four numbers on the card (i.e., 1, 2, 3 or 4), we will calculate a 
number which reflects how well you estimated whether or not that was the number on the 
card. We use these four calculated numbers to determine the points you earn from your 
estimate.  
In the first step, the computer looks up the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card. For 
example, suppose it is 3. The computer then compares your estimate that the number 
would be 3 (i.e., your percentage entry for the number 3) with the number 100, and 
calculates the difference between the two. This difference will then be squared (multiplied 
by itself). The resulting number is then multiplied by a factor of 0.02. Hence, if your estimate 
that the number is 3 was high, the resulting number will be smaller (because the difference 
between your estimate and 100 is small), as compared to the case in which your estimate 
that the number is 3 was low.  
In a second step, the computer determines how well you predicted that the remaining three 
numbers would not be on the First Mover’s 2nd card. For example, still assuming that 3 is 
the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card that means that neither of the remaining three 
numbers, 1, 2 and 4, were on the First Mover’s 2nd card. For each of these three numbers 
(e.g., 4) , the computer compares your estimate that the number on the First Mover’s 2nd 
card would be that number (i.e., your percentage entry for the number 4) with the number 
0, and calculates the difference between the two. This difference will then be squared 
(multiplied by itself). The resulting number is then multiplied by a factor of 0.02. 
In a third step, the computer sums up the four numbers computed above, and calls it L.  
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Finally, L is subtracted from 400, and the result is the number of points that you earn from 
your estimate of the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card. 
(Don’t worry about the exact numbers too much at this point, below you will see examples 
which illustrate the range of points you can earn.) 
Example: Suppose that the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card is 2. Suppose that your 
estimates that the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card is 1,2, 3 and 4, respectively, were: 
 0, 100, 0 and 0. Hence, your estimate was completely accurate. Thus, you earn 
400 − (0.02 × (0) × (0) + 0.02 × (100 − 100) × (100 − 100) + 0.02 × (0) ×
(0) + 0.02 × (0) × (0)) = 400 
 15, 55, 10 and 20. You estimated that the number 2 had a 55% chance of being the 
number on the First Mover’s 2nd card, but the other three numbers had some small 
chance of being the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card. Since the number on the 
First Mover’s 2nd card is 2, you earn 400 − (0.02 × (15 − 0) × (15 − 0) +
0.02 × (55 − 100) × (55 − 100) + 0.02 × (10 − 0) × (10 − 0) + 0.02 × (20 −
0) × (20 − 0)) = 345 
 100, 0, 0 and 0. You estimated that the number 1 was the number on the First 
Mover’s 2nd card, but in fact the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card was 2. Thus, 
you earn 400 − (0.02 × (100 − 0) × (100 − 0) + 0.02 × (0 − 100) × (0 −
100) + 0.02 × (0) × (0) + 0.02 × (0) × (0)) = 0 
How will you be paid for your estimates? 
After you have submitted your estimates on whether the First Mover called the 3rd card for 
all 12 rounds and your estimates of the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card for all 12 
rounds, your earnings from your estimates will be determined as follows: 
One of the 9 rounds not selected to determine your earnings from your choice of whether 
you called the 3rd Card will be selected at random by the computer.  
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Next, the computer will select at the random the estimate you will be paid for that round: 
either your estimate on whether the First Mover called the 3rd card in the interdependent 
decision of that selected round or the estimate of the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card 
in the interdependent decision of that selected round.  
 
You will earn 1 pence for each point you received for the randomly selected estimate. 
 
 
 
 
If you have questions about the instructions above please raise your hand. 
Next, you will take an Understanding Test, to demonstrate that you understand the points 
that your earn from estimating the number on the First Mover’s 2nd card. You need to pass 
the test in order to continue in the experiment. After that we will start Part I. 
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Appendix Understanding Test 
Test for DRT: 
 
UNDERSTANDING TEST 
ID NUMBER: ____________ 
Please write your code number just above. 
You will now take an UNDERSTANDING TEST. You will see a series of questions in each 
screen. Before you move to the next screen you have to answer all questions correctly. In 
order to the next part of instruction, you have to ANSWER ALL THE QUESTIONS CORRECTLY. 
If you cannot finish the test you will be asked to leave, and you will receive your show-up 
fee at the exit. 
 
Q1: In a round, will you see the number on Her/His 2nd card? Yes/No 
Q2: In a round, can S/He see the number on your 2nd card? Yes/No  
Q3: Will you be told whether you won or lost at the end of every round? Yes/No 
Q4: Will S/He be told whether S/He won or lost at the end of every round? Yes/No 
Q5: Will S/He see the number on your 3rd card (if you called a 3rd card in this round) at the 
end of every round? Yes/No 
 
(The following questions are shown in the pictures, the numbers on the cards in which vary 
from subjects to subjects.) 
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Test for ST: 
 
UNDERSTANDING TEST 
ID NUMBER: ____________ 
Please write your code number just above. 
You will now take an UNDERSTANDING TEST. You will see a series of questions in each 
screen. Before you move to the next screen you have to answer all questions correctly. In 
order to the next part of instruction, you have to ANSWER ALL THE QUESTIONS CORRECTLY. 
If you cannot finish the test you will be asked to leave, and you will receive your show-up 
fee at the exit. 
 
Q1: In a round, will you see the number on Her/His 2nd card? Yes/No 
Q2: In a round, can S/He see the number on your 2nd card? Yes/No  
Q3: Will you be told whether you won or lost at the end of every round? Yes/No 
Q4: Will S/He be told whether S/He won or lost at the end of every round? Yes/No 
Q5: Will S/He see the number on your 3rd card (if you called a 3rd card in this round) at the 
end of every round? Yes/No 
 
(The following questions are shown in the pictures, the numbers on the cards in which vary 
from subjects to subjects.) 
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Test for FM: 
(The question is shown in the picture, the numbers on the cards in which vary from subjects 
to subjects.) 
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Test for SM: 
(The questions are shown in the pictures, the numbers on the cards in which vary from 
subjects to subjects.) 
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Appendix Instruction on Bomb Task & CRT 
PART II INSTRUCTIONS 
 
In this part you will first face a single decision situation. Next, you will be asked to answer 
three questions of a quiz. 
 
DECISION SITUATION:  
On the screen in front of you there is a display of 100 boxes. Your task is to decide how 
many boxes you want to collect. For every box that you collect you provisionally earn 4 
pence. 
Your earnings per box collected are provisional, because behind one of these boxes there is 
a time bomb that destroys all the boxes that you have collected so far. You do not know 
where the time bomb lies. You only know that the time bomb can be in any box with equal 
probability.  
Moreover, even if you collect the time bomb, you will only be told that at the end of the 
experiment.  
Every second a box is collected, starting from the top-left corner. Once collected, the box 
disappears from the screen and your earnings are updated accordingly. At any moment you 
can see the amount earned up to that point. Your task is to choose when to stop the 
collecting process. To stop the collection of boxes you have to click the “Stop” button.  
At the end of the experiment we will randomly determine the number of the box containing 
the time bomb by means of a bag containing 100 numbered tokens.  
If you happen to have collected the box where the time bomb is located, you will earn zero. 
If the time bomb is located in a box that you did not collect you will earn the amount of 
money that you had earned up to moment you clicked the “Stop” button.  
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We will start with a practice round. After that, you will play one round for real money. 
 
QUIZ: Please answer the following three questions. You will earn £1 for each correct answer, 
and earn nothing if answer is incorrect. You have 5 minutes to answer all questions, after 
which the computer will move to the next question. 
 
 
PLEASE WAIT UNTIL THE EXPERIMENTER TELLS YOU TO START 
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Appendix CRT 
Q1: In a water reservoir, there is a patch of nenuphar water lilies. Every day, the patch 
doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire water reservoir, how long 
(in days) would it take for the patch to cover half of the water reservoir? (Ans: 47) 
Q2: A pen and an ink recharge cost £0.10. The pen costs £1 more than the ink recharge. 
How much (in £) does the ink recharge cost? (Ans: £0.05) 
Q3: If it takes 5 printers 5 minutes to print 5 large pictures, how long (in minutes) would it 
take 100 printers to print 100 large pictures? (Ans: 5) 
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Chapter 3: An Experimental Study on the Intertemporal 
Trade-Offs between Saving and Consumption Decisions60 
3.1 Introduction 
The intertemporal consumption behaviour in the endowment economy is a popular 
topic in the empirical and theoretical macroeconomics studies. However, rare 
experimental studies pay attention to it. In this chapter, an experimental study is 
presented to investigate that how players manage their intertemporal consumption 
paths over the finite life cycle with an anticipated taxation scheme. This experimental 
study is based on the finite life cycle of the endowment economy analysed in the 
“Anticipated fiscal policy and adaptive learning” (EHM2009) (Evans et al., 2009).  
There are some experimental studies to explore the intertemporal consumption 
behaviours in different scenarios with various features. However, these existing 
experimental studies only focused on the scenarios in which there is no interaction 
within players. In the study on Ricardian Equivalence (Meissner and Rostam-Afschar, 
2017), players determined their consumption paths facing the stochastic income 
process and various tax schemes. Moreover, the similar study of Meissner (2016) either 
only allow debt or only allow saving in the design. Furthermore, the experimental study 
of Feltovich and Ejebu (2014) forbids borrowing behaviours. Moreover, Carbone and 
Duffy (2014) introduce a constant interest rate into their design, but borrowing is not 
allowed.   
The interaction within individuals is ubiquity.  Thus, it is necessary to include this 
feature in the experimental study. Our study is the first experimental study on the 
consumption behaviours in an endowment economy, in which players determine their 
consumption paths by trading with each other, i.e., borrowing or lending from other 
players. In our economy, the market interest factor (MIF) is fully determined by all the 
players’ interaction. The MIF is based on the uniform price double auction to get the 
                                                          
60 This chapter is joint work with Prof. Miguel Costa-Gomes, Prof. George Evans and Prof. Kaushik Mitra. 
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market clearing, and meanwhile, it also has effects on players’ trading results. 
Furthermore, the uncertainty in the previous experimental studies is from either the 
stochastic endowment or the tax scheme, but the uncertainty in our experiment is only 
from the unpredictable MIF.  
To predict the theoretical market of the economy in the experiment, we firstly 
introduce two popular analyses into our analysis. Rational expectation (RE) is a 
widespread model in the macroeconomic analysis. RE replies on complete information 
and assumes that the whole structure and all parameters in the economy are fully 
known. Moreover, in EHM2009’s study, adaptive learning (AL) is introduced to 
compensate the analysis on the scenario with imprecise information on MIF, in which it 
is not necessary for players to have complete knowledge on the economy. Generally, 
the theoretical analysis of RE and AL imply far-sight and smoothing consumption. 
However, some empirical studies using actual policy changes in the US work on 
householder-level consumption with predictable income fluctuations and provide 
evidence on the behaviours deviated from these predictions. The evidence in Parker 
(1999) with data from Consumer Expenditure Survey (from 1980) points out that 
households do adjust their consumption when there is predictable fluctuated income 
caused by the Social Security tax system, which is against consumption-smoothing 
prediction. Moreover, another empirical study (Poterba, 1988) mentions that 
households are myopic, which investigates the monthly consumption data on two 
temporary federal income tax policies in 1968 and 1975 and suggests that households 
tend to respond to the policies but not the announcements of the policies.  Therefore, 
we secondly add a series of myopic models and simple consumption-smoothing models 
to compensate for the far-sight models of RE and AL for identifying individual player’s 
behaviour in the economy.  
The study in this chapter discovers that most of the subjects’ behaviours can be 
explained by myopic models. Meanwhile, some subjects do have far sight and manage 
their intertemporal consumption paths over their life cycles by reacting to the 
announcement of the policy. A small number of subjects even use RE thinking models, 
which seems that they could predict all the future markets accurately.  
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The remaining of the chapter is structured as follows. The following section (Section 
3.2) describes the economy used in the experiments and Section 3.3 represents a series 
of theoretical models to predict subjects’ behaviours. Section 3.4 explains our 
experimental design. Section 3.5 demonstrates the Macro-view and Micro-view data 
analysis on the experimental data. Section 3.6 is the conclusion. 
3.2 The economy 
In this section, we present the endowment economy designed to investigate life-
cycle consumption behaviours. 𝑁 households with finite T-period lifetime live in this 
endowment economy and all households receive the constant nondurable endowment 
(perishable goods) at the beginning of each life period, which cannot be reserved across 
periods and are converted into utilities as consumption at the end of each period. 
Furthermore, there is a government in the economy, whose spending is financed by the 
equal lump-sum tax. Households are informed their anticipated tax schemes of T-period 
lifetime at the beginning of the whole T-period lifetime. The tax scheme is either 
constant across all periods or equal to 𝜏௛ in the first 𝑇௣ିଵ periods and decreases to 𝜏௟ 
from period 𝑇௣ until the end of the whole life.  The households then determine their 
consumptions in each life period by buying one-period debt (borrowing) and/or selling 
one-period saving (lending) in order to manage their whole life wealth (utilities). All 
borrowings and lendings will repay or be repaid in the next period based on the market 
interest factor in the current period, which is determined by all households’ borrowing 
and lending wills in the current period.  The household 𝑖 's CARA utility function61 in 
period 𝑡 is given by  
 𝑢௧௜ = 𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ௖೟
೔
ቁ 
The “flow” budget constraint for the household 𝑖 in period 𝑡 is  
𝑐௧௜ = 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ − 𝑟௧ିଵ𝑏௧ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௧௜  
The debt constraint for the household 𝑖 in period 𝑡 is 
                                                          
61 CARA refers to a utility function with constant absolute risk-aversion. HEY (1980) explained how CARA worked in 
the scenario with income uncertainty. This utility function is also used by other experimental studies on life cycle 
consumption/saving, i.e., Carbone and Hey (2004), Meissner (2016), and Meissner and Rostam-Afschar (2017). 
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𝑟௧𝑏௧௜ ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ାଵ 
Let 𝑡=1, …, 𝑇 index life period and 𝑖 =1, …, 𝑁 index household. 𝑦 represents constant 
endowment and 𝜏௧ represents lump-sum tax in period 𝑡. 𝑟௧ represents market interest 
factor (MIF) of period 𝑡 determined at period 𝑡.  𝑏௧௜ represents the amount of one-period 
net debt (net difference between borrowing and lending) by subject 𝑖 at period 𝑡 (𝑏௧௜<0 
is interpreted as lending larger than borrowing; 𝑏଴௜ = 0.). Then 𝑟௧ିଵ𝑏௧ିଵ௜  represents the 
repayment in period 𝑡. If household 𝑖 has net borrowing in period 𝑡 − 1, which means 
𝑏௧ିଵ௜ > 0 , he will repay 𝑟௧ିଵ𝑏௧ିଵ௜  at the beginning of period 𝑡  before he starts his 
borrowing or lending in period 𝑡. If household 𝑖 has net lending in period 𝑡 − 1, which 
means 𝑏௧ିଵ௜ < 0, he will be repaid 𝑟௧ିଵ𝑏௧ିଵ௜  at the beginning of period 𝑡 before he starts 
his borrowing or lending in period 𝑡 . We define 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ − 𝑟௧ିଵ𝑏௧ିଵ௜  as subject 𝑖 ’s net 
income in period t (𝑁𝐼௧௜). 𝑐௧௜(≥ 0) represents the amount of consumption by subject 𝑖 at 
period 𝑡 . Consumption in each period is converted to utilities based on the utility 
function automatically at the end of the current period. By determining the paths of 𝑏௧௜ 
from 𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡 = 𝑇, the households achieve their target consumption paths.   
3.3 Theoretical prediction on the economy   
Then in this section, the theoretical analyses of RE and AL are conducted to draw 
the possible MIF paths in the economy. In general, RE and AL assume that all households 
in the economy are homogenous. That is, the behaviours of all households in the 
economy follow the same rules, so there is no trading in the market.  
3.3.1 Rational expectation (RE) analysis  
RE is the classical Macroeconomics theory, which models households who 
maximise the expected total utility. As RE is a general equilibrium model, all the 
households in the model are identical. In the market level, RE predicts what the path of 
the MIFs is in equilibrium, which is used to adjust households’ incentives in order to 
reach the market clearing in the economy in each period. That is, all traded borrowing 
amount in the market equals to the traded lending amount in the market. Meanwhile, 
in the individual level, RE predicts households’ consumption paths in the RE equilibrium 
with the MIF path in equilibrium.  
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As all households are identical in RE, then households follow the same decision 
process. A representative household maximises his whole life utility by deciding his life 
consumption path at the beginning of his life. Then all households’ consumption paths 
determine the MIF path, which leads market clearing in each period of the economy. 
The individual optimisation problem of household 𝑖 is described as following: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{௖೟
೔}భ೅
 𝐸௜∗ ൝෍ 𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ௖೟
೔
ቁ
்
௧ୀଵ
ൡ 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝑐௧
௜ = 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ − 𝑟௧ିଵ𝑏௧ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௧௜
𝑟௧𝑏௧௜ ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ାଵ                       
𝑐௧௜ ≥ 0                                        
𝑏଴௜ = 0                                        
𝑏்௜ = 0                                        
𝑡 < 𝑇௣, 𝜏௧ = 𝜏௛                 
𝑡 ≥ 𝑇௣, 𝜏௧ = 𝜏௟                   
 
“𝑟௧” is the market interest factor determined in period 𝑡 by all households’ borrowing 
amount in period 𝑡. As in the first period, there is no previous borrowing or lending, 𝑏௧ିଵ௜  
at 𝑡 = 0 is 0. Similarly, in the last period, households are not allowed to borrow or lend 
as there is no more period for them to repay or be repaid. That is  𝑏்௜ = 0.  
Then, the cumulated market budget constraint is shown as below: 
෍ 𝑐௧௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
= ෍ 𝑏௧௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
+ ෍(y − 𝜏௧)
ே
௜ୀଵ
− 𝑟௧ିଵ ෍ 𝑏௧ିଵ௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
 
Market clearing condition in each period implies ∑ 𝑏௧௜ே௜ୀଵ = 0 and ∑ 𝑏௧ିଵ௜ே௜ୀଵ = 0. Then 
the equation above could be rewritten as below: 
෍ 𝑐௧௜
ே
௜ୀଵ
= ෍(y − 𝜏 )
ே
௜ୀଵ
= 𝑁(y − 𝜏௧) 
As all households are identical, we can use 𝑐௧  as the representative household’s 
consumption in period 𝑡 instead of 𝑐௧௜:  
෍ 𝑐௧
ே
௜ୀଵ
= 𝑁𝑐௧ = 𝑁(y − 𝜏௧) 
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Then, 𝑐௧௜
∗ோாா = 𝑐௧∗ோாா =  y − 𝜏௧ for the representative household in equilibrium. That 
is, each individual household borrows nothing and lends nothing in the equilibrium of 
rational expectation analysis (REE), {𝑐௧௜
∗ோாா = 0}ଵ். Furthermore, Euler equation of the 
representative household is given as following:  
𝑒ିఉ௖೟∗ೃಶಶ = 𝑟௧ ∗ 𝑒ିఉ௖೟శభ
∗ೃಶಶ  
Then, 
𝑟௧∗ோாா = 𝑒ିఉ(௖೟
∗ೃಶಶି௖೟శభ∗ೃಶಶ) = 𝑒ିఉ(୷ିఛ೟ି୷ାఛ೟శభ) = 𝑒ఉ(ఛ೟ିఛ೟శభ) 
That is, if the tax scheme is a constant tax over all periods, the equilibrium MIF path62, 
{𝑟௧∗ோாா}ଵ்ିଵ, has a constant value which equals to 1 as 𝜏௧ = 𝜏௧ାଵ. If the tax scheme has a 
tax decreasing after period 𝑇௣, {𝑟௧∗ோாா}ଵ்ିଵ has a peak value in period 𝑇௣ିଵ as 𝜏௧ > 𝜏௧ାଵ. 
Figure 3.1 represents {𝑟௧∗ோாா}ଵ் under the scenario with tax decreasing, when 𝑇 = 22, 
𝑇௣ = 12, 𝜏௛ = 70, and 𝜏 = 10. 
 
Figure 3.1 
3.3.2 Adaptive Learning (AL) analysis  
AL model (EHM2009) used in this section63 is generalised from Evans et al., 2009. In 
EHM2009’s study, adaptive learning (AL) is introduced to compensate the analysis on 
                                                          
62 There is no 𝑟், as there is no borrowing or lending allowed in the last period. 
63 Utility function in this chapter is different with the utility function used in EHM 2009.  
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the scenario with imprecise information on future MIF, in which it is not necessary for 
households to have complete knowledge on the economy. In other words, AL does not 
assume that households know the future accurately, but it allows households to have 
their expectations on the future MIFs and to update their expectations based on the 
current history.  
Households modelled by AL build their expectations on the future’s MIF based on 
an adaptive learning rule. AL assumes that the market is in the steady state when the 
information on tax change is announced. The overreaction of the representative agent 
on the anticipated change pushes MIF far away from 1 from the beginning of the whole 
life, and then MIF goes back to approximately 1 among with periods. When the timeline 
is close to the conducted tax change, the representative household tends to react 
strongly again, which pushes MIF far away from 1 again. One period before conducting 
time, MIF reaches the highest value (if tax change is decreased, otherwise MIF reaches 
the lowest value). In the conducting period, MIF falls below 1, and converges to 1 along 
with periods.  
We start from the general equilibrium model (ALE) (similar to Evans’s study), in 
which households are identical to follow the same forecasting and decision rules (for a 
specified 𝛾). In the market level, ALE also predicts the path of MIF in equilibrium, which 
is driven by market clearing in the economy in each period. Meanwhile, in the individual 
level, ALE predicts the representative household’s optimal consumption path in 
equilibrium given the MIF path in equilibrium. Then the representative household solves 
the similar optimization problem as in RE described as following: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{௖ೞ೔}ೞస೟೅
𝐸௧௜
∗ ൝෍ 𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ௖ೞ
೔ቁ
்
௦ୀ௧
ൡ  
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝑐௦
௜ = 𝑦 − 𝜏௦ − ?̃?௦ିଵ𝑏௦ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௦௜
?̃?௦𝑏௦௜ ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜏ୱାଵ                       
𝑐௦௜ ≥ 0                                        
𝑏଴௜ = 0                                        
𝑏்௜ = 0                                        
𝑠 < 𝑇௣, 𝜏௦ = 𝜏௛                 
𝑠 ≥ 𝑇௣, 𝜏௦ = 𝜏௟                  
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?̃?௦ represents the prediction on MIF in period 𝑠. Then Euler equation is shown below: 
𝐸௧௜
∗𝑐௦ାଵ௜ =
𝑙𝑛 (?̃?௦)
𝑏
+ 𝑐௦௜ , 𝑠 = 𝑡, … , 𝑇 
Furthermore, 
𝐸௧௜
∗𝑐௧ା௝௜ =
𝑙𝑛൫?̃?௧ ∏ ?̃?௧ା௛ିଵ
௝
௛ୀଶ ൯
𝑏
+ 𝑐௧௜ , 𝑗 ≥ 2 
In ALE, the representative household does not know all the following future MIFs, 
{?̃?௧ା௛ିଵ}௛ୀଶ்ି௧ , but he predicts all following future MIFs starting from period 𝑡 as 
{?̃?௧ା௛ିଵ௘ }௛ୀଶ்ି௧ . ?̃?௧ା௛ିଵ௘ (𝑡) = 𝑟௘(𝑡) for all ℎ ≥ 2, and ?̃?௧ = ?̂?௧ (as ?̂?௧ is seen by households in 
period 𝑡). ?̃?௧ା௛ିଵ௘ (𝑡) refers to the expectation on the MIF ?̃?௧ା௛ିଵ formed at period 𝑡. The 
expectation 𝑟௘(𝑡) consists of the previous expectation and the current period’s MIF, and 
“gain” parameter 𝛾 (1 < 𝛾 < 1) is introduced to discount on the distance from current 
period’s MIF to the previous expectation. The following equation shows how to get the 
expectation with past information: 
𝑟௘(𝑡) = 𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛾(?̂?௧ − 𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1)) 
Then, 
𝐸௧௜
∗𝑐௧ା௝௜ =
𝑙𝑛൫?̂?௧ ∏ 𝑟௘(𝑡)
௝
௛ୀଶ ൯
𝑏
+ 𝑐௧௜, 𝑗 ≥ 2 
As ∏ 𝑟௘(𝑡)௝௛ୀଶ = 𝑟
௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ, then 
𝐸௧௜
∗𝑐௧ା௝௜ =
𝑙𝑛൫?̂?௧ ∗ 𝑟௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ, ൯
𝑏
+ 𝑐௧௜ 
We use 𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡) to represent ?̂?௧ ∗ 𝑟௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ (𝑗 ≥ 2) and ?̂?௧ (𝑗 = 1). As households 
in ALE are identical, then let 𝑐௧௜ = 𝑐௧  and 𝑐௧ା௝௘ (𝑡) = 𝐸௧௜
∗𝑐௧ା௝௜ . Then the representative 
household’s life-time budget constraint at period t is described as below: 
𝑐௧ + ෍
𝑐௧ା௝௘ (𝑡)
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
= 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ − ?̂?௧𝑏௧ିଵ + ෍
𝑦 − 𝜏௧ା௝௘ (𝑡)
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
, 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 − 1 
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∑
௖೟శೕ
೐ (௧)
஽೟,೟శೕషభ
೐ (௧)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ  represents the discount of all future consumptions at period 𝑡  and 
∑
௬ିఛ೟శೕ
೐ (௧)
஽೟,೟శೕషభ
೐ (௧)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ  represents the discount of all future wealth at period t. According to EHM 
2009, when 𝑡 = 1 , 𝑟௘(0) = 1 . It assumes that when the anticipated tax scheme is 
announced, the economy is in the steady state. Similar to REE, market clearing implies 
zero debt, which means 𝑐௧ = 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ . Then MIF in equilibrium, ?̃?௧∗஺௅ா , is described as 
below (details see Appendix 3.II): 
?̃?௧∗஺௅ா = 𝑒𝑥𝑝^ 
ቈ
(𝜏௛ − 𝜏௟)(𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1)்ି்ುషభ − 1)𝑏
(𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1)்ି௧ − 1)
−
(𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1)்ି௧ − (𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1) + 𝑇 − 𝑡 − 1)𝑙𝑛𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1)
(𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1)்ି௧ − 1)(𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1) − 1)
቉ 
for 1 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇௣ିଵ, and for 𝑡 > 𝑇௣ିଵ, 
?̃?௧∗஺௅ா = exp ^ ቈ
(𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1)்ି௧ − (𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1) + 𝑇 − 𝑡 − 1)𝑙𝑛𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1)
(𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1) − 1)(1 − 𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1)்ି௧)
቉ 
And as all households are identical, the optimal consumption path is {𝑐௧௜
∗஺௅ா = 0}ଵ் 
given {?̃?௧∗୅୐୉}ଵ்ିଵ .When 𝑟௘(0) = 1 , 𝑇 = 22 , 𝑇௣ = 12 , 𝜏௛ = 70  and 𝜏௟ = 10 , 
{?̃?௧∗஺௅ா}ଵ்ିଵ is drawn in Figure 3.2: 
 
Figure 3.2 
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3.4. Experimental design 
In this section, the experiment is designed to investigate how households 
determine their whole life consumption paths facing an anticipated tax scheme. 
Following the models described in the previous section, the parameters are set up as 
follows. The length of life 𝑇  equals to 22 periods and the number of players in an 
economy 𝑁 equals to 10. At the beginning of each period, endowment 𝑦 equals to 120. 
In the treatment with constant tax scheme (FT), 𝜏௧ is always 40 in each period, and in 
the treatment with the tax-decreasing scheme (DT), 𝜏௛  is 70 and 𝜏௟  is 10. In DT, 𝑇௣ 
equals to 12. That is, players pay 70 taxes at the first 11 periods and 10 taxes at the latter 
11 periods. Then the total tax income is 880 for both treatments.   
As a proper concavity is needed in the experiment so that deviations from optimal 
path could lead enough loss, and a moderate growth proportion (around 20%) from high 
tax to low tax is also needed, 𝛽  is set at 0.024. The payoff function used in the 
experiment is shown as following: 
 𝑢 = 388(1 − 𝑒ି଴.଴ଶସ௖) 
The endowment, tax, consumption and all other trading players used in each period are 
measured as POINTS, which is converted to ECU (Experiment Currency Unit) at the end 
of each period according to the payoff function. The duration of each period is 105s, in 
which players submit borrowing or lending proposals to reach the target consumption 
they preferred.  
The rules to submit proposals are described as follows. A lending proposal consists 
of the lowest interest factor that the player would like to lend and the largest amount 
that the player would like to lend on the interest factor which is not lower than the one 
he proposed. A borrowing proposal consists of the highest interest factor that the player 
would like to borrow and the largest amount that the player would like to borrow on 
the interest factor which is not higher than the one he proposed. Each play’s borrowing 
amount cannot exceed his borrowing limit, which equals to (௬ିఛ೟శభ)
௥೟
. That is, the 
difference between player’s next period’s endowments and next period’s tax is divided 
by the current MIF. As players can update their borrowing or lending proposals within 
Page 181 of 238 
 
105s, players’ borrowing limit keep updated by new proposals submitted or current 
proposals cancelled. And lending limit equals to the net income of the current period. 
Players can neither borrow more than they can repay in the future nor lend more than 
they have now. Players can submit as many proposals as they would like to but only the 
last borrowing or lending proposal is defined as the current valid (or active) borrowing 
or lending proposal. Each player can have no more than one valid borrowing proposal 
and no more than one valid lending proposal at the same time.  
The market interest factor (MIF) is determined by all players’ valid lending and 
borrowing proposals in the market based on discrete demand and supply rules. (The 
trading mechanism is the uniform price double auction updated every time when a new 
proposal is made or cancelled.) Then some players’ borrowing proposals or lending 
proposals can be fully satisfied, and some players’ proposals cannot be fully satisfied or 
even cannot be chosen to trade. Players are told about their proposals’ states, i.e., 
fulfilled, partially fulfilled or unfulfilled, so that that player can update their proposals.  
After 105s, the market is closed, and players can no longer borrow or lend. At this 
time, all valid proposals in the market are defined as players’ final borrowing or lending 
proposal, and MIF in this period is then determined by all these final proposals. MIF is 
used to determine the amount that players will repay or be repaid in the next period. 
Moreover, the left POINTS, which are not used to borrow or lend, are converted to ECU. 
After 22 periods, the cumulated ECUs across all 22 periods are converted to cash as 400 
ECU equal to £1.  
At the beginning of each session, subjects read an instruction (see Appendix 3.IV 
Instruction) on the experiment and have to pass an understanding test related to the 
instruction. Failure to pass the test leads to dismissal. Afterwards, the subjects left play 
five practice periods before they start the real experiment. All the parameters in the 
practice periods are never used in the real experiment.  Before subjects enter to the first 
period, players are informed on the tax they need to pay in each period. And after each 
period, players are also informed on their performance in this period (Details see 
Appendix 3.IV Instruction). After 22 periods, subjects take the bomb task (Crosetto & 
Filippin, 2013) on risk aversion (see Appendix III), the payment of which is up to £5. The 
fix payoff show-up fee is £5. 
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The experiment was conducted from May 2017 to April 2019. All subjects were 
students and staffs from the University of St Andrews. Each treatment included 9 
sessions. And the average payoff of all players was £22.24.  
3.5 Data analysis 
In this section, the data analysis is presented on the market-level and individual-
level views. Firstly, the market-level analysis focuses on the comparisons on the market 
interest rate (MIF) and aggregated borrowing behaviours between two treatments. 
Secondly, the individual-level analysis concentrates on the identification of each player 
based on a series of decision models. Then a risk analysis (Bomb Task) is added to assist 
the analysis on the performance of the models.  
3.5.1 Market-level comparison 
This section presents a series of figures to demonstrate a series of market-level 
differences on the MIF and the consumption (borrowing) behaviours caused by different 
anticipated tax schemes.  
Firstly, we compare the paths of MIFs in two treatments. Figure 3.3 shows the 
comparisons of the MIF’s paths between two treatments. “X-axis” represents periods 
and “Y-axis” represents the value of MIFs. All MIFs from the same periods across nine 
sessions in the same treatment are pooled together to get the average value of MIF in 
each period, and the path of average MIF along periods for DT (blue line) is significantly 
higher than the one for FT. Testing on the two paths with Two-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test gave the  P-value as 0.009. It means that an anticipated tax decrease does 
lead to a higher MIF path. There is a peak just before tax decrease happens and 
meanwhile, the path of MIF in FT is flatter and closes to 1. This implies that borrowing 
will in DT is stronger than in FT so that MIF is pushed to a higher level to balance the 
market demand and supply in DT. Due to a high-level MIF, the incentive of lending is 
also higher in DT than in FT.  
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Figure 3.3 
Figure 3.4 shows the standard deviation of each session (ordered as the values). 
The p-value of Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 0.124 and the p-value of Two-
sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test is 0.047. This emphasises the 
significant difference between the two treatments. (Appendix 3.I presents the path of 
MIF of each session along with periods.) 
 
Figure 3.4 
Next, a series of box-whisker plot figures (Figure 3.5, Figure 3,6, Figure 3.7, and 
Figure 3.8) demonstrate the within-period fluctuations of individual consumption and 
individual net borrowing (which is from that borrowing amount minus lending amount 
in the same period) along with periods. All subjects’ consumption ratios or net 
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borrowing ratios in the same periods (90 observations in each period) across all sessions 
in the same treatment are pooled together. “X-axis” represents periods and “Y-axis” 
represents consumption ratio (consumption in the current period is divided by the 
difference between endowment and tax in the current period) or net borrowing ratio 
(borrowing in the current period is divided by the difference between endowment and 
tax in the next period).  
Figure 3.5 shows a converged trend along with periods. The within-period 
fluctuation of consumption ratios in the earlier periods are larger than the ones on the 
latter periods, and finally, the consumption ratios are close to 1, which implies that 
subjects borrow or lend less, and consume what they have, i.e., endowment minuses 
tax. In contrast, Figure 3.6 shows a stable path of the within-period fluctuation of 
consumption ratios along with periods. There is no obviously converged trend, which is 
corresponding to the MIF path demonstrated in Figure 3.3 that implies the trading 
incentive in FT is less than in DT.  
 
Figure 3.564 
                                                          
64 The dots in the figures are the outliers which are larger/smaller than the values of the upper bounds of the boxes 
plus the 1.5 times lengths of the boxes/the values of the lower bounds of the boxes minus the 1.5 times lengths of 
the boxes. 
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Figure 3.6 
Figure 3.7 and Figure 3.8 is the supplements of Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6, which 
provide consistent trends from the view of borrowing behaviours. Figure 3.7 shows an 
obvious contrast to the within-period fluctuation of net borrowing ratios between the 
first 11 periods and the latter 11 periods. On the contrast, the within-period fluctuation 
in FT is relatively stable, and the range of fluctuation in FT is smaller than in DT. The large 
fluctuations of net borrowing ratios in the first 11 periods in DT, which is caused by 
higher MIFs, lead to large fluctuations of consumption ratios. 
 
Figure 3.7 
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Figure 3.8 
The following series of Figures show the comparisons of distributions of total net 
borrowing ratio of each period 65. Figure 3.9 shows the comparison of the distributions 
of the total net borrowing ratios between treatments. “X-axis” represents the scale of 
intervals on total net borrowing ratios, and “Y-axis” represents the number of total net 
borrowing ratios in each interval. The behaviour of borrowing between treatments 
shows a significant difference. (P-value of Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 0.) In 
DT, subjects tend to borrow more, while subjects tend to borrow less in FT. The 
distribution of total net borrowing ratios tends to concentrate more in FT than in DT. 
 
Figure 3.9 
                                                          
65 That is the sum of all positive net borrowing /(total endowment – total tax). 
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Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 compare the distributions of total net borrowing ratios 
between two treatments in the first 11 periods and the latter 10 periods.  
 
Figure 3.10 
 
Figure 3.11 
Figure 3.10 shows the comparison from period 1 to period 11 between treatments. 
The behaviour of borrowing between treatments shows a significant difference for the 
first 11 periods. (P-value of Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 0.) The distribution 
in DT shows flatter than in FT comparing with the distribution in Figure 3.10. Figure 3.11 
shows the comparison from period 12 to period 21 between treatments. The behaviour 
of borrowing between treatments shows no significant difference for the latter 10 
periods. (P-value of Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 0.226.) The difference 
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between Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11 imply that the anticipated tax decrease has an 
effect on households’ behaviours before the decrease happens, and after the decrease, 
the behaviours of households converge to the lower trading level.  
Figure 3.12 shows the comparison of the distributions of total net borrowing ratios 
between the first 11 periods and the latter 10 periods within DT. The behaviour of 
borrowing within DT shows a significant difference. (P-value of Two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 0.003). Figure 3.13 shows the comparison of the 
distributions of total net borrowing ratio between the first 11 periods and the latter 10 
periods within FT. The behaviour of borrowing within FT shows no significant difference. 
(P-value of Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 0.878.)  
 
Figure 3.12 
 
Figure 3.13 
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The results shown in Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 are consistent with the results 
shown in Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11. That is, the borrowing behaviours in the first 11 
periods in DT show the highest borrowing tend, and after the decrease, the behaviours 
in the latter periods in DT are similar to the ones in FT.  
Figure 3.14 and Figure 3.15 compare the distributions of total net borrowing ratios 
between the two treatments in period 11. P-value of Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test is 0.002 for Figure 3.14, and 0.081 for Figure 3.15. That implies that subjects do react 
to the tax decrease in the period 𝑇௣ିଵ.  
 
Figure 3.14 
 
Figure 3.15 
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The comparisons from Figure 3.5 to Figure 3.15 imply that an anticipated tax 
decrease affects households’ consumption behaviours. This is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that players have more incentive to borrow before tax decreases 
than after tax decreases. This behaviour preference brings stronger incentive to lend for 
households in DT than in FT and leads to higher MIFs in DT than in FT.  
3.5.2 Identification in DT 
In this section, we identify subjects’ borrowing behaviours in DT based on a series 
of models in order to explain how individual-level motivations drive market-level 
manifestations as described in the previous section (Section 3.5.1). As the results show 
in the previous section, most of the MIF paths appear to deviate from the prediction of 
RE and AL (shown as Appendix 3.I). Based on the studies of Parker (1999) and Poterba 
(1988), a series of myopic models are added. Then, the models of identification contain 
two categories of models, far-sighted models and myopic models. Far-sight models are 
generalised from 3 main theories, RE, AL and consumption smoothing. Myopic models 
consist of two-period consumption smoothing models and borrowing adverse models.  
In the experiment, 𝑦 always equals to 120. Life period 𝑡 is from 1 to 22 and T=22. 
Then 𝑡 + 1 means the next period of the current period. 𝜏௧ାଵ  means tax in the next 
period, which equals 70 from period 1 to period 10 and equals to 10 from period 11 to 
period 21 in DT. Subjects were informed their 𝑁𝐼௧௜  in each period. 𝛽 equals to 0.024. 𝑟௧ 
is the MIF in period 𝑡, which was determined after 105s trading finished. The following 
sections detail each model with the parameters used in the experiment. 
3.5.2.1 Far-sight Models  
3.5.2.1.a) RE models 
As REE is a market equilibrium model, which predicts both MIF path and individual 
consumption path in equilibrium, and all households predict themselves and others are 
identical. Meanwhile, {𝑟௧∗ோாா}ଵ்ିଵ  is endogenous determined by all households’ 
consumption paths, and all households should trade nothing in {𝑟௧∗ோாா}ଵ்ିଵ. In other 
words, as everyone is identical, if someone has incentive to borrow, then all others also 
have the same incentive. As a result, no trading could exist. However, it is reasonable 
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that households are not identical. Outside of REE, some households do not follow RE, 
but other households conceivably do. Thus, it is necessary to improve REE to an 
individual-level model, Perfect-Foresight Model (PFM), in which the MIF is considered 
as exogenous. Then the group of households who follow rational expectation still solve 
the similar optimization problem with a given specific {?̂?௧}ଵ்ିଵ . PFM only predicts 
individual-level consumption path in the group of households who follow RE. The group 
of households modelling by PFM are assumed to know the specific {?̂?௧}ଵ்ିଵ  at the 
beginning of the life, and the optimization problem in PFM is shown below: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{௖೟
೔}భ೅
 𝐸௜∗ ൝෍ 𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ௖೟
೔
ቁ
்
௧ୀଵ
ൡ 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝑐௧
௜ = 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ − ?̂?௧ିଵ𝑏௧ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௧௜
?̂?௧𝑏௧௜ ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ାଵ                       
𝑐௧௜ ≥ 0                                        
𝑏଴௜ = 0                                        
𝑏்௜ = 0                                        
𝑡 < 𝑇௣, 𝜏௧ = 𝜏௛                 
𝑡 ≥ 𝑇௣, 𝜏௧ = 𝜏௟                   
 
Using Euler equation,  
𝑒ିఉ௖೟
೔
= ?̂?௧ ∗ 𝑒ିఉ௖೟శభ
೔
 
Then, 
𝑐௧ାଵ௜ =
ln (?̂?௧)
𝛽
+ 𝑐௧௜ 
The optimal consumption path {𝑐௧௜
∗௉ிெ}ଵ்  is determined by {?̂?}ଵ்ିଵ  in PFM at the 
beginning of the life. The group of households modelled by PFM with the same 
{?̂?}ଵ்ିଵshare the same consumption path {𝑐௧௜
∗௉ிெ}ଵ். As PFM determines {𝑐௧௜
∗௉ிெ}ଵ் for 
households at the beginning of the life, {𝑐௧௜
∗௉ிெ}ଵ்  is time consistent, which does not 
change over time.  
PFM assumes households do not make deviations from the optimal path, but it is 
conceivable that some households do deviate from the optimal path at least once. An 
updated sequential model, Sequential Perfect-Foresight Model (SPFM), evolves from 
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PFM by conducting PFM at the beginning of each period. SPFM is also an individual-level 
model and only predicts individual-level consumption path with a given specific {?̂?௧}ଵ்ିଵ . 
SPFM solves the individual optimization problem but does not predict MIF.  
As households in the group modelled by SPFM can have different deviation levels 
in each period, then different households in the group have different 𝑁𝐼௧௜. This means 
different “flow” budget constraints in each period. The households 𝑖 ’s optimization 
problem is given as following:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{௖ೞ೔}ೞస೟೅
𝐸௧௜
∗ ൝෍ 𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ௖ೞ
೔ቁ
்
௦ୀ௧
ൡ  
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝑐௦
௜ = 𝑦 − 𝜏௦ − 𝑟௦ିଵ𝑏௦ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௦௜
𝑟௦𝑏௦௜ ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜏ୱାଵ                       
𝑐௦௜ ≥ 0                                        
𝑏଴௜ = 0                                        
𝑏்௜ = 0                                        
𝑠 < 𝑇௣, 𝜏௦ = 𝜏௛                 
𝑠 ≥ 𝑇௣, 𝜏௦ = 𝜏௟                  
 
Then, there are 𝑇 series of optimal consumption path {𝑐௦௜
∗ௌ௉ிெ}௦ୀ௧்  from 𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡 = 𝑇 
determined by {?̂?}ଵ்ିଵ  and pick up the first item of each series, i.e., 𝑐௦௜
∗ௌ௉ிெ
 at 𝑠 = 𝑡 
from 𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡 = 𝑇. The new {𝑐௧௜
∗ௌ௉ிெ}௧ୀଵ்  becomes to the optimal consumption path 
of SPFM.  
In a particular scenario, in which a household makes no deviation from the 
beginning of the life to the end, his {𝑐௧௜
∗ௌ௉ிெ}௧ୀଵ்  reduces to his {𝑐௧௜
∗௉ிெ}ଵ்  given the 
same {?̂?}ଵ்ିଵ . Otherwise, when the household makes at least one deviation, his 
{𝑐௧௜
∗ௌ௉ிெ}௧ୀଵ்  becomes time inconsistent, as his optimal path {𝑐௧௜
∗ௌ௉ிெ}௧ୀଵ்  is updated 
along with time at least once.  
PFM and SPFM are both individual-level models and non-equilibrium models. That 
is, MIF, {?̂?}ଵ்ିଵ, is exogenous, which is not only determined by either of two groups of 
households’ consumptions and which is assumed to be fully known by households in 
these two groups. However, households modelled by PFM with the same {?̂?}ଵ்ିଵare 
homogenous, who share the same optimal path, {𝑐௧௜
∗௉ிெ}ଵ் = {𝑐௧
∗௉ிெ
}ଵ் . However, 
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households modelled by SPFM with the same {?̂?}ଵ்ିଵare heterogenous, who could have 
different optimal paths, {𝑐௧௜
∗௉ிெ}ଵ். As different households in SPFM can have different 
deviation levels, this implies that SPFM allows households to correct their previous 
mistakes by repeatedly conducting the optimal procedure at the beginning of each 
period.  
As we need to identify subjects according to their borrowing behaviours, the 
optimisation problem of PFM is transformed to find the optimal borrowing path. PFM 
assumes that subjects plausibly know {𝑀𝐼𝐹}ଵଶଵ at the beginning of each session. Then 
we use Mathematica to solve the maximal problem below:  
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{௕೟
೔}భమభ
 𝐸௜∗ ൝෍ 388 ቀ1 − 𝑒ି଴.଴ଶସ௖೟
೔
ቁ
ଶଶ
௧ୀଵ
ൡ 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝑐௧
௜ = 120 − 𝜏௧ − 𝑀𝐼𝐹௧ିଵ ∗ 𝑏௧ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௧௜
𝑀𝐼𝐹௧ ∗ 𝑏௧௜ ≤ 120 − 𝜏௧ାଵ                      
𝑐௧௜ ≥ 0                                                       
𝑏଴௜ = 0                                                      
𝑏ଶଶ௜ = 0                                                      
𝑡 < 12, 𝜏௧ = 70                             
𝑡 ≥ 12, 𝜏௧ = 10                             
 
As {𝑀𝐼𝐹}ଵଶଵ  is known after each session, then {𝑏௧௜}ଵଶଵ  is the path of optimal net 
borrowing 𝑏௧௜∗(𝑃𝐹𝑀) of each session in DT. Subjects in the same session share the same 
𝑏௧∗(𝑃𝐹𝑀).  
Also, to get the optimal net borrowing of SPFM of each session in DT, the procedure 
of PFM is conducted in each period. Subjects solve the maximisation problem in period 
𝑡 below with the given 𝑀𝐼𝐹௧ିଵ ∗ 𝑏௧ିଵ௜  determined at period 𝑡 − 1 : 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{௕ೞ೔}ೞస೟మభ
𝐸௧௜
∗ ൝෍ 388 ቀ1 − 𝑒ି଴.଴ଶସ௖ೞ
೔ቁ
ଶଶ
௦ୀ௧
ൡ  
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𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧𝑐௦
௜ = 120 − 𝜏௦ − 𝑀𝐼𝐹௦ିଵ ∗ 𝑏௦ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௦௜
𝑀𝐼𝐹௦ ∗ 𝑏௦௜ ≤ 120 − 𝜏ୱାଵ                       
𝑐௦௜ ≥ 0                                                       
𝑏଴௜ = 0                                                       
𝑏ଶଶ௜ = 0                                                     
𝑠 < 12, 𝜏௦ = 70                              
𝑠 ≥ 12, 𝜏௦ = 10                              
 
Then the optimal net borrowing of SPFM consists of the series of {𝑏௦௜}௦ୀ௧ଶଵ  in period 
𝑡. The first item of the solution series of each period of each subject is the optimal net 
borrowing in that period, 𝑏௧௜∗(𝑆𝑃𝐹𝑀) = 𝑏௦ୀ௧௜ .  
3.5.2.1.b) AL models 
Households modelled by AL also may have different “gain” parameter, 𝛾. Then, Al 
evolves to a series of individual-level AL(𝛾) models with different “gain” parameter 𝛾௜. 
Similar to SPFM, MIFs of individual-level AL(𝛾) models are exogenous, and households 
correct their consumption paths in each period. The individual optimization problem is 
described as below: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{௖ೞ೔}ೞస೟೅
𝐸௧௜
∗ ൝෍ 𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ௖ೞ
೔ቁ
்
௦ୀ௧
ൡ  
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎪
⎧𝑐௦
௜ = 𝑦 − 𝜏௦ − ?̃?௜,௦ିଵ𝑏௦ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௦௜
?̃?௜,௦𝑏௦௜ ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜏ୱାଵ                       
𝑐௦௜ ≥ 0                                        
𝑏଴௜ = 0                                        
𝑏்௜ = 0                                        
𝑠 < 𝑇௣, 𝜏௦ = 𝜏௛                 
𝑠 ≥ 𝑇௣, 𝜏௦ = 𝜏௟                  
 
?̃?௜,௦ represents household 𝑖’s prediction on MIF in period 𝑠. And start from household 𝑖’s 
expectation MIF, 𝑟௜௘(0) = 1, for all 𝑖 and use 𝑟௜௘(𝑡) instead of all future MIFs from 𝑡 + 1 
to T . Following 𝑟௜௘(𝑡) = 𝑟௜௘(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛾௜(?̂?௧ − 𝑟௜௘(𝑡 − 1)) , {?̃?௜,௦ }௦ୀ௧்ିଵ  can be calculated. 
Then, solving the optimization problem above, there are T series of {𝑐௦௜}ୀ௧்  from 𝑡 = 1 to 
𝑡 = 𝑇 and pick up the first item of all series, i.e., 𝑐௦௜  at 𝑠 = 𝑡 from 𝑡 = 1 to 𝑡 = 𝑇. The 
new {𝑐௧௜
∗஺௅ }௧ୀଵ்  becomes to household 𝑖’s optimal consumption path of AL(𝛾). 
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Individual-level models AL(𝛾) are time inconsistent models. That is, as the deviation 
level across households may be different, different households modelled by AL(𝛾) with 
the same 𝛾 may have different consumption paths.  
Likewise, the optimisation problem of AL(𝛾) is needed to transform to find the 
optimal borrowing path. AL suggests different optimal net borrowing paths with 
different “gain” parameter 𝛾. Subjects solve the maximization problem in each period 
along with 𝑡: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{௕ೞ೔}ೞస೟మభ
𝐸௧௜
∗ ൝෍ 388 ቀ1 − 𝑒ି଴.଴ଶସ௖ೞ
೔ቁ
ଶଶ
௦ୀ௧
ൡ  
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝑐௦
௜ = 120 − 𝜏௦ − 𝑟௦ିଵ𝑏௦ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௦௜
𝑟௦𝑏௦௜ ≤ 120 − 𝜏ୱାଵ                       
𝑟௧௘ = 𝑟௧ିଵ௘ + 𝛾(𝑀𝐼𝐹௧ − 𝑟௧ିଵ௘ )      
𝑟௘(0) = 1                                        
𝑟௦ = 𝑀𝐼𝐹௧,                  𝑠 = 𝑡            
𝑟௦ିଵ = 𝑀𝐼𝐹௧ିଵ, 𝑠 = 𝑡            
𝑟௦ = 𝑟௧௘ ,                       𝑠 > 𝑡            
𝑐௦௜ ≥ 0                                               
𝑏଴௜ = 0                                              
𝑏ଶଶ௜ = 0                                             
𝑠 < 12, 𝜏௦ = 70                       
𝑠 ≥ 12, 𝜏௦ = 10                       
 
given 𝑟௧௘ = 𝑟௧ିଵ௘ + 𝛾(𝑀𝐼𝐹௧ − 𝑟௧ିଵ௘ ) and 𝑟௘(0) = 1.  
Then the optimal net borrowing of AL(𝛾) consist of the series of {𝑏௦௜}௦ୀ௧ଶଵ  when 𝑠 =
𝑡. The first item of the solution series of each period of each subject is the optimal net 
borrowing in that period, 𝑏௧௜∗(AL𝛾 ) = 𝑏௦ୀ௧௜ . In AL(𝛾), each subject has his own optimal 
net borrowing path, which is different to others’. To investigate how the performance 
of AL(𝛾) varies along with gain parameter, we choose three values of the gain parameter, 
𝛾 = 1, 𝛾 = 0.5, and 𝛾 = 0.1 Corresponding to the three models AL10, Al05 and AL01.  
3.5.2.1.c) Consumption Smoothing (CS) models  
RE and AL models ask households to solve a maximising problem. This requires that 
households are high intelligence. However, it is scarce that an economy is all composed 
of high intelligent householders. Then, we introduce a series of individual-level bounded 
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rational models (CS), which allows households not to solve the maximise problem. 
Households in CS react the anticipated tax scheme when they are informed, but 
households cannot maximise their total utilities of life accurately, so they try to smooth 
their consumption over the life. As the utility function is concavity, smoothing whole life 
consumption is intuitively reasonable.  
Firstly, we start from a CS model without sequentially updated target (CSHO), in 
which households determine the consumption strategy at the beginning of life. He will 
choose the actual consumption level in each period. To smooth consumption in each 
period, households sum all T-period incomes ∑ (𝑦 − 𝜏௧)்௧ୀଵ  and divide it by 𝑇 to get their 
target consumption in each period. Then in each period, households try to reach the 
target consumption as close as possible by borrowing and lending when 𝑡 < 𝑇௉ିଵ. And 
when 𝑡 = 𝑇௉ିଵ , households reset their target consumptions as the same smoothing 
procedure. After that, households try to reach the target consumptions as close as 
possible by borrowing and lending. Then households get the consumption paths 
{𝑐௧௜∗஼ௌுை}௧ୀଵ்  in CSHO model. CSHO is a time inconsistent model, as different households 
have different deviations. The procedure is described as below: 
𝑐௧௜∗஼ௌுை = min [𝑁𝐼௧௜ +
𝑦 − 𝜏୲ାଵ
?̂?௧
,
∑ (𝑦 − 𝜏௧)்௧ୀଵ
𝑇
], 𝑡 < 𝑇௉ିଵ 
𝑐௧௜∗஼ௌுை = min ቈ𝑁𝐼௧௜ +
𝑦 − 𝜏୲ାଵ
?̂?௧
,
∑ (𝑦 − 𝜏௧)்௧ୀ்ು
𝑇 − 𝑇௉ିଵ + 1
቉ , 𝑡 ≥ 𝑇௉ିଵ 
Secondly, we updated CSHO models to a model (CSHE) with a sequentially updated 
target, in which households update their target consumptions at the beginning of each 
period by dividing 𝑁𝐼௧௜ + ∑ (𝑦 − 𝜏௦)்௦ୀ௧ାଵ  by (𝑇 − 𝑡 + 1). As different households may 
make deviations from their previous target consumptions, different households have 
different 𝑁𝐼௧௜  in period 𝑡 . Thus, CSHE is also time inconsistent. The procedure is 
described as below:  
𝑐௧௜∗஼ௌுா = min [𝑁𝐼௧௜ +
𝑦 − 𝜏୲ାଵ
?̂?௧
,
𝑁𝐼௧௜ + ∑ (𝑦 − 𝜏௦)்௦ୀ௧ାଵ
𝑇 − 𝑡 + 1
] 
Furthermore, CSHO and CSHE both do not include wealth discount by MIF. Then 
another updated model (CSR) with sequentially updated target and future wealth 
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discount, is introduced. Households modelled by CSR first discount all future incomes 
∑ (𝑦 − 𝜏௦)்௦ୀ௧  into current period 𝑡 by the MIF ?̂?௧ in period 𝑡 and divide it by (𝑇 − 𝑡 + 1). 
This model also allows households to correct their previous deviations by resetting their 
target consumptions in each period. Similarity, CHR is also time inconsistent. The 
consumption in CSR is described as below: 
𝑐௧௜∗஼ௌோ = min [𝑁𝐼௧௜ +
𝑦 − 𝜏୲ାଵ
?̂?௧
,
𝑁𝐼௧௜ + ∑
(𝑦 − 𝜏௦)
?̂?௧
௦ି௧
்
௦ୀ௧ାଵ
𝑇 − 𝑡 + 1
] 
Finally, transforming the problem to find the optimal borrowing path, CSHO 
suggests the optimal net borrowing path is described as below: 
𝑏௧௜∗(CSHO ) = min [
120 − 𝜏୲ାଵ
𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
, 80 − 𝑁𝐼௧௜], 𝑡 < 11 
𝑏௧௜∗(CSHO ) = min ൤
120 − 𝜏୲ାଵ
𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
, 110 ×
11
12
− 𝑁𝐼௧௜൨ , 𝑡 ≥ 11 
As all subjects in the same session face the same MIF path, 𝑏௧௜∗(CSHO ) is the same 
for all subjects in the same sessions.  
The optimal net borrowing of CSHE and CSR are described as shown below:  
𝑏௧௜∗(CSHE ) = min [
120 − 𝜏୲ାଵ
𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
,
𝑁𝐼௧௜ + ∑ (120 − 𝜏௦)ଶଶ௦ୀ௧ାଵ
22 − 𝑡 + 1
− 𝑁𝐼௧௜] 
𝑏௧௜∗(CSR ) = min [
120 − 𝜏୲ାଵ
𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
,
𝑁𝐼௧௜ + ∑
(120 − 𝜏௦)
𝑀𝐼𝐹௧ ௦ିଵ
ଶଶ
௦ୀ௧ାଵ
22 − 𝑡 + 1
− 𝑁𝐼௧௜] 
Both CSHE’s and CSR’s optimal bet borrowing paths vary with different subjects.  
3.5.2.2 Myopic models  
To align with the empirical evidence, we introduce a series of time-inconsistent 
myopic models in this section, which only allow households to manage their 
consumptions on two successive periods. The series of myopic models consist of two 
kinds of models, consumption smoothing between two periods and borrowing aversion.  
3.5.2.2 a) Two-Period Consumption Smoothing models 
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As households following myopic models cannot manage whole life consumption 
plans, they could only manage their tomorrow’s plans. Then households try to smooth 
their 2-period consumptions or maximise their total utilities in the current period and 
the next period. 
Firstly, we introduce a 2-period consumption smoothing (2PCS) model. Assuming 
zero debt in next period, households try to make the current period’s utilities equal to 
the next period’s utilities by borrowing and lending. That is, 
𝑢௧௜ = 𝑢௧ାଵ௜  
𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ(ேூ೟
೔ା௕೟
೔)ቁ = 𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ(௬ିఛ೟శభି௥೟௕೟
೔)ቁ 
Then,  
𝑏௧௜∗ =
𝑦 − 𝜏௧ାଵ − 𝑁𝐼௧௜
1 + ?̂?௧
 
And 𝑐௧௜∗ଶ௉஼ௌ = 𝑁𝐼௧௜ + 𝑏௧௜∗.  
The next model is a 2-period Euler Equation (2PEU) model, in which households try 
to maximise the sum of the current period’s utilities and the next period’s utilities by 
borrowing and lending with zero debt in next period. That is, 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
௖೟
೔,௖೟శభ
೔
𝐸௧௜
∗ ቄ𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ௖೟
೔
ቁ + 𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ௖೟శభ
೔
ቁቅ 
𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝑐௧
௜ = 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ − ?̂?௧ିଵ𝑏௧ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௧௜
?̂?௧𝑏௧௜ ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜏୲ାଵ                       
𝑏௧ାଵ௜ = 0                                    
𝑐௧௜ ≥ 0                                        
𝑏଴௜ = 0                                        
𝑏்௜ = 0                                        
𝑡 < 𝑇௣, 𝜏௧ = 𝜏௛                 
𝑡 ≥ 𝑇௣, 𝜏௧ = 𝜏௟                   
 
given?̂?௧ିଵ𝑏௧ିଵ௜  known. Then the first order condition implies: 
𝑑𝑢௧௜
𝑑𝑏௧௜
= −
𝑑𝑢௧ାଵ௜
𝑑𝑏௧௜
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𝑒ିఉ(ேூ೟
೔ା௕೟
೔) = 𝑟௧ ∗ 𝑒ିఉ(௬ିఛ೟శభି௥̂೟௕೟
೔) 
Then,  
𝑏௧௜∗ =
𝑦 − 𝜏௧ାଵ − 𝑁𝐼௧௜ −
𝑙𝑛𝑟௧
𝛽
1 + ?̂?௧
 
And 𝑐௧௜∗ଶ௉ா௎ = 𝑁𝐼௧௜ + 𝑏௧௜.  
Then the optimal borrowing paths are described as below: 
𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐶𝑆) =
120 − 𝜏௧ାଵ − 𝑁𝐼௧௜
1 + 𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
 
𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐸𝑈) =
120 − 𝜏௧ାଵ − 𝑁𝐼௧௜ −
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
0.024
1 + 𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
 
3.5.2.2 b) Two-Period Borrowing-Averse Model 
As mentioned by Meissner’s study (2016), some people do not like borrowing from 
others. Then we describe this kind of behaviour with borrowing-averse models, which 
are updated from the 2PCS and 2PEU. 2-Period Borrowing Averse (2PCSBA) model from 
2PCS is drawn as follows: 
𝑐௧௜∗ଶ௉஼ௌ஻஺ = min ቊ𝑁𝐼௧௜ ,
𝑦 − 𝜏௧ାଵ + ?̂?௧ ∗ 𝑁𝐼௧௜
1 + ?̂?௧
ቋ 
Moreover, 2-Period Euler Equation Borrowing Averse (2PEUBA) model from 2PEU is 
drawn as follows: 
𝑐௧௜∗ଶ௉ா௎஻ = min ൞𝑁𝐼௧௜ ,
𝑦 − 𝜏௧ାଵ + ?̂?௧ ∗ 𝑁𝐼௧௜ −
𝑙𝑛𝑟௧
𝛽
1 + ?̂?௧
ൢ 
As 𝑏௧௜ < 0 means lending, then the two functions above imply that 𝑏௧௜∗  will never be 
positive. Therefore, no borrowing will be realised as any borrowing plan will be reduce 
to 0 in 2PCSBA and 2PEUBA. Then the optimal borrowing paths are described as below: 
𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐵𝐴) = min ቊ0,
120 − 𝜏௧ାଵ − 𝑁𝐼௧௜
1 + 𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
ቋ 
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𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐸𝑈𝐵𝐴) = min ቐ0,
120 − 𝜏௧ାଵ − 𝑁𝐼௧௜ −
𝑙𝑛𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
0.024
1 + 𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
ቑ 
When 𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐶𝑆)  or 𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐸𝑈)  is non-positive, 𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐶𝑆)  or 𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐸𝑈)  equals to 
𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐵𝐴)  or 𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐸𝑈𝐵𝐴) . Otherwise, 𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐶𝑆𝐵𝐴)  or 𝑏௧௜∗(2𝑃𝐸𝑈𝐵𝐴)  always 
equals to 0.  
3.5.2.3 Identification 
According to the series of optimal net borrowing paths provided previously (Section 
3.5.2.2), we conduct a series of regressions for each subject in DT and test if the subject 
follows at least one optimal path suggested by these 12 models. The regress is described 
as below: 
𝑏𝑙௧௜ = 𝑏0(𝑘) + 𝑏1(𝑘) ∗ 𝑏௧௜∗(𝑘) + 𝑒 
𝑏𝑙𝑝௧௜ = 𝑏0(𝑘) + 𝑏1(𝑘) ∗ 𝑏௧௜∗(𝑘) + 𝑒 
𝑏௧௜∗(𝑘) represents subject 𝑖’s optimal net borrowing in period 𝑡 suggested by model 𝑘. 
𝑘 indexes, 2PCS, 2PEU, 2PCSBA, 2PEUBA, PFM, SPFM, AL10, AL05, AL01, CSHO, CSHE and 
CSR. 𝑏𝑙௧௜  represents subject 𝑖’s net borrowing in period 𝑡, which is the subject’s actual 
traded net borrowing after 105s, and 𝑏𝑙𝑝௧௜ represents subject 𝑖’s proposal net borrowing 
in period 𝑡, which is determined by the subject’s last valid fulfilled or partially fulfilled 
borrowing and/or lending proposal(s) within 105s. That is, 𝑏𝑙𝑝௧௜ reflects subject’s will to 
borrow and/or lend, but due to the market size, the willing may not be fully satisfied.  
If a subject follows an optimal path provided by model 𝑘, then theoretically 𝑏0(𝑘) 
should be 0 and 𝑏1(𝑘) should equal to 1. To identify the subject’s decision path, we 
conduct a series of joint tests on the 12 regressions of each subject:  
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 3. 𝐼 0: 𝑏0(𝑘) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏1(𝑘) = 1 
If the p-value of a joint test on model 𝑘 of a subject is larger than 0.1, the subject is 
labelled as strictly following model 𝑘. The same subject could be labelled as more than 
one model type. Another weak test is:  
𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 3. 𝐼𝐼 0: 𝑏1(𝑘) ≥ 0.5 
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If the p-value of a joint test on model 𝑘 of a subject is larger than 0.1, the subject is 
labelled as weakly following model 𝑘. 
Table 3.2 presents the summary of groups of subjects labelled into each model in 
DT. “Proposal” column means 𝑏0(𝑘) and 𝑏1(𝑘) get from the regressions using 𝑏𝑙𝑝௧௜ and 
“Actual” column means 𝑏0(𝑘) and 𝑏1(𝑘) get from the regressions using 𝑏𝑙௧௜ . “b0=0 & 
b1=1” column presents the results on 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 3. 𝐼 and “b1>=0.5” column presents 
the results on 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 3. 𝐼𝐼. 
Table 3.2. Summary of the Performance of Models  
 b0=0 & b1=1 b1>=0.5 
Model Actual Proposal Actual Proposal 
Myopic     
2PCS 31 50 46 31 
2PEU 34 48 46 33 
2PCSBA 35 56 51 41 
2PEUBA 35 70 62 53 
     
Far-sight     
PFM 0 4 2 3 
SPFM 11 16 22 13 
     
CSHO 5 5 12 6 
CSHE 5 7 15 7 
CSR 9 17 14 10 
     
AL10 11 18 21 11 
AL05 11 18 22 11 
AL01 12 19 22 14 
     
Random (15) (Chi-square test) +5 +5 +6 +12 
total (90) 57 75 68 67 
Numbers in the table show the number of subjects who follow a specific borrowing path. 
Obviously, four myopic models dominate the most labelled subjects’ behaviours (out of 
90 observations in DT). This is consistent with the results found by Poterba (1988). 
Within far-sight models, AL shows relatively better performance than other models. The 
results using actual net borrowing data are consistent with the ones using proposal net 
borrowing data, and the number of subjects explained by models with actual net 
borrowing data is obviously less than the one with proposal net borrowing data in the 
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strict models. This better performance of proposal data may be explained by that the 
proposal data reflect players’ true wills.  
However, there are still around 1/3 ~1/6 subjects whose borrowing paths cannot 
be explained by any models used in the experiment. Furthermore, the Chi-square test is 
conducted to check if subjects’ behaviours follow randomisation. We define subject 𝑖’s 
valid choosing interval as below: 
[−𝑁𝐼௧௜ ,
120 − 𝜏୲ାଵ
𝑀𝐼𝐹௧
] 
We divide the interval into four subintervals equally, which are named from 1 to 4. Check 
which subinterval subject 𝑖’s net borrowing belongs to and sign the subinterval’s name 
to the subject. Then each subject has a series of numbers from 1 to 4 along with periods, 
which is tested by Chi-square test. “Random (Chi-square test)” row in Table Models 
reports the adding number of subjects whose borrowing behaviours are classified as 
randomization.  
Table 3.3 represents the summary of overlapping among models for “Actual” 
columns of 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 3. 𝐼. In general, AL models show non-sensitive to the “gain” 
parameter, as subjects who are explained by both AL10 and AL05 are also explained by 
AL01. Moreover, subjects who are explained by other far-sight models are highly 
possibly explained by AL models.  
3.5.2.4 Rule of Thumb  
As there are still some subjects left whose borrowing paths cannot be explained by 
any of 12 models, we run 𝑏𝑙௧௜ = 𝑏0(𝑗) + 𝑏1(𝑗) ∗ 𝑏𝑙௧
௝ + 𝑒, 𝑗 ≠ 𝑖 among all subjects within 
each session to check if there are some rules of thumb used by subjects. There is only 
one pair of subjects (Subject 3 and Subject 5) out of 405 pairs66 within the same session 
(Session 8) whose borrowing series in the 21 periods have been explained by each other 
at 90% significant level (passing 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 3. 𝐼). (Details on test results in Appendix 
3.III.) In general, there is no obvious rules of thumb following by players. 
                                                          
66 1 * 9 (each subject has 9 pairs with the other 9 subjects in the same treatment) * 10 (total subjects in each 
treatment) /2 (excluding repeated pairs) * 9 (sessions) = 405 (pairs).  
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 Table 3.3. Summary on Overlapping among Models 
 2PCS 2PEU 2PCSBA 2PEUBA PFM SPFM CSHO CSHE CSR AL10 AL05 AL01 
2PCS 31            
2PEU 30 34           
2PCSBA 23 24 36          
2PEUBA 22 25 31 35         
PFM 0 0 0 0 0        
SPFM 6 7 4 5 0 11       
CSHO 1 1 0 0 0 3 5      
CSHE 2 2 0 0 0 2 4 5     
CSR 3 4 2 2 0 6 4 3 9    
AL10 5 7 4 5 0 10 3 2 7 11   
AL05 5 7 4 5 0 10 3 2 7 11 11  
AL01 6 8 4 5 0 10 3 2 7 11 11 12 
 
Table 3.4. Summary of Coefficient r 
 2PCS 2PEU 2PCSBA 2PEUBA PFM SPFM CSHO CSHE CSR AL10 AL05 AL01 
Binary Value -0.18 -0.16 -0.15 -0.12 - 0.04 -0.06 0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 
P-value -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.16 -0.10 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Mean of Boxes 35.39 36.32 37.81 37.74 - 42.91 35.40 41.40 36.67 41.55 41.55 41.42 
Mean of “r”67 0.56 0.60 0.56 0.68 - 1.03 0.98 1.14 0.87 0.99 0.99 0.96 
 
                                                            
67 “Mean of r” excludes an observation with 100 boxes collected. 
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3.4.3 Risk Analysis 
In this section, we introduce the risk attitude of subjects into the analysis with 
models. Following the study of Crosetto and Filippin (2013), we used a dynamic visual 
version to elicit subjects’ risk attitudes. Then the coefficient of risk aversion, “𝑟”, is 
determined by the number (𝑘) of boxed collected. That is,  
𝑘 =
100𝑟
1 + 𝑟
 
Then,  
𝑟 =
𝑘
100 − 𝑘
 
Subjects who collected no more than 49 boxes are signed as risk aversion. Subjects 
who collected 50 boxes are signed as risk neutral. Subjects who collected more than 50 
boxes are signed as risk seeker. Figure 3.16 shows the distribution of 90 subjects’ 
numbers of boxes collected. “X-axis” represents the scale of intervals on the numbers of 
boxes collected, and “Y-axis” represents the number of observations in each interval.  
 
Figure 3.16 
Figure 3.17 represents the distribution of 90 subjects’ coefficient of risk aversion, 
“𝑟”. “X-axis” represents the scale of intervals on “𝑟” and “Y-axis” represents the number 
of observations in each interval. 
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Figure 3.17 
Figure 3.16 and Figure 3.17 both show that more subjects are risk averse. Table 3.4 
represents a series of correlation analysis on 12 models and risk attitude. “Binary Value” 
row shows the correlation coefficient between the numbers of collected boxes by 
subjects and whether the subjects pass 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐼 on a specific model with their 
actual data on 90% level (if pass, then valued as 1; if not, then valued as 0).  “P-Value” 
row shows the correlation coefficient between the numbers of collected boxes of 
subjects and the P-value of the subjects on 𝐻𝑦𝑝𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑠 𝐼 testing on a specific model 
with their actual data. “Mean of Boxes” row represent the average boxes collected of 
subjects whose borrowing paths are explained by a specific model. “Mean of 𝑟 ” 
represents the average of “𝑟” of subjects whose borrowing paths are explained by a 
specific model. 
“Binary Value” and “P-Value” show negative in 4 myopic models, and “Mean of 
Boxes” and “Mean of 𝑟” consistently indicate risk averse for subjects who follow 4 
myopic models. This implies that subjects who follow myopic models are risk averse, 
and in contrast, subjects who follow far-sight models are more likely to be risk seeker. 
As most of the far-sight models predict the future’s MIFs, which includes uncertainty, 
risk seekers could bear more risk so that they could manage fthe uture’s plans.  
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3.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we design an experiment to study how players determine their life 
consumption plans by reacting to an anticipated tax decrease and explore the factors 
which affect subjects’ whole life consumption paths.  
We compare the MIF paths and borrowing behaviours between the treatment with 
constant tax and the treatment with tax decrease, and the differences between two 
treatments are significant on both MIF paths and borrowing behaviours. We generalise 
four myopic models and eight far-sight models to explain subjects’ borrowing 
behaviours. Myopic models show a better performance, which are followed by around 
2/3 subjects explained by at least one models. This result is similar to previous studies. 
Meanwhile, the other 1/3 far-sight subjects do react to the tax decrease and have the 
incentive to borrow before the tax decrease happens. Myopic subjects are driven by a 
higher MIF level, which is caused by far-sight subjects’ borrowing needs, to lend their 
wealth. Lending brings a temporary wealth rise to myopic subjects. The active trading in 
DT maintains the MIF on a higher level than in FT, but in FT there is no strong incentive 
for far-sight subjects to borrow. Moreover, within far-sight models, a small number of 
subjects behave as sequential RE paths, in which subjects are assumed to have the full 
knowledge on the future MIFS, but adaptive learning shows a relatively better 
performance comparing with other far-sight models. In general, most of the subjects 
whose behaviours can be explained by one far-sight model also can be explained by AL 
models. 
In the next step, risk attitude is introduced to compensate the analysis on the factor 
which drives subjects to play as myopic or far-sight players. The analysis shows that 
there is a plausible correlation between myopic playing and risk aversion. Subjects who 
follow myopic models are more risk-averse. However, there is no evidence or studies on 
that either risk aversion or intelligence limit can lead the subject to follow myopic 
models. In our study, only the correlation between behaviours and risk is investigated. 
More studies are needed to be conducted to study the correlation between behaviours 
and intelligence.  
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Appendix 3.I  
 
Note: The left axis represents the value of MIFs and the right axis represents the value of Net Ratios.
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Note: The left axis represents the value of MIFs and the right axis represents the value of Net Ratios.
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Appendix 3.II 
Following Section 3.1.2, ALE used in this chapter is the maximising problem as following 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{௖ೞ೔}ೞస೟೅
𝐸௧௜
∗ ൝෍ 𝛼 ቀ1 − 𝑒ିఉ௖ೞ
೔ቁ
்
௦ୀ௧
ൡ  
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜 
⎩
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎧ 𝑐௦
௜ = 𝑦 − 𝜏௦ − ?̃?௦ିଵ𝑏௦ିଵ௜ + 𝑏௦௜
?̃?௦𝑏௦௜ ≤ 𝑦 − 𝜏ୱାଵ                       
𝑐௦௜ ≥ 0                                        
𝑏଴௜ = 0                                        
𝑏்௜ = 0                                        
𝑠 < 𝑇௣, 𝜏௦ = 𝜏௛                 
𝑠 ≥ 𝑇௣, 𝜏௦ = 𝜏௟                  
 
?̃?௦ represents the prediction on MIF in period 𝑠. Then Euler equation shows: 
𝐸௧௜
∗𝑐௦ାଵ௜ =
𝑙𝑛 (?̃?௦)
𝑏
+ 𝑐௦௜ , 𝑠 = 𝑡, … , 𝑇 
Furthermore, 
𝐸௧௜
∗𝑐௦ା௝௜ =
𝑙𝑛൫𝑟௦ ∏ ?̃?௦ା௛ିଵ
௝
௛ୀଶ ൯
𝑏
+ 𝑐௧௜, 𝑗 ≥ 2, 𝑠 = 𝑡, … , 𝑇 
As 𝑟௧ା௛ିଵ௘ (𝑡) = 𝑟௘(𝑡) for all ℎ ≥ 2, and  
𝑟௘(𝑡) = 𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1) + 𝛾(?̂?௧ − 𝑟௘(𝑡 − 1)) 
Then, 
𝐸௧௜
∗𝑐௧ା௝௜ =
𝑙𝑛൫?̂?௧ ∏ 𝑟௘(𝑡)
௝
௛ୀଶ ൯
𝑏
+ 𝑐௧௜ , 𝑗 ≥ 2, 𝑠 = 𝑡, … , 𝑇 
As ∏ 𝑟௘(𝑡)௝௛ୀଶ = 𝑟
௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ, then 
𝐸௧௜
∗𝑐௧ା௝௜ =
𝑙𝑛൫?̂?௧ ∗ 𝑟௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ, ൯
𝑏
+ 𝑐௧௜ 
We use 𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡) to represent ?̂?௧ ∗ 𝑟௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ (𝑗 ≥ 2) and ?̂?௧ (𝑗 = 1). As households in 
ALE are identical, then let 𝑐௧௜ = 𝑐௧  and 𝑐௧ା௝௘ (𝑡) = 𝐸௧௜
∗𝑐௧ା௝௜ . Then the representative 
household’s life-time budget constraint at period t is described as below: 
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𝑐௧ + ෍
𝑐௧ା௝௘ (𝑡)
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
= 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ − ?̂?௧𝑏௧ିଵ + ෍
𝑦 − 𝜏௧ା௝௘ (𝑡)
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
, 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇 − 1 
Then re-write the life balance function: 
𝑐௧ + ෍
𝑙𝑛൫𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡) ൯
𝑏 + 𝑐௧
௜
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
= 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ − ?̂?௧𝑏௧ିଵ + ෍
𝑦
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
− ෍
𝜏௧ା௝௘ (𝑡)
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
 
𝑐௧ ቌ1 + ෍
1
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
ቍ + ෍
𝑙𝑛 ቀ𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)ቁ
𝑏 ∗ 𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
= 𝑦 − 𝜏௧ − ?̂?௧𝑏௧ିଵ + ෍
𝑦
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
− ෍
𝜏௧ା௝௘ (𝑡)
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
 
Market clearing implies zero debt, which means 𝑐௧ = 𝑦 − 𝜏௧. Then,  
(𝑦 − 𝜏௧) ቌ෍
1
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
ቍ + ෍
𝑙𝑛 ቀ𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)ቁ
𝑏 ∗ 𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
= 𝑦 ෍
1
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
− ෍
𝜏௧ା௝௘ (𝑡)
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
 
Then,  
෍
𝑙𝑛 ቀ𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)ቁ
𝑏 ∗ 𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
= ෍
𝜏௧ − 𝜏௧ା௝௘ (𝑡)
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
 
As 𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡) = ?̂?௧ ∗ 𝑟௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ, then  
෍
1
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
= ෍
1
?̂?௧ ∗ 𝑟௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
= 𝑟௧ ෍
1
𝑟௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
=
1
?̂?௧
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − 1
(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)𝑟௘()்ି௧ିଵ
 
Then, 
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෍
𝑙𝑛 ቀ𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)ቁ
𝑏 ∗ 𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
=
ln (?̂?௧)
𝑏 ∗ ?̂?௧
෍
1
𝑟௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ
+
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
ln 𝑟௘(𝑡)
𝑏 ∗ ?̂?௧
෍
𝑗 − 1
𝑟௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
=
ln (?̂?௧)
𝑏 ∗ ?̂?௧
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − 1
(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ିଵ
+
ln 𝑟௘(𝑡)
𝑏 ∗ ?̂?௧
෍
𝑗 − 1
𝑟௘(𝑡)௝ିଵ
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
=
ln(?̂?௧)
𝑏 ∗ ?̂?௧
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − 1
(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ିଵ
+
ln 𝑟௘(𝑡)
𝑏 ∗ ?̂?௧
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − (𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑟௘(𝑡) + 𝑇 − 𝑡 − 1
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ିଵ(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)ଶ
 
When 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇௉ିଵ, 
෍
𝜏௧ − 𝜏௧ା௝௘ (𝑡)
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ
௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
= ෍
𝜏௛ − 𝜏௟
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ
௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀ்ುି௧
=
𝜏௛ − 𝜏௟
?̂?௧
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି்ುషభ − 1
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ିଵ(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)
 
When 𝑡 > 𝑇௉ିଵ, 
෍
𝜏௧ − 𝜏௧ା௝௘ (𝑡)
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௝ୀଵ
= ෍
𝜏௟ − 𝜏௟
𝐷௧,௧ା௝ିଵ௘ (𝑡)
்ି௧
௃ୀଵ
= 0 
Then, when 𝑡 ≤ 𝑇௉ିଵ, 
ln(𝑟௧)
𝑏 ∗ ?̂?௧
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − 1
(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ିଵ
+
ln 𝑟௘(𝑡)
𝑏 ∗ ?̂?௧
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − (𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑟௘(𝑡) + 𝑇 − 𝑡 − 1
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ିଵ(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)ଶ
=
𝜏௛ − 𝜏௟
?̂?௧
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି்ುషభ − 1
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ିଵ(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)
 
So, 
?̃?௧∗஺௅ா
= exp ^
(𝜏௛ − 𝜏௟)(𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି்ುషభ − 1)𝑏 −
(𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − (𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑟௘(𝑡) + 𝑇 − 𝑡 − 1)𝑙𝑛𝑟௘(𝑡)
𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1
(𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − 1)
 
And when 𝑡 > 𝑇௉ିଵ, 
ln(?̂?௧)
𝑏 ∗ ?̂?௧
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − 1
(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ିଵ
+
ln 𝑟௘(𝑡)
𝑏 ∗ ?̂?௧
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − (𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑟௘(𝑡) + 𝑇 − 𝑡 − 1
𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ିଵ(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)ଶ
= 0 
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So,  
?̃?௧∗஺௅ா = exp ^
(𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧ − (𝑇 − 𝑡)𝑟௘(𝑡) + 𝑇 − 𝑡 − 1)ln 𝑟௘(𝑡)
(𝑟௘(𝑡) − 1)(1 − 𝑟௘(𝑡)்ି௧)
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Appendix 3.III 
The series of following tables represent the p-value of the test on Hypothesis 3.I for regressions between subjects in each session. “Subject 
i” in the first row represents the dependent variable and the “Subject j” in the first column represent the independent variable.  
Table I. P-value of Test on Hypothesis 3.I in Session 1 
 Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9 Subject 10 
Subject 1 . 0.000 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 2 0.232 . 0.001 0.089 0.003 0.010 0.032 0.000 0.006 0.000 
Subject 3 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 5 0.049 0.000 0.001 0.001 . 0.100 0.194 0.000 0.008 0.001 
Subject 6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 8 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.039 0.000 . 0.000 0.024 
Subject 9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.019 0.002 0.000 . 0.000 
Subject 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 
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Table II. P-value of Test on Hypothesis 3.I in Session 2 
 Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9 Subject 10 
Subject 1 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
Subject 2 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.982 0.000 
Subject 3 0.003 0.001 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.634 0.000 
Subject 4 0.337 0.008 0.004 . 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.449 0.419 0.000 
Subject 5 0.182 0.199 0.021 0.000 . 0.001 0.000 0.005 0.822 0.046 
Subject 6 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Subject 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 8 0.285 0.014 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.038 0.000 . 0.281 0.000 
Subject 9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 
Subject 10 0.153 0.023 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 . 
 
Table III. P-value of Test on Hypothesis 3.I in Session 3 
 Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9 Subject 10 
Subject 1 . 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.117 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 2 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 3 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 4 0.000 0.000 0.272 . 0.209 0.000 0.015 0.036 0.000 0.000 
Subject 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 6 0.393 0.008 0.011 0.000 0.534 . 0.080 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Subject 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 8 0.001 0.000 0.142 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.027 . 0.000 0.000 
Subject 9 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.980 0.000 0.090 0.001 . 0.011 
Subject 10 0.010 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.723 0.000 0.079 0.002 0.000 . 
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Table IV. P-value of Test on Hypothesis 3.I in Session 4 
 Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9 Subject 10 
Subject 1 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.000 
Subject 2 0.000 . 0.234 0.030 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Subject 3 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 6 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.071 0.000 . 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Subject 7 0.000 0.027 0.571 0.502 0.002 0.840 . 0.024 0.003 0.000 
Subject 8 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 
Subject 9 0.001 0.027 0.006 0.595 0.001 0.012 0.000 0.000 . 0.002 
Subject 10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 
 
Table V. P-value of Test on Hypothesis 3.I in Session 5 
 Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9 Subject 10 
Subject 1 . 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 
Subject 2 0.000 . 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.000 
Subject 3 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 5 0.000 0.004 0.086 0.023 . 0.012 0.005 0.311 0.002 0.055 
Subject 6 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 
Subject 7 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.031 0.000 0.000 . 0.002 0.138 0.032 
Subject 8 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.007 0.008 
Subject 9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 
Subject 10 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.077 . 
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Table VI. P-value of Test on Hypothesis 3.I in Session 6 
 Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9 Subject 10 
Subject 1 . 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.000 
Subject 2 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 3 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.114 0.000 0.000 
Subject 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 6 0.000 0.022 0.004 0.152 0.307 . 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.062 
Subject 7 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 8 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 
Subject 9 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.337 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.001 . 0.003 
Subject 10 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 . 
 
Table VII. P-value of Test on Hypothesis 3.I in Session 7 
 Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9 Subject 10 
Subject 1 . 0.004 0.000 0.333 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
Subject 2 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 3 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 5 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.060 . 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.481 0.000 
Subject 6 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 . 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 
Subject 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 8 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 
Subject 9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.107 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 . 0.000 
Subject 10 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 . 
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Table VIII. P-value of Test on Hypothesis 3.I in Session 8 
 Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9 Subject 10 
Subject 1 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 2 0.017 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 3 0.007 0.015 . 0.001 0.101 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.159 0.000 
Subject 4 0.038 0.052 0.564 . 0.436 0.079 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.008 
Subject 5 0.025 0.036 0.337 0.003 . 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.004 
Subject 6 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000 
Subject 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 8 0.018 0.446 0.201 0.503 0.507 0.264 0.000 . 0.113 0.415 
Subject 9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 
Subject 10 0.001 0.056 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.232 0.000 0.000 0.110 . 
 
Table IX. P-value of Test on Hypothesis 3.I in Session 9 
 Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4 Subject 5 Subject 6 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9 Subject 10 
Subject 1 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 2 0.000 . 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 
Subject 3 0.627 0.000 . 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010 
Subject 4 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 5 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 7 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Subject 8 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 . 0.000 0.002 
Subject 9 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 0.022 
Subject 10 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 . 
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Appendix 3.IV Instructions 
INSTRUCTIONS 
WELCOME! 
 
You are about to participate in an experiment in decision making.  
First, you will read instructions that explain the decision scenarios that you will face in 
the experiment. Next, you will answer questions that test your understanding of the 
instructions. If you answer the questions correctly, you will earn £3. You must answer 
the questions correctly in order to participate in the experiment. 
 
In the actual experiment, you will make decisions that will allow you to earn money. 
Your decisions and the decisions of other participants in the experiment will determine 
your monetary earnings in the experiment. All that you earn is yours to keep, and will 
be paid to you in private, in cash, after today's session. 
It is important to us that you remain silent and do not look at other people's work. If you 
have any questions or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and an 
experimenter will come to you. If you talk, exclaim out loudly, etc., you will be asked to 
leave, and you will forfeit your earnings. Thank you. 
In the experiment, you will interact anonymously in a group of 10 people who are 
currently in the room. We will assign an ID to you and all the other participants, so that 
you interact with the other participants in your group anonymously. Your ID, and the IDs 
of the other participants in your group, will not be revealed to any of the participants, 
either during or after the experiment. 
 
DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENT 
The experiment has 22 decision PERIODS. At the start of each period, you will receive 
an ENDOWMENT of ‘’experimental currency units,’’ (ECUs for short). In each period, you 
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will pay a certain amount of ECUs in TAX. This TAX will be automatically deducted from 
your ENDOWMENT for that period. Your ENDOWMENT and TAX for all periods will be 
announced before period 1 starts. 
In each period, you will be making decisions that determine the amount of ECUs you 
CONSUME that period. You may think of each period as a consumption period. The 
amount of ECUs you consume in a period determines the NUMBER OF POINTS you earn 
that period according to the formula described below. The number of points that you 
earn in the experiment is the SUM of the POINTS you earn in the 22 decision PERIODS. 
In each period, except in the last period, you can increase or decrease the amount of 
ECUs you consume that period by BORROWING or LENDING an amount of ECUs (under 
some conditions described below).  
To BORROW you need to submit: 
A BORROWING PROPOSAL: the AMOUNT of ECUs you want to BORROW and the 
INTEREST FACTOR, which is the MAXIMUM AMOUNT of ECUs you would be willing to 
pay back next period for each ECU you borrow in the current period;  
To LEND you need to submit: 
A LENDING PROPOSAL: the AMOUNT of ECUs you want to LEND and the INTEREST 
FACTOR, which is the MINIMUM AMOUNT of ECUs you would want to be paid back 
next period for each ECU you lend in the current period.  
In a period, the decisions that you and all the other participants in the group make on 
the amount of ECUs to borrow and/or lend and the interest factors that all participants 
indicate for their borrowing and lending proposals jointly determine that period’s 
MARKET INTEREST FACTOR (as explained in the Appendix).  
A period’s MARKET INTEREST FACTOR is the amount of ECUs every participant will repay 
next period for every ECU s/he borrows in the current period, as well as the amount of 
ECUs every participant will be repaid next period for every ECU s/he lends in the current 
period. 
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Examples:  
- Suppose the market interest factor is 1.05. In this case if you were to borrow 1 ECU this 
period you would repay 1.05 ECUs next period. Likewise, if you were to lend 1 ECU this 
period you would be repaid 1.05 ECUs next period. 
- Suppose the market interest factor is 0.78. In this case if you were to borrow 1 ECU this 
period you would repay 0.78 ECUs next period. Likewise, if you were to lend 1 ECU this 
period you would be repaid 0.78 ECUs next period. 
 
In every period after the first period, you might receive or pay a certain amount of ECUs, 
because you have to repay what you borrowed in the previous period, and you are 
repaid what you lent in the previous period. This amount is the NET REPAYMENT in the 
current period, and is equal to: 
𝑵𝑬𝑻 𝑹𝑬𝑷𝑨𝒀𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻 = 
= (𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝑳𝑬𝑵𝑫𝑰𝑵𝑮 − 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝑩𝑶𝑹𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑰𝑵𝑮)
× 𝑷𝒓𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒐𝒖𝒔 𝑴𝑨𝑹𝑲𝑬𝑻 𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑬𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑻 𝑭𝑨𝑪𝑻𝑶𝑹 
where Previous LENDING, Previous BORROWING, and the Previous MARKET INTEREST 
FACTOR refer to your lending, borrowing and the market interest factor in the previous 
period. 
From this expression you can conclude that: 
a) If in the previous period you borrowed fewer ECUs than you lent, or if you only lent 
but did not borrow, your NET REPAYMENT this period will be positive.  
b) If in the previous period you borrowed more ECUs than you lent, or if you borrowed 
but did not lend, your NET REPAYMENT this period will be negative; 
c) NET REPAYMENT will be equal to zero if in the previous period you lent and borrowed 
the same amount of ECUs, or if you neither lent nor borrowed 
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Your ENDOWMENT, TAX and NET REPAYMENT determine your NET INCOME (in ECUS) 
in a period as follows: 
𝑵𝑬𝑻 𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬 = 𝑬𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑾𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻 − 𝑻𝑨𝑿 + 𝑵𝑬𝑻 𝑹𝑬𝑷𝑨𝒀𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻 
Your CONSUMPTION in a period is equal to your net income minus the amount of ECUs 
you lend plus the amount of ECUs you borrow: 
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑼𝑴𝑷𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵 = 𝑵𝑬𝑻 𝑰𝑵𝑪𝑶𝑴𝑬 − 𝑳𝑬𝑵𝑫𝑰𝑵𝑮 + 𝑩𝑶𝑹𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑰𝑵𝑮 
So, your consumption would be larger than your NET INCOME if you borrow more than 
you lend, and vice-versa. If you neither borrow nor lend your consumption will be equal 
to your NET INCOME.  
In all periods, except the last period, the lending and borrowing proposals have to satisfy 
the following conditions: 
i) You cannot propose to lend an amount of ECUs larger than your NET INCOME. 
ii) Your borrowing proposal has to be such that you can repay it in entirety next period. 
Therefore, the proposal cannot require that you pay back more than an amount of ECUs 
equal to your ENDOWNMENT minus TAX next period. This means the interest factor 
and the borrowing amount (in ECUs) in your borrowing proposal has to satisfy the 
following condition: 
𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑬𝑹𝑬𝑺𝑻 𝑭𝑨𝑪𝑻𝑶𝑹 × 𝑩𝑶𝑹𝑹𝑶𝑾𝑰𝑵𝑮 ≤ 𝑵𝒆𝒙𝒕 𝑬𝑵𝑫𝑶𝑾𝑴𝑬𝑵𝑻 − 𝑵𝒆𝒙𝒕 𝑻𝑨𝑿 
In other words, it follows that the borrowing amount (in ECUs) in your borrowing 
proposal has to be less than or equal to your (next-period) ENDOWMENT minus (next-
period) TAX divided by the interest factor: 
𝐵𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑊𝐼𝑁𝐺 ≤
(𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝐸𝑁𝐷𝑂𝑊𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇 − 𝑁𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑇𝐴𝑋)
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑇 𝐹𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑂𝑅
 
Examples:  
a) Suppose that next period your ENDOWMENT is 60, and the TAX you will pay is 20, if 
you propose an interest factor of 1.05, then you cannot propose to borrow more than 
38. 
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b) Suppose that next period your ENDOWMENT is 60, and the TAX you will pay is 20, if 
you propose an interest factor of 0.78, then you cannot propose to borrow more than 
51. 
Please note in the last period you cannot either lend or borrow, since there is no next 
period. In the last period your CONSUMPTION will simply be equal to your NET INCOME 
that period.  
In each period, you will earn a number of POINTS calculated by converting your 
CONSUMPTION (in ECUs) in that period, according to the formula below.   
𝑷𝑶𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑺 = 𝟑𝟖𝟖 ×  (𝟏 –  𝑬𝑿𝑷 (−𝟎. 𝟎𝟐𝟒 ×  𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑺𝑼𝑴𝑷𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵)) 
where EXP is a NUMBER approximately equal to 2.718. 
A numerical and graphical representation of the formula are provided in the Table and 
Graph in the Appendix of the instructions. Please see the Table and Graph now.  
It is not necessary to fully understand the formula. What is important to understand, 
and which you can see from the Table and Graph is that: 1) The larger your 
CONSUMPTION (in ECUS) in a period the larger the number of POINTS you earn that 
period; 2) The NUMBER OF ADDITIONAL POINTS you earn in a period when you increase 
your consumption by ONE ECU decreases as your CONSUMPTION (in ECUs) that period 
increases. 
At the end of the experiment POINTS will be converted into cash according to the 
following exchange rate: Each 400 POINTS are worth £1, i.e. every 4 points is worth 1 
pence. 
THE COMPUTER INTERFACE 
We now describe the different screens of the computer interface that you will use to 
enter your decisions, see the decisions of the other participants, and receive feedback 
throughout the 22 periods of the experiment. 
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THE ENDOWMENT AND TAX TABLE SCREEN 
At the start of the experiment you will see the ENDOWMENT AND TAX TABLE. This 
screen tells you your endowment and the tax you will pay in each of the periods of the 
experiment. Every time the tax and/or endowment changes from one period to the next 
the numbers in the table are displayed in a different color. See the example in the screen 
below. 
 
THE ACTIVITY SCREEN 
At the start of every period you will see the ACTIVITY SCREEN, an example of which is 
below. In this screen you can: 
i) See the number of the current period and the time remaining in the current period. 
Note that each period has a duration of 105 seconds (please see the box at the top of 
the screen; in the example screen below the current period is 1 and the remaining time 
is 49 secs.); 
ii) See your endowment, tax, net repayment received, and your net income at the start 
of the current period (please see box on the top left side of the screen labeled “Current 
Period Information”); 
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iii) See the market interest factor, the amount of ECUs you lent, the amount of ECUs you 
borrowed, and your consumption (in ECUs) in the previous period (please see the second 
box from the top on the left side of the screen labeled “Previous Period Information”); 
iv) See the maximum amount of ECUs you can lend, which is equal to your net income 
this period, as well your current provisional level of consumption, i.e., the amount of 
ECUs you will consume given your current borrowing and lending proposals and how the 
current period’s provisional market outcome determines the amount of ECUs that you 
borrow and/or lend, which we explain below in detail (please see the third box from the 
top on the left side of the screen labeled “Further Current Period Information”); 
v) Enter your borrowing and lending proposals for the current period and see the list of 
all the proposals you have entered so far this period (please see box in the middle of the 
screen labeled “CURRENT PERIOD PROPOSAL BOX”). If you want to enter a borrowing or 
lending proposal you will first enter the interest factor (a number that can have up to 
three decimal places, i.e., a number such as 1.005) and the amount of ECUs you want to 
borrow or lend (which has to be a whole a number). You will next click the red 
“Borrowing Proposal” or the red “Lending Proposal” button to submit the proposal. In a 
period, you can always replace the most recent borrowing/lending proposal by entering 
a new one.  You may enter as many borrowing/lending proposals you want in a period. 
However, among your entered borrowing proposals only the most recent is active. 
Similarly, among your entered lending proposals only the most recent is active. 
Your lending proposal will be permitted if the amount of ECUs you wish to lend is smaller 
than or equal to the maximum amount of ECUs you can lend (this appears in the “Further 
current period information” box). Your borrowing proposal will be permitted as long as 
your income after taxes next period is sufficient to repay it (as explained above).  
You can click the calculator icon in order to use a pop-up calculator for any calculations 
you might find useful. For example, the amount of ECUs you would be repaid next period 
given the interest factor and the amount of ECUs of your lending proposal, or the 
amount of ECUs you will have to repay given the interest factor and the amount of ECUs 
of your borrowing proposal. 
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 In the “CURRENT PERIOD PROPOSAL BOX” you can also find the list of all the borrowing 
and lending proposals you have made so far in the current period. The proposals are 
ordered according to the decision time, i.e., how many seconds into the period you 
submitted them, with the most recent proposal at the top. The most recent borrowing 
proposal and lending proposal appears in blue (even if you have cancelled it). If you have 
cancelled a proposal, then it will disappear from the relevant ALL PARTICIPANTS’ 
PROPOSALS list. 
vi) In the “CURRENT PERIOD’S PROVISIONAL MARKET OUTCOME” (please see the box 
on the top right hand side of the screen), see the list of the current period’s provisional 
market interest factor and the market amount borrowed. The market amount (in ECUs) 
borrowed is the sum of the amounts (in ECUs) borrowed by you and all the other 
participants. Note that this amount (in ECUs) is also equal to the sum of the amounts (in 
ECUs) lent by you and the other participants, since any amount of ECUs that is borrowed 
by one participant has to be lent to him/her by the other participants. The list of the 
current period’s provisional market interest factor and the market amount (in ECUs) 
borrowed is numbered from the most recent (at the top and highlighted in red) to the 
earlier ones at the bottom. The most recent market interest factor and the market 
amount (in ECUs) borrowed/lent determines the amount of ECUs that you lend and/or 
borrow, as explained below. Every time any of the participants enters a new borrowing 
and lending proposal the current period’s provisional market outcome is updated. Below 
we explain in more detail how the market interest factor and the market amount (in 
ECUs) borrowed/lent are determined. 
A detailed and extended explanation on how to find the CURRENT PERIOD’S 
PROVISIONAL MARKET OUTCOME is provided in the print out named Appendix that is 
on your desk. Nevertheless, here is a brief explanation on how it is found:  all participants’ 
active borrowing and lending proposals are taken together and the computer software 
searches for the particular interest factor (X) such that the sum of the amounts of the 
borrowing proposals with interest factors greater than or equal to this particular interest 
factor (X) is equal to the sum of the amounts of the lending proposals with interest 
factors smaller than or equal to this particular interest factor. We call this particular 
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interest factor (X), the Market Interest Factor, at which all borrowing and lending 
outcomes in the market take place.  
In some cases, there is no Market Interest Factor (and thus there is no borrowing or 
lending), in other cases several values work as the Market Interest Factor (the average 
of those vales is chosen as the Market Interest Factor), while in other cases no value 
works as the Market Interest Factor to fulfil all borrowing proposals with equal or 
smaller interest factors and all lending proposals with equal or larger interest factors 
(in this case the borrowing and lending proposals that specify the same interest factors 
will be fulfilled, partially fulfilled or be unfulfilled according to a time priority rule: 
proposals submitted earlier will be fulfilled before proposals that were submitted later.  
vii) See the list of the borrowing proposals currently submitted to the market by all the 
participants (please see the box on the bottom left hand side of the screen labeled 
“PARTICIPANTS’ BORROWING PROPOSALS”). The borrowing proposals are ordered 
according to the interest factor with the largest at the top and the smallest at the bottom. 
Your most recent borrowing proposal is highlighted in blue. In case you want to cancel 
your borrowing proposal you first click on it and next click the “Cancel your Borrowing 
Proposal” button, which appears below the list. 
The status of a borrowing proposal is displayed in the “Provisional outcome” column: It 
appears as fulfilled if in the provisional market outcome, the participant will borrow the 
amount of ECUs she wishes (in which case the number in the “Provisional amount” 
column equals the number in the “Amount” column); It appears as part-fulfilled if in the 
provisional market outcome, the participant will borrow an amount of ECUs smaller (but 
larger than zero)  than the amount of ECUs she wishes (in which case the number in the 
“Provisional amount” column is smaller than the number in the “Amount” column);  
Finally, it appears as unfulfilled if in the provisional market outcome, the participant will 
not borrow anything. 
viii) See the list of the lending proposals currently submitted to the market by all the 
participants (please see the box on the bottom right hand side of the screen labeled 
“PARTICIPANTS’ LENDING PROPOSALS”). The lending proposals are ordered according 
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to the interest factor with the smallest at the top and the largest at the bottom. Your 
most recent lending proposal is highlighted in blue. In case you want to cancel your 
lending proposal you first click on it and next click the “Cancel your Lending Proposal” 
button, which appears below the list. 
The status of a lending proposal is displayed in the “Provisional outcome” column: The 
interpretation of fulfilled, part-fulfilled and unfulfilled is the same as in the borrowing 
proposals explained above in (vi). 
ix) Calculate how many points consumption of a certain amount of ECUs will earn you in 
the current period. By entering an amount of ECUs in front of the box “Consumption”, 
followed by clicking the “calculate” button at the bottom left hand side of the screen, 
will show you the points you earn. 
x) Vote to end the current period, by ticking the box in front of “Vote to end current 
period”, followed by clicking the red “Vote” button at the bottom right hand side of the 
screen. If all the participants vote to end the current period, the period will end before 
its default duration, i.e., 120 seconds. However, the period cannot end during the first 
90 seconds, even if all participants have voted to end the period. If a period ends before 
its default duration, i.e., 120 seconds, at the moment of ending, the current period’s 
provisional outcome becomes final. 
When the current period ends you have 10 seconds to review the activity screen. 
However, no participant can submit or cancel a proposal. You can still use the calculator 
to learn how many points you will earn from the ECUs you CONSUMED in the current 
period. 
 
Please note that you will not see an activity screen for the last period. In the last period 
your CONSUMPTION will simply be equal to your NET INCOME, as explained above.  
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Your net income in the current 
period. 
 Your previous period’s 
borrowing, lending, and 
consumption; previous 
period’s market interest 
factor. 
The list of proposals you made in the 
current period. (The most recent 
borrowing/lending proposals you 
submitted appear in blue.) 
You can submit a borrowing/lending proposal 
by entering an ‘’Interest factor’’ and 
‘’Amount’’, and press the corresponding 
button ‘‘Borrowing Proposal’’ or ‘’Lending 
Proposal’’. 
Current period’s 
historical list of 
provisional pairs of 
the market interest 
factor and the market 
amount 
borrowed/lent. 
(Most recent 
provisional outcome 
Calculator 
Your provisional consumption 
in the current period given the 
provisional amounts lent and 
borrowed.   
Current period’s historical list of borrowing/lending proposals of all 
participants, provisional outcomes (i.e. whether they will be fulfilled, 
unfulfilled or partially fulfilled) and provisional amounts (lent and 
borrowed). (Your proposal(s) in blue) 
To cancel a borrowing/lending proposal: Click the proposal 
you want to cancel, and then click the ‘‘Cancel your 
Borrowing proposal/Cancel your Lending proposal’’ button 
below. 
When you cancel a proposal it disappears from the 
borrowing/lending queue. 
By entering the amount of ECUs 
you want to consume in the 
current period and clicking 
“calculate” you can find out the 
number of POINTS you will earn 
in the current period. 
Current period ends early 
only if all the participants 
vote to leave. 
Figure 1 
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THE FEEDBACK SCREEN 
In each period after the activity screen you will see the feedback screen (an example of which 
appears in Figure 2) for 25 seconds. A countdown clock is displayed at the top right hand side of 
the screen. 
The left hand side of this screen displays from top to bottom, your endowment, tax, and the 
market interest factor for the current period; your borrowing/lending outcome (the amount of 
ECUs you lent, the amount of ECUs you will be repaid next period, the amount of ECUs you 
borrowed, the amount of ECUs you will repay next period), your consumption (in ECUs) and the 
POINTS you earned in the period just ended, and your cumulative POINTS (i.e. the POINTS you 
have earned up to and including the period just ended).  
The top part of the right hand side of the screen displays your consumption and net repayment 
for all the periods up to the period just ended.  
The bottom part of the right hand side of the screen displays the endowment and tax table for 
the remaining periods. 
When the 25 seconds end, you move to the next period automatically, and you will see the new 
period’s activity screen (like the one in Figure 1).  
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APPENDIX: FINDING THE CURRENT PERIOD’S PROVISIONAL MARKET OUTCOME  
We now explain in more detail how the CURRENT PERIOD’S PROVISIONAL MARKET OUTCOME 
is determined, i.e., how the market interest factor and the market amount borrowed/lent are 
determined. 
After any participant submits a new proposal or cancels an existing proposal, a new provisional 
outcome is determined, as follows: 
A) All participants’ active borrowing proposals (which appear in the “ALL PARTICIPANTS’ 
BORROWING PROPOSALS” box) are ordered according to the interest factor, with the largest 
number at the top and the smallest number at the bottom. 
B) All participants’ active lending proposals (which appear in the “ALL PARTICIPANTS’ LENDING 
PROPOSALS” box) are ordered according to the interest factor, with the smallest number at the 
top and the largest number at the bottom. 
Your outcome (amounts you loaned, borrowed, you will 
repay, you will be repaid, your consumption, points 
earned) and the market interest factor for the period just 
ended. The cumulative points you have earned so far. 
Your endowment and tax in all 
future periods. 
Your previous periods’ consumption amounts 
and net repayments to be received in the 
following period. 
Figure 2 
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C) The computer searches for the particular interest factor (X) such that the sum of the amounts 
of the borrowing proposals with interest factors greater than or equal to this particular interest 
factor (X) is equal to the sum of the amounts of the lending proposals with interest factors 
smaller than or equal to this particular interest factor (X). We call this particular interest factor 
(X), the Market Interest Factor, at which all borrowing and lending outcomes in the market take 
place. Below we provide some concrete examples. 
If the Market Interest Factor is below your borrowing proposal interest factor, then your order 
will be fulfilled at the Market Interest Factor. If the Market Interest Factor is above your lending 
proposal interest factor, then your order will be fulfilled at the Market Interest Factor. 
(It is also possible that several values work as the Market Interest Factor. In that case, the Market 
Interest Factor is defined as the average of the largest and smallest of these values. Example 3 
below illustrates this possibility.) 
Note that if the interest factors of all the borrowing proposals are smaller than all the interest 
factors of all the lending proposals, then there does not exist a market interest factor. In this 
instance, the “Market Interest Factor Column” will display two interest factors side by side: the 
largest of the interest factors among all the borrowing proposals preceded by the letter B; the 
smallest of the interest factors among all the lending proposals preceded by the letter L. For 
example, B0.99/L1.08 as in the activity screen above. 
It is also possible that no value works as the Market Interest Factor to fulfil all borrowing 
proposals with equal or smaller interest factors and all lending proposals with equal or larger 
interest factors, but that there are borrowing proposals with interest factors larger than the 
interest factors of some lending proposals. In this case, we define a Market Interest Factor at 
which some orders are partially fulfilled. Specifically, the Market Interest Factor is defined as 
the particular value (Y) such that the difference between the sum of the amounts of the 
borrowing proposals with interest factors greater than or equal to this particular value (Y) and 
the sum of the amounts of the lending proposals with interest factors smaller than or equal to 
this particular value (Y) is as small as possible. In this case some proposals will be fulfilled, while 
others will be part-fulfilled. Example 4 below illustrates this possibility. 
D) Borrowing proposals with an interest factor greater than the market interest factor are 
fulfilled; Lending proposals with an interest factor smaller than the market interest factor are 
fulfilled;  Borrowing proposals with an interest factor smaller than the market interest factor are 
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unfulfilled; Lending proposals with an interest factor greater than the market interest factor are 
unfulfilled; Borrowing and lending proposals with an interest factor equal to the market interest 
factor are either fulfilled or part-fulfilled, as explained  in the examples below. 
The provisional market outcome at the end of the period becomes the actual outcome of that 
period, which determines your outcome (mainly your borrowing and lending and your 
consumption) in that period.   
 
 
 
EXAMPLES: Determining the Market Interest Factor and Market Amount Borrowed/Lent: 
Example 1: Illustration when the Market Interest Factor does not exist. Suppose the borrowing 
and lending proposals are as follows: 
Borrowing proposals Lending proposals 
Interest factor: 1.09; Amount: 12  Interest factor: 1.11; Amount: 20 
Interest factor: 0.69; Amount:   8 Interest factor: 1.51; Amount: 12 
 
In this example, there is no Market Interest Factor (which we called X) because the interest 
factor of the borrowing proposal with the largest interest factor is smaller than the interest 
factor of the lending proposal with the lowest interest factor. All proposals are unfulfilled. 
 
Example 2: Illustration of Fulfilled and Unfulfilled proposals. Suppose the borrowing and lending 
proposals are as follows: 
Borrowing proposals Lending proposals 
Interest factor: 1.29; Amount: 12  Interest factor: 1.17; Amount: 20 
Interest factor: 1.17; Amount:   8 Interest factor: 1.31; Amount: 12 
Interest factor: 1.01; Amount: 10 Interest factor: 1.44; Amount:   8 
Interest factor: 0.87; Amount: 20 Interest factor: 1.55; Amount: 22 
In this example, 1.17 is the Market Interest Factor (which we called X). In particular, for X=1.17, 
the sum of the amounts of the borrowing proposals with interest factors greater than or equal 
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to 1.17 (the borrowing proposal of 12 in the first row plus the borrowing proposal of 8 in the 
second row) is equal to the sum of the amounts of the lending proposals with interest factors 
smaller than or equal to 1.17 (the lending proposal of 20 in the first row). These proposals are 
fulfilled. The other proposals are left unfulfilled. 
The participant who submitted the borrowing proposal in the first row will repay 12x1.17=14.04 
next period. The participant who submitted the borrowing proposal in the second row will repay 
8x1.17=9.36 next period. The participant who submitted the lending proposal in the first row 
will be repaid 20x1.17=23.40 next period. 
 
Example 3: Illustration of the Market Interest Factor when several values work as the Market 
Interest Factor. Suppose the borrowing and lending proposals are as follows: 
Borrowing proposals Lending proposals  
Interest factor: 1.19; Amount: 12  Interest factor: 0.80; Amount: 20 
Interest factor: 0.99; Amount: 18 Interest factor: 0.95; Amount: 10 
Interest factor: 0.85; Amount: 10 Interest factor: 1.08; Amount:   8 
Interest factor: 0.60; Amount: 20 Interest factor: 1.23; Amount: 22 
 
In this example, any number from 0.95 to 0.99 may qualify as the Market Interest Factor (which 
we called X). In particular, for X from 0.95 to 0.99, the sum of the amounts of the borrowing 
proposals with interest factors greater than or equal to X (the borrowing proposal of 12 in the 
first row plus the borrowing proposal of 18 in the second row) is equal to the sum of the amounts 
of the lending proposals with interest factors smaller than or equal to X (the lending proposal of 
20 in the first row plus the lending proposal of 10 in the second row). In this case, we select the 
average of 0.95 and 0.99, i.e. 0.97 as the Market Interest Factor.  The lending and borrowing 
proposals in the first and second rows are fulfilled. The remaining borrowing and lending 
proposals will be unfulfilled. 
The participant who submitted the borrowing proposal in the first row will repay 12x0.97=11.64 
next period. The participant who submitted the borrowing proposal in the second row will repay 
18x0.97=17.46 next period. The participant who submitted the lending proposal in the first row 
will be repaid 20x0.97=19.40 next period. The participant who submitted the lending proposal 
in the second row will be repaid 10x0.97=9.70 next period. 
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Example 4: Illustration of Part-fulfilled proposals. Suppose the borrowing and lending proposals 
are as follows: 
Borrowing proposals Lending proposals 
Interest factor: 1.02; Amount: 12  Interest factor: 1.00; Amount: 20 
Interest factor: 1.00; Amount: 10 Interest factor: 1.01; Amount: 12 
Interest factor: 0.98; Amount: 10 Interest factor: 1.02; Amount:   8 
Interest factor: 0.96; Amount: 20 Interest factor: 1.03; Amount: 22 
 
In this example, 1.00 is the Market Interest Factor (which we called X). In particular, X=1.00, 
makes the difference between the sum of the amounts of the borrowing proposals with interest 
factors greater than or equal to X (for X=1.00 this sum is equal to 22, 12 plus 10 from the 
borrowing proposals in the first and second rows, respectively) and the sum of the amounts of 
the lending proposals with interest factors smaller than or equal to X (for X=1.00 this sum is 
equal to 20 from the lending proposal in the first row) as small as possible (for X=1.00, this 
difference is 22-20=2), (You can check that any value different from X=1.00 leads to a larger 
difference than 2). In this case, the lending and borrowing proposals in the first row are fulfilled. 
However, the borrowing proposal in the second row is part-fulfilled, because the amount of the 
lending proposal in the first row that remains after fulfilling the borrowing proposal in the first 
row, (i.e., 8 = 20 - 12) is smaller than the amount of the borrowing proposal in the second row 
(i.e. 10). All the other borrowing proposals and lending proposals will be unfulfilled. 
The participant who submitted the borrowing proposal in the first row will repay 12x1.00=12 
next period. The participant who submitted the borrowing proposal in the second row will repay 
8x1.00=8 next period. The participant who submitted the lending proposal in the first row will 
be repaid 20x1.00=20 next period. 
Note: When the interest factor of different borrowing proposals or of different lending proposals 
is the same, the proposals entered first will be fulfilled. This might result in some proposals with 
the same interest factor being fulfilled, while others are part-fulfilled or unfulfilled. 
Please be sure you understand all above. Raise your hand if you would like further explanation. 
Otherwise, if you feel that you understand with how to play the experiment, please wait until 
the other participants have finished reading these instructions. After everyone in the room has 
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read the instructions, we will proceed to the understanding test, in which you will be asked 
several questions about some decision situation. These decision situations will be different from 
the one described above. 
 
 
Consumption POINTS 
Additional 
POINTS 
 Consumption POINTS 
Additional 
POINTS 
 Consumption POINTS 
Additional 
POINTS 
 
Consumption POINTS 
Additional 
POINTS 
 Consumption POINTS 
Additional 
POINTS 
 Consumption POINTS 
Additional 
POINTS 
0 0.00    36 224.47 3.97  71 317.40 1.71 
 
106 357.52 0.74  141 374.84 0.32  176 382.32 0.14 
1 9.20 9.20  37 228.35 3.88  72 319.08 1.67 
 
107 358.24 0.72  142 375.15 0.31  177 382.45 0.13 
2 18.18 8.98  38 232.13 3.79  73 320.71 1.63 
 
108 358.95 0.71  143 375.46 0.30  178 382.59 0.13 
3 26.95 8.77  39 235.83 3.70  74 322.31 1.60 
 
109 359.64 0.69  144 375.76 0.30  179 382.71 0.13 
4 35.52 8.56  40 239.44 3.61  75 323.86 1.56 
 
110 360.31 0.67  145 376.05 0.29  180 382.84 0.13 
5 43.87 8.36  41 242.96 3.52  76 325.38 1.52 
 
111 360.97 0.66  146 376.33 0.28  181 382.96 0.12 
6 52.04 8.16  42 246.40 3.44  77 326.87 1.48 
 
112 361.61 0.64  147 376.61 0.28  182 383.08 0.12 
7 60.00 7.97  43 249.76 3.36  78 328.32 1.45 
 
113 362.24 0.63  148 376.88 0.27  183 383.20 0.12 
8 67.78 7.78  44 253.04 3.28  79 329.73 1.42 
 
114 362.85 0.61  149 377.14 0.26  184 383.31 0.11 
9 75.37 7.59  45 256.24 3.20  80 331.12 1.38 
 
115 363.44 0.60  150 377.40 0.26  185 383.42 0.11 
10 82.79 7.41  46 259.36 3.12  81 332.47 1.35 
 
116 364.03 0.58  151 377.65 0.25  186 383.53 0.11 
11 90.03 7.24  47 262.41 3.05  82 333.78 1.32 
 
117 364.59 0.57  152 377.90 0.25  187 383.64 0.11 
12 97.09 7.07  48 265.39 2.98  83 335.07 1.29 
 
118 365.15 0.56  153 378.13 0.24  188 383.74 0.10 
13 103.99 6.90  49 268.30 2.91  84 336.32 1.26 
 
119 365.69 0.54  154 378.37 0.23  189 383.84 0.10 
14 110.73 6.74  50 271.14 2.84  85 337.55 1.23 
 
120 366.22 0.53  155 378.60 0.23  190 383.94 0.10 
15 117.30 6.58  51 273.91 2.77  86 338.75 1.20 
 
121 366.74 0.52  156 378.82 0.22  191 384.04 0.10 
16 123.72 6.42  52 276.61 2.71  87 339.91 1.17 
 
122 367.24 0.50  157 379.04 0.22  192 384.13 0.09 
17 129.99 6.27  53 279.26 2.64  88 341.05 1.14 
 
123 367.73 0.49  158 379.25 0.21  193 384.22 0.09 
18 136.11 6.12  54 281.83 2.58  89 342.17 1.11 
 
124 368.21 0.48  159 379.46 0.21  194 384.31 0.09 
19 142.08 5.97  55 284.35 2.52  90 343.25 1.09 
 
125 368.68 0.47  160 379.66 0.20  195 384.40 0.09 
20 147.91 5.83  56 286.81 2.46  91 344.31 1.06 
 
126 369.14 0.46  161 379.86 0.20  196 384.49 0.09 
21 153.61 5.69  57 289.21 2.40  92 345.35 1.04 
 
127 369.59 0.45  162 380.05 0.19  197 384.57 0.08 
22 159.16 5.56  58 291.55 2.34  93 346.36 1.01 
 
128 370.02 0.44  163 380.24 0.19  198 384.65 0.08 
23 164.59 5.43  59 293.84 2.29  94 347.35 0.99 
 
129 370.45 0.43  164 380.42 0.18  199 384.73 0.08 
24 169.89 5.30  60 296.07 2.23  95 348.31 0.96 
 
130 370.87 0.42  165 380.60 0.18  200 384.81 0.08 
25 175.06 5.17  61 298.25 2.18  96 349.25 0.94 
 
131 371.27 0.41  166 380.78 0.18  201 384.88 0.08 
26 180.11 5.05  62 300.38 2.13  97 350.17 0.92 
 
132 371.67 0.40  167 380.95 0.17  202 384.96 0.07 
27 185.04 4.93  63 302.46 2.08  98 351.07 0.90 
 
133 372.06 0.39  168 381.12 0.17  203 385.03 0.07 
28 189.85 4.81  64 304.49 2.03  99 351.95 0.88 
 
134 372.44 0.38  169 381.28 0.16  204 385.10 0.07 
29 194.55 4.70  65 306.47 1.98  100 352.80 0.85 
 
135 372.80 0.37  170 381.44 0.16  205 385.17 0.07 
30 199.14 4.59  66 308.40 1.93  101 353.64 0.83 
 
136 373.16 0.36  171 381.60 0.16  206 385.24 0.07 
31 203.62 4.48  67 310.29 1.89  102 354.45 0.81 
 
137 373.52 0.35  172 381.75 0.15  207 385.30 0.07 
32 207.99 4.37  68 312.13 1.84  103 355.25 0.80 
 
138 373.86 0.34  173 381.90 0.15  208 385.36 0.06 
33 212.26 4.27  69 313.93 1.80  104 356.02 0.78 
 
139 374.20 0.34  174 382.04 0.14  209 385.43 0.06 
34 216.43 4.17  70 315.69 1.76  105 356.78 0.76 
 
140 374.52 0.33  175 382.18 0.14  210 385.49 0.06 
35 220.50 4.07         
 
    
   
 
   
 
Notes: i) The more ECUs you CONSUME in a period the more POINTS you earn that period (see middle column); ii) The number of ADDITIONAL 
POINTS that you earn in a period when you increase the ECUs CONSUMED by ONE ECU decreases as the amount of ECUs you CONSUME that 
period increases (see right column). 
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